

Λόγος and *Dasein*: A Fresh Reading of Heidegger's Reading of Heraclitus

Joaquin Trujillo

This article discerns the meaning of λόγος as such – of λόγος as it is meant from itself inclusive of its suggested ontological (meaning) horizons – it proposes is discoverable in Heidegger's reading of Heraclitus's fragments. Its primary data comprises *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (GA 40) (1935),¹ *Heraklit* (GA 55) (1943/1944),² and "Logos (Heraklit, Fragment 50)" (1951), Section III of *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (GA 7).³ Its purpose is to contribute to the hermeneutic-phenomenology of λόγος – a ground word (*Grundwort*) that in many ways sits at the margins of hermeneutic-phenomenological thinking and Heidegger contends is as elusive to a matching rendition as the "guiding-word" *Ereignis* (enowning)⁴ – and furbish its disclosing-saying power. The project (1) discusses the hermeneutical challenges of reading Heidegger's dialogue with Heraclitus's thinking, including those possibly associated with the individuation of λόγος as *Rede* (discourse) in *Sein und Zeit* (*SZ*) (GA 2) (1927);⁵ (2) individuates the three phenomenological interpretations of λόγος – two articulated and the third, the meaning of λόγος as *Dasein*, implied – it contends can be found in Heidegger's study of the fragments; and (3) correlates the uncertainties and equivocations evoked by his analysis (ἀνάλλυσις) to the way he is thinking being and his attempt to circumvent the metaphysical obstacles affiliated with the ontological difference.

¹ Martin Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (1935), GA 40 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983) (hereafter: GA 40); *Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Mannheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959) (hereafter RM-tr.).

² *Heraklit: Der Anfang des abendländischen Denkens / Logik. Heraklits Lehre vom Logos* (1943/1944), GA 55, Third ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994) (hereafter: GA 55); *Heraclitus: The Inception of Occidental Thinking and Logic: Heraclitus's Doctrine of the Logos*, trans. Julia Goesser Assaiante and S. Montgomery Ewegen (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018) (hereafter: AE-tr.).

³ *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (1936-1954), GA 7 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000) (hereafter: GA 7); *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1984) (hereafter: KC-tr.).

⁴ *Identität und Differenz* (1949-1963), GA 11 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006) (hereafter: GA 11), 45; Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, "Translators' Forward," in *Contributions to Philosophy (from Enowning)* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), xix. Translation mine.

⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (1927), GA 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977) (hereafter: GA 2, referred to in text as *SZ*); *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1962) (hereafter: MR-tr.).

1. Hermeneutical challenges of reading Heidegger's reading of Heraclitus

One is hard pressed to find in Heidegger's reading of Heraclitus's fragments a concise interpretation of λόγος that univocally articulates its meaning as such, as this ground word, including its implied horizontal significance, is meant from itself within the hermeneutic-phenomenological problematic. Studies of Heidegger's dialogue with the fragments that coincide λόγος solely with being (*Sein*), including the being of beings in the whole (*Sein des Seienden im Ganzen*) with the hard emphasis on being, reflect an isolated, perhaps even hurried, reading of Heidegger's writings. Emad is spot on when he writes that Heidegger's being-historical thinking "casts an invaluable light on Heidegger's entire works on the early Greeks and thus calls for renewed efforts for hermeneutically coming to terms with these works."⁶ Armed with the hindsight of access to these treatises – especially *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (GA 65) (1936-1938)⁷ and *Besinnung* (GA 66) (1938-1939),⁸ whose formulation precedes two of the Heraclitus writings – one does not only find in Heidegger's dialogue with Heraclitus's thinking the rendition of λόγος as being. Instead one confronts an index of meditations on λόγος that hermeneutically weave through the phenomenon and are continuous with the full course of his phenomenology beginning in *SZ* and culminating in his being-historical works. Heidegger's study of the fragments represents, as Father Richardson reveals it, an ongoing rendition of a ground word whose (a) meaning assumes "ever increasing importance" in the "evolution" of his thinking⁹ and (b) hermeneutical point of departure is its rendition in *SZ*.

Heidegger's investigation of λόγος does not begin with Heraclitus. The hermeneutic phenomenology of λόγος, including its preliminary thesaurus of pre-Socratic Greek, was inaugurated in *SZ* "Section 7(a)" as part of the introduction to the transcendental-horizontal investigation (fundamental ontology) of *Dasein* (the being-of-the-t/here, t/here-being, also transcendence).¹⁰ The meaning of λόγος found in Heidegger's study of the fragments includes, but is not bounded by, *SZ*'s

⁶ Parvis Emad, *On the Way to Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), 88.

⁷ Martin Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1938), GA 65 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989) (hereafter GA 65); *Contributions to Philosophy (from Enowning)*, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999) (hereafter EM-tr.).

⁸ *Besinnung* (1938-1939), GA 66 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997) (hereafter: GA 66); *Mindfulness*, trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006).

