

Dark Intelligence

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1. Dark Intelligence

Artificial intelligence (AI), regardless the iteration, current or envisaged, and including generative and proposed general formulations, is essentially a statistical machine. Its core operations are probabilistic *and* stochastic. They are prefigured by the thinking of C.E. Shannon¹ and consist chiefly of encoded networks of statistical tests, methods, and techniques. The only likeness of AI to human intelligence is a schematical (diagrammatic, symbolic) comparability to reasoning rendered as rationality (root: ratio), calculation, or logic. All other associations with the phenomenon of intelligence – indeed, with all forms of human interpreting (*Auslegung*), including understanding, thinking, knowing, experiencing, and saying (*Sagen*) – are spurious. They presuppose an understanding of human intelligence that disregards (abandons, forgets, overlooks) its ownmost (*Wesen*), the originary (*ursprünglich*) human potentiality (*Möglichkeit*) that affords its possibility, its essential enabling-steering power. The understanding of intelligence intimated by common interpretations of AI, including the proposition to produce artificial general intelligence (AGI) or its hypothesized advanced iteration, digital superintelligence (DSI), and which, as supposed, mean “AI that can do everything that *any* human can do, but to a superior level,”² commonly overlooks the factual (*faktisch*) allowance of intelligence by the “pre-thematic” (“pre-ontological”) comprehension of being (“*vorontologischen Seinsverständnisses*”) that distinguishes human being (sets it apart among beings) as *Dasein* – the being (*Sein*) of the t/here (*Da*) – and essentially sways through all interpreting.³ They suggest a forgottenness, perhaps even

¹ Claude E. Shannon, “A Mathematical Theory of Communication,” *The Bell System Technical Journal* 27, no. 3, (1948). For more insights concerning the statistical foundations of AI, see: Edwin T. Jaynes, “Information Theory and Statistical Mechanics,” *Physical Review* 106, no. 4, (1957) and “Information Theory and Statistical Mechanics. II,” *Physical Review* 108, no. 2 (1957).

² Zoë Corbin, “AI Scientist Ray Kurzweil: ‘We Are Going to Expand Intelligence a Million Fold by 2045,’” *The Guardian* (2024), <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/article/2024/jun/29/ray-kurzweil-google-ai-the-singularity-is-nearer>; Sam Altman, “The Gentle Singularity,” *Sam Altman*, 11 June (2025), <https://blog.samaltman.com/the-gentle-singularity>; Ben Goertzel, “Artificial General Intelligence: Concept, State of the Art, and Future Prospects,” *Journal of Artificial General Intelligence* 5, no. 1 (2014).

³ Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (1927), GA 2, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977) (hereafter SZ and GA 2), 20; *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New

abandonment, of *Dasein*'s ontological prerogative: the preconceptual understanding of "is" that commissions its coming-to-pass (*geschehen*) as the being and, hence, meaning of the things it intends, including the being and meaning of the phenomena brought to light by intelligence.⁴

The ontological blackout distinguishing common interpretations of AI – the tendency of the everyday understanding of AI to disregard or forget the ownmost of human intelligence, the comprehension of "is" and a constitutive moment (*existential*) of human being, and allot the possibility to machines – is not overturned by the "artificial" modifier. *It is amplified by it.* The adjective, "artificial," belies the technology. It engenders prejudices that occlude AI's ontological status as a mere entity, a thing and nothing more, distinguished by its ontological ineligibility. "Artificial intelligence" denotes intelligence, more precisely, human intelligence, that is manufactured, fabricated, or invented, hence, simulated or replicated. It implies (projects) the prospect of building machines with capacities likened to human thinking, understanding, saying, and being. It presuppositionally assigns the potentiality to comprehend being to instruments (*Zeug*) while overlooking the essential sway of the existential in (human) *Dasein*. This article proposes replacing the "artificial intelligence" sobriquet with "*dark intelligence*" to mitigate those biases and clarify the way AI is thought. It contends the new moniker would illumine AI's ontological status – namely, *no ontology* – incite a confrontation with the challenges implicit to thinking its reputed prospects, and prompt an awakening to the essential (*wesentlich*) meaning of human intelligence.