⁹ William J. Richardson, S.J., *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, with a new preface by the author (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), 66-67.

¹⁰ GA 2, 43-46; MR-tr., 55-58.

rendition of λόγος as discourse (*Rede*). Discourse, as thought within *SZ*, corresponds to the essential meaning of λέγειν, which Heidegger, both in *SZ* and his Heraclitus writings, coincides with the ownmost (*Wesen*) of λόγος. Λόγος understood as discourse is the inherent potentiality of *Dasein* to bring-forth (gather) beings as they are (in their meaning) from concealment and articulate (thus shelter) their being (meaning) in/through language.¹¹ It is, as Kovacs writes, the “power” (δύναμις) inherent to *Dasein* that “enables” it to make “‘visible’ meanings”¹² and, as Kalary and Schalow, as well as Emad, put it over against von Herrmann’s renewed study of *SZ*:¹³ the disclosing-saying power most own (*das Eigenste*) to “language” that equal-primordially (“co-originally”) (*Gleichursprünglichkeit*) determines the equal-primordial moments (structural elements, *existentials*) of *Befindlichkeit* (attunement) and *Verstehen* (understanding).¹⁴

Human comprehending is distinguished by its profound indigence, by the limitations intrinsic to its power to know and its inherent propensity to err. It is not untenable to surmise that the misconstruction of discourse as a third existential of *Dasein* – combined with fact that *SZ* more or less consigns λόγος to a specific dimension of its unfolding, sc., λέγειν – may have contributed to the challenge of discerning the meaning of λόγος as such in Heidegger’s reading of Heraclitus. Perhaps it may even foreshadow it. At a minimum the misconceptions surrounding the interpretation of discourse may have preset the encounter with Heidegger’s Heraclitus writings, a journey that over and over hermeneutically circles through the fragments, with biases that incline the student toward a narrow, perhaps, even objectivistic or dualistic, understanding of λόγος that impedes efforts to arrive at a fuller (although never complete) understanding of the phenomenon as unearthed by Heidegger’s research. The misunderstanding of discourse as a third existential is not solely a consequent of “shallow” readings of *SZ*, as Kalary and Schalow contend,¹⁵ however. Heidegger also bears responsibility. Father Richardson justifiably calls *SZ*’s rendition of discourse “very obscure,”

¹¹ GA 2, 43; MR-tr., 56; GA 7, 232; KC-tr., 77.

¹² George Kovacs, *The Question of God in Heidegger’s Phenomenology* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1990), 84.

¹³ Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, *Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Daseins: Ein Kommentar zu “Sein und Zeit,”* vol. 3 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Kostermann, 2008); *Subjekt und Dasein: Interpretation zu “Sein und Zeit,”* Second ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Kostermann, 1985).

¹⁴ Thomas Kalary and Frank Schalow, “Attunement, Discourse, and the Onefold of Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Recent Heidegger-Literature and a New Translation of His Work in Critical Perspective,” *Heidegger Studies* 27 (2011), 203; Parvis Emad, “The Significance of the New Edition of ‘*Subjekt und Dasein*’ and the Fundamental Ontology of Language,” *ibid.*, 2 (1986).

¹⁵ Kalary and Schalow, “Attunement, Discourse, and the Onefold of Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Recent Heidegger-Literature and a New Translation of His Work in Critical Perspective,” 205.

assesses Heidegger to be “still very much in the dark at this point” and “groping for some way to express an experience” that, as of *SZ*, defied “formulation,” and also calls *SZ*’s “Section 34” (“*Dasein and discourse*”) – the section that explicates the relation of discourse to attunement (*Befindlichkeit*) and understanding (*Verstehen*) – its “least satisfying section.”¹⁶ Father Richardson’s observations bring to light possible reasons beyond “shallow” readings that may explain why “perhaps no section” in *SZ*, as Kalary and Schalow note, “has been more misunderstood and subjected to more misinterpretation” than “Section 34” has been, and:

it is an irony that even after more than three decades of study and close scrutiny of this all important section from *Being and Time*, we lack the necessary clarity regarding these existential elements and their inter-relationships. There are any number of authors who consider discourse as the third constitutive dimension of t/here, equally originary with attunement and understanding. The long list includes W. Biemel, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Tietz, Figal, Lafont, Dreyfus, Mathew Rampley, and so forth. This has its origin in Pöggler’s *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*. Blattner’s recent guide to *Being and Time* is a typical example of how Heidegger scholarship labors even today under such a fundamental misunderstanding of these crucial dimension of the being of *Dasein*. Like many others, he too calls disposedness, understanding, and discourse the “three facets” of disclosedness. Again, Schümann considers attunement, understanding and speech as the ‘three structural components of being-in-the-world.’¹⁷

von Herrmann’s assiduous reading of *SZ*,¹⁸ as conscientiously explicated by Kalary and Schalow,¹⁹ as well as Emad,²⁰ aligned the interpretation of “Section 34” with its intended meaning, with what in fact the section, regardless its shortcomings, says the relation of discourse to attunement and understanding is. It remedied the misunderstanding of discourse as “an independent third dimension” of factual disclosedness; clarified the understanding of Heidegger’s rendition of attunement and understanding as “the two,” and only two, “equal-primordial” structural elements of *Dasein*;²¹ and further clarified the understanding of the two elements (existentials) as, in Heidegger’s words, “equal-primordially determined by *discourse*” (“*Befindlichkeit und Verstehen sind gleichursprünglich bestimmt durch die Rede.*”)²² von Herrmann’s exacting study of *SZ* revealed

¹⁶ Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 66-67.

¹⁷ Kalary and Schalow, “Attunement, Discourse, and the Onefold of Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Recent Heidegger-Literature and a New Translation of His Work in Critical Perspective,” 203.

¹⁸ Herrmann, *Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Daseins: Ein Kommentar zu “Sein und Zeit.”* 3.

¹⁹ Kalary and Schalow, “Attunement, Discourse, and the Onefold of Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Recent Heidegger-Literature and a New Translation of His Work in Critical Perspective.”

²⁰ Emad, “The Significance of the New Edition of ‘*Subjekt und Dasein*’ and the Fundamental Ontology of Language.”

²¹ Kalary and Schalow, “Attunement, Discourse, and the Onefold of Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Recent Heidegger-Literature and a New Translation of His Work in Critical Perspective,” 204.

²² GA 2, 177; Kalary and Schalow, “Attunement, Discourse, and the Onefold of Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Recent Heidegger-Literature and a New Translation of His Work in Critical Perspective,” 204.

the interpretation of discourse as Heidegger meant it, which was not as an “independent disclosive function,” as is often misconstrued,²³ but rather as the ownmost power (*Wesensmöglichkeit*) of attunement and understanding.²⁴ It brought the interpretation of discourse in line with *SZ*’s provisional *definition* of *Dasein* as the “ζῶον λόγον ἔχον” – as that living thing whose being is essentially determined by the potentiality for discourse.”²⁵

Attunement and understanding are the co-originary ways *Dasein* essentially unfolds (*west*)²⁶ as the being (*Sein*) of the t/here (*Da*), as the factual disclosure of beings (the t/here of its to be), as, thought even more radically, beings in the whole (*Seiende im Ganzen*).²⁷ They make up the continuous instant *Dasein* discovers “that it is and has to be” (*Existenz*). Said another way: attunement and understanding constitute the ongoing instantiation of *Dasein* (a) finding itself “delivered over” (*Überantwortetsein*) or “thrown” (*geworfen*) into a World it *is* and “in some way familiar with,”²⁸ thus attuned to and understands (projects-open) (*Entwurf*), and (b) is obliged to continue to understand (project-open) (*entwerfen*) to be.²⁹ Discourse, *Dasein*’s intrinsic disclosing-saying power and the interpretation of λόγος that prevails in *SZ*,³⁰ enables attunement and understanding to “come to fruition”³¹ and steers the moments – which irrupt as such as a single unfolding – “*from within*.”³² It is the dynamism innermost to the “projecting-opening” of the wherein (t/here) *Dasein* “is already thrown,” thus originarily attuned to.³³ Λόγος, discerned as discourse,

²³ “Attunement, Discourse, and the Onefold of Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Recent Heidegger-Literature and a New Translation of His Work in Critical Perspective,” 204.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 206.

²⁵ GA 2, 34, 211; MR-tr., 47, 208-209. See also GA 7, 281; KC-tr., 116 for an extended (prephilosophical) interpretation of ζῶον (and ζωή) and its root ζα, which Heidegger coincides with being, insists, per his reading of the early Greeks, including Heraclitus, should not be understood in the “zoological or broader biological sense,” and phenomenologically translates as “the pure letting-rise within appearing.”

²⁶ See Kovacs, *Thinking and Be-ing in Heidegger’s Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (Bucharest: Zeta Books, 2015), 24-25, for a discussion of the respective translation of “*west*,” “*wesen*,” and “*Wesung*” as “essentially unfolds,” “to essentially unfold,” and “essential unfolding,” as opposed to Emad and Maly’s respective translation of the terms as “essentially sways,” “to essentially sway,” and “essential swaying” as explained in their “Translators’ Forward,” xxiv-xxvii.

²⁷ Thomas Kalary, “New Access to Being and Time: Focusing on Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann’s Commentary on *Sein und Zeit*,” *Heidegger Studies* 24 (2008), 190.

²⁸ GA 2, 79; MR-tr., 85.

²⁹ Kalary and Schalow, “Attunement, Discourse, and the Onefold of Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Recent Heidegger-Literature and a New Translation of His Work in Critical Perspective,” 201-206. For explanations of the respective translations of *Entwurf* and *entwerfen* as “projecting-open” and “to project-open” see Emad and Maly, “Translators’ Forward,” xxvi-xxviii.