2. Intelligence and *Dasein*

The preceding remarks do not suggest a "negative evaluation." The disregard of the comprehension of being is commensurate with the "forgottenness of being" ("*Seinsvergessenheit*"),⁵

York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1962) (hereafter MR-tr.), 35; William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 4th ed. with a new preface by the author (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), 53.

⁴ Thought through the fundamental ontology of *SZ* – as well as Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1927/1928), GA 3, ed. F.-W. von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991) (hereafter GA 3); *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962) (hereafter JC-tr.) – and as Emmanuel Levinas underscores in his reading of *SZ*, being (*Sein*), or, more precisely, the being of the t/here, and the comprehension of being (*Seinsverständnis*) are "inseparable," *Totalité et infini: essai sur l'extériorité* (Paris: Librairie Générale Française, 1990), 36; *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hauge: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), 45. They are most own (*eigenste*) to each other.

⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (1935), GA 40, ed. Petra Jaeger (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983) (hereafter GA 40); *Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Mannheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959) (hereafter RM-tr.). For the translation of "*Seinsvergessenheit*" as "forgottenness of being," versus, for example,

which is the seal of “everydayness” (*Alltäglichkeit*) and the “average” (*durchschnittliche*) way *Dasein* (human being as such) encounters its “to be.”⁶ The understanding of human intelligence spoken by common interpretations of AI coincides with *Dasein*’s everyday mode (*Modus*) of being (and interpreting) that prescinds the self-showing of itself as it is directly and openly endured: the being of the t/here (transcendence) and a World (*Welt*) that comes-to-pass (*geschieht*); rendered hermeneutical-phenomenologically, “*Dasein*,” “transcendence,” and “World” are largely synonymous. It denotes the ontological blackout commensurate with *Dasein*’s practical (πρακτικός) comportment with the World and thrown (*gerworfen*) “circumspective absorption” (*besorgenden Aufgehens*) in things.⁷ The understanding of intelligence articulated by the way AI is commonly thought is indicative of *Dasein*’s obliviousness to being and the “very prerogative that constitutes its uniqueness.”⁸ It is correlated to *Dasein*’s everyday way of to be.

The pre-Socratic (prephilosophical) saying of human intelligence, its articulation as νοῦς (contemporary rendition: νοημοσύνη) – interpreted here as a situation that comprehends itself (i.e., an event or happening (φαινόμενον, World) that is distinguished by its comprehending power), hence, its hermeneutical connection to οὐσία (presence) – connotes its originary relation to the being of *Dasein* and comprehension of “to be.” So do its etymological kin, νοεῖν, νόησις, and νόημα, and Latin cognate, *intelligentia*, which, as to gather (*legere*) meaning summoned into “the Open” (*das Offene*)⁹ by beings in the whole (*inter*) (*das Seiende im Ganzen*), points to the unicity of human intelligence with “ἐν πάντα εἶναι”¹⁰ (“one-all-is”) and λέγειν (the source language saying of *legere*). The primordial words in νοῦς’s etymological orbit say the reference more explicitly. They express more

“forgetfulness of being,” RM-tr., vii, see Frank Schalow, “Introduction,” in *Heidegger, Translation, and the Task of Thinking: Essays in Honor of Parvis Emad*, ed., Frank Schalow (New York: Springer, 2011), 30–31.

⁶ GA 2, 58, 194, 233; MR-tr., 69, 186, 220. Translation of “*besorgenden Aufgehens*” modified.

⁷ GA 2, 6–77, 90–91, 95–96, 172–173, 222; MR-tr., 83–84, 95–96, 101, 167, 210.

⁸ Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 70.

⁹ Martin Heidegger, *Holzwege*, GA 5, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977) (hereafter GA 5), 46–47; “The Origins of the Work of Art,” trans. A. Hofstadter, in *Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to the Task of Thinking (1964)*, ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1993), 184; *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (1936–1954), GA 7, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000) (hereafter GA 7); “The Question Concerning Technology,” trans. W. Lovitt, in *Basic Writings*; Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 310–311, 317; GA 2, 38; MR-tr., 51. See Richardson, 214–215, and based on his reading of GA 5 and Martin Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit: zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet* (1927/1928), ed. Hermann Mörchén (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1988) (hereafter GA 34), for his translation of “*das Offene*” as “the Open” and its distinction, as he clarifies it, from “*das Offenbare*,” or “the manifest.”