³⁰ Kovacs, *Thinking and Be-ing in Heidegger’s Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, 11.

³¹ Kalary and Schalow, “Attunement, Discourse, and the Onefold of Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Recent Heidegger-Literature and a New Translation of His Work in Critical Perspective,” 200.

³² Emad, “The Significance of the New Edition of ‘*Subjekt und Dasein*’ and the Fundamental Ontology of Language,” 145.

³³ Kalary and Schalow, “Attunement, Discourse, and the Onefold of Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Recent Heidegger-Literature and a New Translation of His Work in Critical Perspective,” 207.

distinguishes “human being as *speaking being* (*Sprachwesen*),”³⁴ as the being-of-the-t/here whose ownmost is primordially determined by the “potentiality for discourse” (“*das Redenkönnen bestimmt ist*”).³⁵ The essential meaning of human being is discourse, for “it is in words and language” – and, thought hermeneutic-phenomenologically, not simply straight up perception – “that things first come into being and are.”³⁶

Although Heidegger’s analysis of the fragments discontinue *SZ*’s (the transcendental-horizonal) individuation of λόγος as discourse, it does not break from the discernment of λέγειν as the essential meaning of λόγος and the hermeneutical potentiality most own to *Dasein*. It also is not removed from *SZ*’s fundamental ontology. Indeed, an appreciation of *SZ*’s thinking, like the thinking articulated in Heidegger’s being-historical treatises, including their effort to resolve the hermeneutical obstacles affiliated with the metaphysical appropriation of the ontological difference, is indispensable to arriving at a hermeneutically consistent understanding of his reading of Heraclitus. Heidegger’s meditations on λόγος are moments along the radicalization of the pursuit of his hermeneutical priority, as initially stated in *SZ*, “the question of the meaning of being,”³⁷ and his ongoing struggle to project-open “to be” more meaningfully. Their painstaking investigation of Heraclitus’s fragments and the different names in the sayings they discern for being evoke ambiguities when withdrawn from the journey of Heidegger’s thought. Father Richardson, who at the time of writing *Through Phenomenology to Thought*³⁸ did not have access to Heidegger’s being-historical works, confronts this exact issue in his magnum opus, which, incidentally, and alongside Maly and Emad’s *Heidegger on Heraclitus: A New Reading*,³⁹ remains among the most astute studies of Heidegger’s rendition of λόγος. He points out the uncertainties affiliated with the dilation of Heidegger’s interpretations, including their susceptibility to equivocation, and attempts to clarify “the later development” of Heidegger’s understanding “in its initial stages” by distinguishing *SZ*’s interpretation of λόγος as “Logos”⁴⁰ and, citing GA 7,⁴¹ coinciding “Λόγος” with the being of beings in the whole and “ὁ Λόγος” (“the Λόγος”) with being itself.

³⁴ George Kovacs, “Heidegger’s Insight into the History of Language,” *ibid.*, 29 (2013), 127, 129. Italics mine.

³⁵ GA 2, 34; MR-tr., 47.

³⁶ GA 40, 16; RM-tr., 13. Translation modified.

³⁷ GA 2, 3-20; MR-tr., 2-35.

³⁸ Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*.

³⁹ Kenneth Maly and Parvis Emad, eds., *Heidegger on Heraclitus: A New Reading* (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986).

⁴⁰ Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 66-67.

⁴¹ “Das Wort ὁ Λόγος nennt Jenes, das alles Anwesende ins Anwesen versammelt und darin vorliegen läßt. Ὁ Λόγος nennt Jenes, worin sich das Anwesen des Anwesenden ereignet,” GA 7, 231-232; KC-tr., 76.

Because Λόγος is Ἐν, it may be called the utterly Simple... Ἐν Πάντα tells [us] what Λόγος is. Λόγος tells [us] how Ἐν Πάντα comes-to-presence. Both are but one. Briefly, Λόγος is the Being of beings-in-the-ensemble [*das Seiende im Ganzen*] ‘...The word ὁ Λόγος names that which gathers all [beings] into [Being] and thereby lets [them] lie forth...’⁴²

Heidegger, who, immediately following the same passage in GA 7 Richardson cites, calls ὁ Λόγος “the name for the being of beings [the extant],”⁴³ which is another way of saying the being of beings in the whole, the horizontally unfolding all-that-is, the World (the Majestic), employs language deliberately, and his use of articles, capitalization, and adverbs matter, particularly when employing the pre-Socratic Greek. They connote emphasis, orientation, focus, and the effort to mitigate obscurity and enhance clarity. Many of the uncertainties they evoke speak less to inconsistencies in his thinking than they do to his resolve to land a hermeneutically meaningful understanding of λόγος within the way he is striving to think it in the face of the privations indigent to language, phenomenological or otherwise.

Heidegger *sculpts* (renders, elucidates, unearths) λόγος in the round. He endeavors to exhibit the meaning of λόγος as it shows itself from itself in its full dynamism and dimensionality, the way he postulates Heraclitus says it. The “evolution” of this course includes the rendition of λόγος as being and the being of beings in the whole, both of which, depending on the context and the moment of his thinking, he articulates as “the Λόγος,” “ὁ Λόγος,” “Λόγος,” “the Logos,” “the *Logos*,” as well as “λόγος” and “the λόγος;”⁴⁴ the differentiation of the ownmost of λόγος as λέγειν;⁴⁵ the correspondence of “ὁμολογεῖν” to a λέγειν that unfolds in accordance with “the ownmost of ‘the’ Λόγος;”⁴⁶ the understanding that when λέγειν – which he coincides with “ποιεῖν”⁴⁷ – “listens carefully” (heeds, attunes) to λόγος, it unfolds as ὁμολογεῖν and “says the same as what the *Logos* says,” and as “ὁμολογεῖν” – the “joining” (“*Fügung*”) of “λέγειν and λόγος” – comes “into immediacy with the Λόγος,” which in the same passage he also writes as “ὁ λόγος;”⁴⁸ the sameness he posits between λόγος and

⁴² Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 493. Slightly modified.

⁴³ GA 7, 233; KC-tr., 77.

⁴⁴ GA 40; RM-tr.; GA 55; AE-tr.; GA 7; KC-tr.

⁴⁵ GA 55, 371; Kenneth Maly and Steven Davis, “Reading Heidegger Reading Heraclitus—Fragment 112,” in *Heidegger on Heraclitus: A New Reading*, ed. Kenneth Maly and Parvis Emad (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986), 148-149; AE-tr., 277; GA 7, 214-220; KC-tr., 60-66.

⁴⁶ GA 55, 315-316, 353; AE-tr., 236-237, 264.

⁴⁷ GA 55, 371; AE-tr., 277.

⁴⁸ GA 55, 249-251; AE-tr., 191-192. Translation modified. See also GA 55, 371; Kenneth Maly, “The Transformation of ‘Logic’ in Heraclitus,” in *Heidegger on Heraclitus: A New Reading*, ed. Kenneth Maly and Parvis Emad (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986), 101-102.

φύσις,⁴⁹ which he occasionally writes as “Φύσις” and also coincides with being and the being of beings in the whole⁵⁰; the sameness he posits between Λόγος and ἀλήθεια (as well as Ἀλήθεια), which he also discerns as being;⁵¹ the sameness he posits between λόγος, interpreted as being, and “ἄρμονία, ἀλήθεια, φύσις [and] φαίνεσθαι,”⁵² the correspondence of Λόγος with “ἔν” and ἐν πάντα” as well as “Ἐν” and “Ἐν Πάντα;”⁵³ the discernment of “πάντα” as “beings in the whole” and “ἔν” as its “ownmost;”⁵⁴ his explication of the “homological relation of the human λόγος to *the* Λόγος” that distinguishes being and the “relation to being” as the “ownmost of man;”⁵⁵ the contrast he underscores between the metaphysical understanding of λόγος as “logic,” “assertion,” “saying,” “an act and faculty of man” and “the Λόγος of which Heraclitus speaks,” which is not “some trait affiliated with beings,” but, rather, “harvesting and gathering” and “the all-unifying one;”⁵⁶ the understanding that “this Λόγος,” the one Heraclitus says, is “the originary foregathering that safeguards beings as the beings they are,” “being itself,” and “the ownmost of the extant;”⁵⁷ and his elucidation of “Logos,” which from itself says (*“vom Logos wird gesagt”*): (1) “permanence” and “enduring unfolding” characterize the ownmost of Logos; (2) Logos “is the togetherness ownmost to beings, the togetherness of beings [the extant], and the “gathering” [of beings] into their abiding togetherness;” and (3) “all that manifests (i.e., comes into being) and abides t/here in accordance with this abiding togetherness; this is the essential unfolding.”⁵⁸

⁴⁹ GA 40, 139; RM-tr., 130-131.

⁵⁰ GA 40, 19; RM-tr., 16; GA 55, 371; AE-tr., 277.

⁵¹ “Ἀλήθεια, Φύσις, Λόγος sind das Selbe, nicht in der leeren Gleichförmigkeit des Zusammenfallens in das gleiche Unterschiedslose, sondern als das ursprüngliche Sichversammeln in das unterschiedsreiche Eine: τὸ Ἐν. Das Ἐν, das ursprünglich einigende Eine – Einzige, ist der Λόγος als die Ἀλήθεια, als die Φύσις,” GA 55, 371, which, per Maly’s translation in “The Transformation of ‘Logic’ in Heraclitus,” 102, Heidegger reads as: “Ἀλήθεια, Φύσις, and Λόγος are the *same*, not in an empty equality, but rather as the originary self-gathering into the richly different one: τὸ Ἐν. The Ἐν, the originary one-only that brings together, is the Λόγος as the Ἀλήθεια, as the Φύσις.”