¹⁰ Kenneth Maly, “The Transformation of ‘Logic’ in Heraclitus,” in *Heidegger on Heraclitus: A New Reading*, ed. Kenneth Maly and Parvis Emad (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986); Joaquin Trujillo, “Λόγος and Everydayness (*Alltäglichkeit*),” *eudia* 18 (2024), 8.

clearly the (inceptual) “moved-ness” (“ἀρχὴ κινήσεως”) of being – indivisibly inclusive of the understanding of “is” – as gathering in the sense of rendering-comprehending, as λόγος.¹¹ They also carry a more direct connotation of light: φῶς. The ancient lexicon includes φαίνω, φαινόμενον, ἀπόφανσις, ἀπόφασις, φήμη, λέγειν, λόγος, φύσις (root: φύω), ἀλήθεια, εἶναι, and ἐόν. It also includes τέχνη and ποίησις, as well as ἐντελέχεια (“ἐν-τέλει-ἔχει”),¹² their provisional (always incomplete or underway) terminus. Τέχνη and ποίησις, read hermeneutic-phenomenologically, and pre-Socratically, convey the essential meaning of human intelligence, which is: the originary power of *Dasein* to heed resolutely (*entschlossen*) the summons of being (thought also, pre-Socratically, as ἀλήθεια and φύσις)¹³ to gather the culmination (τέλος) of phenomena from its shelteredness-concealedness (*Verborgenheit*) into unconcealedness (*Unverborgenheit*), i.e. the Open (*das Offene*). Τέχνη and ποίησις – specific expressions (enactments) of λόγος thought as λέγειν – render within the light of “articulable understandability” (“*artikulierbarn Verständlichkeit*”) the full, although always incomplete, meaning of phenomena from its obscurity or hiddenness.¹⁴ Both are coextensive with language (*Sprache*): the power to manifest the being (and meaning) of phenomena through words (i.e., *Dasein*’s innate disclosing-saying power, and not simply communication), hence, their uniqueness to human being, as opposed to, for example, the intelligence of animals or imputed to machines. They also coincide with εὐφυΐα: the factual potentiality of *Dasein* to discern the jointedness (ἁρμονία) of phenomena commensurate with their truth (ἀλήθεια) or self-manifestation (φύσις).

Although equal originary (*gleichursprünglich*) to each other, τέχνη comes closer to the essential meaning of human intelligence than ποίησις does. The difference between the two corresponds to the measure of their practicality and their way of moved-ness. The summoning power of τέχνη is also spoken by a phenomenon’s concrete situation. It is correlated more meaningfully to πρᾶγμα, or the pragmatic dimensions of transcendence (human existence, κατάστασις, also *Dasein*), than ποίησις is. In accord with that relation, it sways more as bringing-forth-from-hiddenness phenomena whose unconcealedness is more or less situationally beckoned or anticipated. Ποίησις comes closer to the essential meaning of thinking as such than it does to intelligence. The call of its correlate is

¹¹ Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 310.

¹² *Ibid.*, 310-311, 317.

¹³ Maly, “The Transformation of ‘Logic’ in Heraclitus.”

¹⁴ See Trujillo, “Λόγος and Everydayness (*Alltäglichkeit*),” 12-13, for the exposition of the being of *Dasein* as the “articulable understandability (*artikulierbaren Verständlichkeit*) of the *Da*.”

more isolated, more muted, and less intimated by everyday life. Correspondingly, it sways more as letting-come-forth-from-hiddenness than it does as bringing-forth. The “light” (“φῶς”) connoted by τέχνη and ποίησις, indeed, all the Greek primordial words noted above beginning with νοῦς, as well as the Latin *intelligentia* when thought through its source-language meaning, is not electromagnetism. It is the illuminating-comprehending affiliated with being discerned as unconcealing (*Entbergung*), disclosing (*Erschließen*), and clearing (*Lichtung*). The hermeneutic-phenomenological exposition of human intelligence reveals its entanglement with being discerned as the lighting-up (*Leuchten*) that gathers beings forth from their shelteredness-concealedness into the Open and makes their meaning visible.