⁵² “Weil das Sein λόγος, ἄρμονία, ἀλήθεια, φύσις, φαίνεσθαι ist, deshalb zeigt es sich gerade nicht beliebig,” GA 40, 142; RM-tr., 133.

⁵³ GA 55, 264; AE tr., 201; GA 7, 226; KC-tr., 71; GA 7; Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 493. See also GA 55, 249-251, 371; AE-tr., 191-192, 277-278; Maly, “The Transformation of ‘Logic’ in Heraclitus,” 101-102.

⁵⁴ GA 55, 264-265; AE-tr., 201-202. Translation modified.

⁵⁵ GA 55, 296; AE-tr., 223.

⁵⁶ GA 55, 278; AE-tr., 210. Translation modified.

⁵⁷ GA 55, 278; AE-tr., 210. Translation modified.

⁵⁸ GA 40, 136; RM-tr., 128. Translation mine.

Further contributing to the contest of digesting Heidegger's reading of Heraclitus is the apparently "fogged up" relation between the meaning of "*Dasein* as *Lichtung*" and "*Sein* itself as *Lichtung*" Father Richardson imputes to the evolution of his hermeneutics,⁵⁹ and he also formulates as the neglect of the question concerning the "relationship" of "the human dimension of *Lichtung*" to "*Lichtung* as such"⁶⁰ and, relatedly, the connotation that *Lichtung* "derives from something earlier than the experience of 'is.'"⁶¹ This obscurity – which Heidegger appears also to allude to in GA 65 when he distinguishes the remaining "task" of hermeneutic phenomenology as the charge "*to restore beings from within the truth of be-ing*"⁶² – is particularly problematic in Heidegger's reading of the fragments, which largely neglects to address the relation of λόγος interpreted as either being or the being of beings in the whole to *Dasein*. A participant in the "Heraclitus 1966/1967 Seminar" led by Fink with Heidegger in attendance alludes to the same discrepancy when he asks: "If the steering principle [i.e., being] does not lie within the whole [i.e., beings in the whole], must it be found outside or above the whole? But how can it be outside the whole?"⁶³ Heidegger's attempt to relate λόγος understood as being to the "human λόγος,"⁶⁴ a proposition that is remarkably susceptible to metaphysical prejudice as well as outwardly incompatible with the *esistenziale Analytik* (the analysis of *Dasein*), not only fails to answer this question satisfactorily, but also adds to the challenge of reading the Heraclitus texts.

Heidegger's hermeneutical priority, particularly when considered against his being-historical writings, should not be discounted as a factor contributing to the "fogged up" relation between *Dasein* and *Lichtung* pointed out by Father Richardson. Heidegger's fantastically scrupulous response to the question of the meaning of being sways within his dialogue with Heraclitus's thinking and at times appears to steer it toward the elucidation of being at the expense of disallowing the fragments from themselves fully commandeering their disclosure or revealing more completely the relation of λόγος to *Dasein*. Potential hazards of this trajectory – a course distinguished by Heidegger's interpretation of Fragment 50⁶⁵ to mean "the Λόγος itself" [being]...is

⁵⁹ William J. Richardson, S.J., interview by Babette Babich, May, 2015.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Interview by Babette Babich, 16 October, 2011.

⁶² GA 65, 10-11; EM-tr., 8.

⁶³ Martin Heidegger and Eugen Fink, *Heraclitus Seminar 1966/1967*, trans. Charles H. Seibert (University: University of Alabama Press, 1979), 15.

⁶⁴ See Section § 6 of "*Logik. Heraklits Lehre vom Logos*" in GA 55, 295-347; AE-tr., 223-258.

⁶⁵ οὐκ ἐμοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστὶν ἐν πάντα [εἶναι], GA 40, 137; which, per Maly and Emad's translation in "Fragments and Translations" in *Heidegger on Heraclitus: A New Reading*, ed. Kenneth Maly and Parvis

the to-be-thought that is before all else, in all else, and beyond all else”⁶⁶ and “that which for all thinking is first and foremost to be thought” [“*was für alles Denken allem zuvor das Zu-denkende ist*”]⁶⁷ – include reading more into “the interpretation of the fragments than stands in them,” as a participant in the Heraclitus seminar remarks,⁶⁸ or diverting attention from what the fragments might say other than the meaning of being, or both. Heidegger is dead. He died nearly 50 years ago. Determined efforts to unpack the monumentality of his thinking, especially his being-historical thinking, continue in earnest. The question of the meaning of being, or, as Heidegger writes it in GA 65, “the question of the truth of be-ing,” which he quite tellingly also calls “the question concerning the ‘meaning’ [“*Die Frage nach dem »Sinn«*”], i.e, in accordance with the elucidation in *Sein und Zeit*,” was, as he explains it, his question and his “*one and only* question” concerning what he thought to be the “*most sole and unique*,” sc. being.⁶⁹ The eminence of this question to Heidegger *does not*, however, enjoin the subscription of all hermeneutic-phenomenological thinking. Moreover, all phenomenological thinking, including Heidegger’s, is defined by its incompleteness and errancy, a point he labored to make in GA 65 and GA 66, and there is nothing in his writings that suggests he expected us to reify his hermeneutics or shrink from challenging it. Indeed, if anything, he would insist we strive to surpass his thinking, and implies as much to Fink during the Heraclitus seminar. “It does not concern me to interpret Heraclitus by Heidegger,” he tells Fink, “rather,” he continues:

the elaboration of the reasons for your interpretation concerns me. Both of us are in agreement that if we speak with a thinker, we must heed what is unsaid in what is said. The question is only which way leads to this, and of what kind is the foundation of the interpretive step.⁷⁰

Emad (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986) (hereafter: ME-tr.), 36-38, Heidegger reads as: “If you have heard not me but rather the λόγος, then it is wise to say accordingly: all is *one*.”

⁶⁶ GA 55, 286; AE-tr., 216.

⁶⁷ GA 55, 278; AE-tr., 210. Translation mine.

⁶⁸ Heidegger and Fink, *Heraclitus Seminar 1966/1967*, 73.

⁶⁹ GA 65, 10-11; EM-tr., 8. Translation modified.

⁷⁰ Heidegger and Fink, *Heraclitus Seminar 1966/1967*, 67.

2. The fragments

Heidegger's exhaustive reading of Heraclitus's sayings forms an arc that runs back and forth through the fragments, particularly, but not exclusively, fragments 50, 32,⁷¹ 1,⁷² 16,⁷³ 64,⁷⁴ 112,⁷⁵ 123⁷⁶ – that hermeneutically encircles itself.⁷⁷ Setting aside the metaphysical understanding of λόγος as logic, assertion, or a human faculty, three interpretations of λόγος can be found in his analysis. The first two Heidegger articulates. The third is discoverable within his dialogue with the fragments. They are: (a) λόγος understood as λέγειν, which conveys essentially the same meaning as discourse in SZ, although perhaps more fundamentally; (b) λόγος understood as being and the being of beings in the whole, or, as distinguished here following Heidegger, “the Λόγος;” and, as this study proposes, (c) λόγος as such understood as *Dasein*, or simply “λόγος.”

Heidegger deconstructs the meaning of λόγος spoken by Heraclitus by returning to its originary source language significance: λέγειν. Λέγειν is not simply “talking and saying,” as Heidegger convincingly reveals.⁷⁸ Its essential meaning rendered hermeneutic-phenomenologically (and etymologically) is “to lay,” in the sense of “to-lay-down” or “to-lay-before,”⁷⁹ and “gathering” (*Sammeln*) understood as “bringing-together-into-lying-before” (*zusammen-ins-Vorliegen-bringen*),

⁷¹ Ἐν τῷ σοφῶν μόνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηῆδος ὄνομα, GA 7, 226; GA 55, 376; which, per ME-tr., 27-28, Heidegger reads as: “the unique one unifying all is alone the fateful” (GA 7) and “The one, the unique-one-unifying-unison, the only thing present in genuine knowing, resists the gathering and accords the gathering in the name of Zeus” (GA 55).

⁷² τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ' ἐόντος αἰεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἀπίροισιν εἰκόασι πειρώμενοι καὶ ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων τοιούτων ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγέομαι κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον καὶ φράζων ὅπως ἔχει. τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ποιῶσιν ὁκωσπερ ὁκόσα εὐδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται, GA 55, 400; which, per ME-tr., 13-14, Heidegger reads as: “But whereas the λόγος remains ever λόγος, humans act as though they do not comprehend it, both before they have heard it as well as afterwards. For everything comes to be κατὰ τοῦ λόγον τόνδε, in accordance with and owing to this λόγος.”

⁷³ τὸ μὴ δῶδόν ποτε πῶς ἂν τις λάθοι, GA 55, 46; which, per ME-tr., 20-21, Heidegger reads as: “How could anyone be concealed before the not ever setting (what never sets)?”

⁷⁴ τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰακίζει Κεραυνός, GA 7, 227; GA 55, 162; which, per ME-tr., 45, Heidegger reads as: “But the lightning steers into (presencing) everything (which comes to presence)” (GA 7) and “But lightning steers beings in the whole” (GA 55).

⁷⁵ σωφρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μεγίστη, καὶ σοφίη ἀληθῆα λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαῖοντας, GA 55, 373-374, which, per ME-tr., 60-61, Heidegger reads as: “Reflecting thinking is nobility; and it is this because knowing is gathering the unconcealed (out of concealedness into unconcealedness) in the manner of bringing-forth into what is brought forth and set up, in the light of the emerging – (all of this however) in reference to originary gathering which ranges wide and brings-in [at the same time].” Translation corrected.