3. Dark intelligence

Contemporary AI, regardless the iteration, including generative technologies (e.g., ChatGPT, Grok, Gemini), is an instrument. It is a tool, a mere entity, like a calculator, coffeemaker, or hammer, and nothing more notwithstanding its statistical and algorithmic sophistication. Its ontological status (no ontology) precludes the possibility of being, transcendence, and, hence, the comprehension of “to be.” Although it contains a discovery function, the operation is radically disparate from the gathering from concealedness synonymous with being, τέχνη, or ποίησις. It is also entirely dissimilar from the source language meaning of *intelligentia*: ἐν πάντα εἶναι and λέγειν. Contemporary AI possesses nothing akin to the essential meaning of human intelligence. Indeed, like a shoe, wrench, or automobile, including self-driving ones, it does not possess anything. It is a mere thing encoded to execute operations. The only intelligence affiliated with current AI is the intelligence of systems reduced to their constituent information processes.¹⁵ All other correspondences are specious. They are delusional. They result from spontaneous affirmations of the technology’s consequents (i.e., invalid reference, *affirmatio consequentis*), such as problem solving, mitigations of complexity and ambiguity, analyses of covariance, and executions of routine tasks, all automated. Affiliations of current AI with human intelligence speak to the shortages inherent to human interpreting generally including the thrown forgottenness of “to be.”

¹⁵ Joaquin Trujillo, “The Intelligence of Machines,” *Filosofija. Sociologija* 32, no. 1 (2021), 89-90; “Thinking Machine (Artificial) Intelligence,” *Existencia* 28 (2018), 147-148.

AGI (or DSI) is propounded. It is surmised, despite broad confidence among many AI experts, researchers, and entrepreneurs in its achievement over the next decades.¹⁶ Whatever “intelligence” might be affiliated with AGI has been undetermined, which is one of the reasons it is called a “singularity” insofar as “we don’t know what’s going to happen.”¹⁷ That hypothesized moment is not an impossibility whatever its improbability, however. The emergent properties of stochastic systems modeled by AI are consistent with the “emergence of order from disorder” (i.e. local decrease in entropy) permitted by the Second Law of Thermodynamics ($dS/dt \geq 0$).¹⁸ The proposed “singularity” may be likened to a Boltzmann Brain (BB), so to speak, or a “hypothetical chance fluctuation” that effects a “conscious observer in the late universe”¹⁹ (i.e., a “random fluctuation from a high-entropy state”) allowed by the Second Law’s statistical formulation ($S = k \log W$).²⁰ “AI Man” R.H. Dave also proffers the possibility of AI BBs, and provokes a confrontation with the matter by posing the question: “*What counts as ‘real’ consciousness?*”²¹

In all likelihood AGI’s technological basis, as Marcus and Davis suggest, will comprise new, perhaps, “hybrid,” formulations of current AI systems.²² The architecture, as postulated, implies the same ontological constraints pertaining to contemporary AI regardless the breadth and complexity of its stochastic processes or any “singularity” that may emerge from them. It does not necessarily preclude the production of an independent, and not simply automated, discovery process, one

¹⁶ Cem Dilmegani and Sila Ermut, “When Will AGI/Singularity Happen? 8,590 Predictions Analyzed,” *AI Multiple*, 7 October (2025), <https://research.aimultiple.com/artificial-general-intelligence-singularity-timing/>.

¹⁷ Elon Musk, *Lex Fridman*, podcast, “Elon Musk: Neuralink, AI, Autopilot, and the Pale Blue Dot: Lex Fridman Podcast #49,” 36:09, 2019, <https://youtu.be/smK9dgdTl40>; *Y Combinator*, podcast, “Elon Musk: Digital Superintelligence, Multiplanetary Life, How to Be Useful,” 49:40, 2025, <https://youtu.be/cFlltaiGkiE>.

¹⁸ Although “the emergence of order from disorder in Nature, also called *self-organization* of matter, may appear to contradict the Second Law with its general trend toward disorder and chaos,” the “fundamental phenomenological equation [$dS/dt \geq 0$] allows entropy to decrease *locally*,” H. Dieter Zeh, *The Physical Basis of the Direction of Time*, 5th ed. (Berlin: Springer, 2007), 77.

¹⁹ Scott Aaronson, “Could a Quantum Computer Have Subjective Experience?,” *Shtetl-Optimized*, 25 August (2014), <https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=1951>.

²⁰ “The BB problem arises if our universe (1) lasts forever (or at least an extraordinarily long time...), and (2) undergoes random fluctuations that could potentially create conscious observers. If the rate of fluctuations times the lifetime of the universe is sufficiently large, we would expect a ‘typical’ observer to be such a fluctuation, rather than one of the ordinary observers (OOs) that arise through traditional thermodynamic evolution in the wake of a low-entropy Big Bang,” Sean Carroll, “Why Boltzmann’s Brain Are Bad,” *arXiv:1702.00850 [hep-th]* (2017), <https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1702.00850>, 2-3.

²¹ Raajeev H Dave, “Are You Real? The Strange Physics of Boltzmann Brains and AI Minds,” *Raajeev H Dave (AI Man)*, 10 August (2025), <https://rajeevkdave.medium.com/are-you-real-the-strange-physics-of-boltzmann-brains-and-ai-minds-913769a5f258>.

²² Gary Marcus, “The Next Decade of AI: Four Steps Towards Robust Intelligence,” *arXiv:2002.06177v3 [cs.AI]* (2020); Gary Marcus and Ernest Davis, “Insights for AI from the Human Mind,” *Communications of the ACM* 64, no. 1 (2021).

thought solely as an information system, that contains operations isomorphically akin to volition and interpreting. If such a process, or something like it, is indeed effected, given its ontological ineligibility, perhaps it would not be one of “light” rendered hermeneutic-phenomenologically as being and the ownmost of human intelligence, but of *darkness*. This darkness, as surmised, would not be the darkness denoted by λήθη or σκοτός, by nothingness or obscurity, which factually belong to *Dasein* (the human “to be”) and equal originarily say being, the comprehension of being, and transcendence, but by the elementary μηδέν, or nothing. In accord with the phenomenological principles, “no being, then nothing” and “no comprehension of being, then no meaning,” whatever “intelligence” might be available to AGI may be one of utter meaninglessness. It would thus, aside from engineered effects, be unequivocally dissimilar from human intelligence thought as τέχνη or ποίησις. It would also be nothing akin to the ownmost of human experiencing, understanding, thinking, saying, or, and as denoted by the hermeneutical-phenomenological axiom, “*machines do not exist*,”²³ transcendence.

So does where this leave us? Words matter, and the analysis (ἀνάλυσις) of human intelligence – the deconstruction of the phenomenon into its constitutive phenomenological moments – illumines inconsistencies in the “artificial intelligence” sobriquet that belie the technology. The question of nomenclature becomes more pronounced against the endeavor to produce AGI. The “intelligence” moniker, like the words, “being,” “experiencing,” “understanding,” “thinking,” and “language,” is radically inappropriate to the AI project regardless its current or proposed formulation. The cybernetic thesis equating the intelligence of machines to the incorporation of the basic elements of a system – redundancies, variance, parameters, and equifinalities – and the degree of a machine’s “intelligence” to the range of its encoded equifinalities and programmed capacity to arrive at them autonomously is empirically consistent with the technology,²⁴ but lacks market, cultural, and scientific appeal. The same goes for “statistical machine,” which also is short on meaning and obscures whatever prospects might be affiliated with the technology, particularly when surmised with regard to the emergent properties of stochastic systems. On its surface, “digital intelligence,” a term frequently used by Elon Musk, appears more fitting to the epistemics of AI insofar as it frames the technology informationally or computationally.²⁵ The thinking often affiliated with the

²³ Trujillo, “The Intelligence of Machines,” 89; “Thinking Machine (Artificial) Intelligence,” 137.

²⁴ “The Intelligence of Machines,” 89-90; “Thinking Machine (Artificial) Intelligence,” 147-148.

²⁵ *Y Combinator*.

appellation, however, as evinced by the general receptiveness to Musk's sureness in the creation of DSI, which he defines as AI that is "smarter than any human at anything," belief that DSI "will discover new physics" and "invent new technologies," and confidence that, "at some point, the collective sum of human intelligence will be less than one percent of all [digital] intelligence,"²⁶ implies the same interpretive shortages spoken by the "AI" sobriquet generally.

The question of nomenclature suggests two points. First, interpretations of AI appear to be preconceptually confined to defining it in human terms not only in relation to the phenomenon of human intelligence as it is preconceptually endured, as τέχνη or ποίησις, but also within the context of transcendence inclusive of the sway of the comprehension of being. In other words, conceptualizations of AI, including AGI and DSI, are ineludibly bound to – only happen within and are preconceptually circumscribed by – the thrown (factual) coming-to-pass of human being as the being of the *Da* and the pre-thematic understanding of "is." As a consequent, and this is the second point, because the understanding of intelligence appears to be confined to the preconceptual encounter with human intelligence and the comprehension of being, definitions of AI may be stuck with some iteration of an "intelligence" moniker despite its interpretive misgivings. Maybe a more epistemically appropriate name, then, given AI's ontological ineligibility – the fact that AI, regardless the iteration, contemporary or envisaged, is devoid of the possibility of being, the comprehension of being, and transcendence, all of which speak to "the lightening-clearing of being" ("*der lichtenden Lichtung des Seins*"),²⁷ but are nonetheless commonly connoted by descriptions of the technology – might be "*dark intelligence*," or, in the case of AGI and DSI, "*dark general intelligence*" and "*dark superintelligence*." The adjective, "dark," significantly more so than "artificial," or "digital," would emphatically negate its noun and perhaps help clarify the way AI is thought. More specifically, the contradiction evoked by the modifier might:

- (a) offset common presuppositions belying the technology and commensurate with a disregard of *Dasein*'s ontological prerogative: the comprehension of being;
- (b) incite a re-collection of AI's ontological ineligibility and the meaning of human intelligence;

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, "Dasein and Da-Sein in *Being and Time* and in *Contributions to Philosophy (from Enowning)*," in *Heidegger, Translation, and the Task of Thinking: Essays in Honor of Parvis Emad*, ed. Frank Schalow (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), 221.

(c) connote more explicitly the possible discoverability of a yet unenvisioned, and maybe even unforeseeable, manufactured system of discovery;

(d) prompt a reevaluation of current engineering vectors against the technology's ontological status, and;

(e) induce an attunement to the comprehension of “‘is’ (*ist*)” – a word that “speaks (*spricht*) everywhere in our language, and says (*sagt*) [speaks] of being, even where it does not come to the fore (*hervortritt*) expressly”²⁸ – and thereby reconcile reputed technological prospects with actual technological possibilities.

4. Closing remarks

The “*dark intelligence*” sobriquet invites consideration of the essential meaning of human intelligence and its ownmost sway: the comprehension of being inclusive of its indivisibility from “to be.” It also incites a confrontation with the radical limitations of understanding, thinking, and saying. The comprehension of being enowns (*ereignet*) human interpreting. It is its originary potentiality and constitutes the horizons of the to-be-thought. Understanding, thinking, and saying, as well as human intelligence, are constrained by the limitations inherent to its dynamism. The comprehension of being is the only path to understanding intelligence. Forecasts of AI invariably presuppose it. Even AI researchers, including, for example, Gary Marcus, who, like Musk, says “nobody quite knows what...AI will evolve into [in] the coming decades,” are ineluctably bound to its originary disclosing-saying power. Attempts to render intelligence mechanistically fail to countervail its sway. Witness Marcus’s subsequent assertion: “Let us call that new level *robust artificial intelligence*,” or “intelligence” that can “apply what it knows to a wide range of problems in a *systematic* and *reliable* way, synthesizing knowledge from a variety of sources such that it can reason *flexibly* and *dynamically* about the world, *transferring* what it learns in one context to another,” as expected “of an ordinary adult.”²⁹ The proposition suggests a frame of mind – one “dominated by (and subjected to) the imperatives of technicity (*Technik*)”³⁰ – that simultaneously

²⁸ Martin Heidegger, *Identität und Differenz* (1949-1963), GA 11, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006) (hereafter GA 11), 79; George Kovacs, *Thinking and Be-ing in Heidegger's Beiträge Zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (Bucharest: Zeta Books, 2015), 382. Translation by Kovacs. Slightly modified.

²⁹ Marcus, “The Next Decade of AI: Four Steps Towards Robust Intelligence,” 3.

³⁰ George Kovacs, “Heidegger’s Insight into the History of Language,” *Heidegger Studies* 29 (2013), 123.

presupposes and forgets the enownment (*Ereignung*) of intelligence by the originary human power to pre-thematically comprehend “is.”

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