⁷⁶ φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ, *Die Grundbegriffe Der Metaphysik. Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit* (1929/1930), GA 29/30 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983) (hereafter: GA 29/30), 41; GA 40, 122; which, per ME-tr., 67, Heidegger reads as: “The sway of things has *in itself* the urge to be hidden” (GA 29/30) and “Being [emergent appearing] tends in itself to a self-concealing” (GA 40).

⁷⁷ Maly and Davis, “Reading Heidegger Reading Heraclitus—Fragment 112,” 148-149.

⁷⁸ GA 7, 214; KC-tr., 60.

⁷⁹ GA 7, 214; KC-tr., 60; Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 491-492.

sheltering (*Unterbringen*), and “harvesting” (*Lesen*).⁸⁰ Λέγειν, thought inceptually over against a phenomenological reading of Heraclitus’s fragments – including the sameness they say among “the Λόγος,” “φύσις,” and “ἀλήθεια” (Fragment 50)⁸¹ and the antinomy between “λέγειν” and “κρύπτειν” they also connote, between “revealing” and “concealing” (Fragment 93)⁸² – is the essential unfolding (*Wesung*) of being, indeed, it is another name for being (the essential unfolding), and the ownmost way the primordial “is” brings beings forth from unconcealment as that-which-is-open (*das Offenbare*), hence, conjoined (*Gefüge*). Per GA 7: “By letting things lie together before us,” by letting beings show themselves as they are and sheltering their meaning, “λέγειν undertakes to secure what lies before us in unconcealment.”⁸³ Λέγειν, per Heidegger’s reading of Fragment 112, is phenomenologically akin to, it emanates the essential meaning of, ἀλήθεια, φύσις, and ποιεῖν: to bring forth from concealment into unconcealment as joined (*fügen*) or gathered into joinedness (*Fügung*),⁸⁴ hence, safeguarded or preserved. It is also, as he further reveals it, phenomenologically akin to the derivative of ποιεῖν, ποιήσις: the “bringing to appearance of beings as beings out of what is concealed into unconcealment” (“*aus der Verbergung Seiendes als Seiendes zum Erscheinen in die Unverborgenheit bringen*”).⁸⁵ Note: The originary meaning of λέγειν illumed by Heidegger’s analysis of the fragments clarifies once and for all any prevailing misconstructions of discourse as a third existential; the immanence of being to λέγειν it reveals also underscores the power of discourse to equal-primordially determine the equal-primordial moments of attunement and understanding.

The Λόγος (ὁ Λόγος) is λέγειν thought to its ownmost. It is, as articulated in GA 55, “the originary foregathering” (“*die ursprüngliche Versammlung*”)⁸⁶ – also, “the originary self-foregathering” (“*das ursprüngliche Sichversammeln*”)⁸⁷ – and “being itself [*das Sein selbst*],” the “clearing [*Lichtung*] in which all beings essentially are.”⁸⁸ The Λόγος coincides with the essential movement of λέγειν, as expressed in the observation, “ὁ Λόγος λέγει,”⁸⁹ and “is the same as that with which λέγειν is concerned,” which is ἀλήθεια (truth as such), or being: the unconcealing of the self-concealing-

⁸⁰ GA 7, 215; KC-tr., 61; GA 5., 178; AE-tr., 133.

⁸¹ GA 55, 269; AE-tr., 205.

⁸² GA 55, 177-178; AE-tr., 133-134.

⁸³ GA 7, 217; KC-tr., 63.

⁸⁴ Maly and Davis, “Reading Heidegger Reading Heraclitus—Fragment 112,” 140-141; GA 55, 364-366; AE-tr., 272-273.

⁸⁵ GA 55, 366; Maly and Davis, “Reading Heidegger Reading Heraclitus—Fragment 112,” 144.

⁸⁶ Heidegger, GA 55, 278; AE-tr., 210. Translation modified.

⁸⁷ GA 55, 371; AE-tr., 277. Translation modified. See also Heidegger and Fink, *Heraclitus Seminar 1966/1967*, 28, 126.

⁸⁸ GA 55, 278; Maly, “The Transformation of ‘Logic’ in Heraclitus,” 100. Translation modified.

⁸⁹ GA 7, 225; KC-tr., 70. Translation modified.

withdrawing.⁹⁰ As elucidated by Heidegger’s reading of the fragments, the Λόγος and ἀλήθεια, ἔν, and φύσις all say the same: being, or, as thought in the language of *SZ*, disclosedness. They name the primordial meaning of “is”—the Open (*das Offene*) that frees from hiddenness the “t/here” (“that!”) unto which *Dasein* is thrown (hence attuned to) and projects-open (*Entwerfende*) (*Dasein* is its attuned thrownness and projecting-opening unto/of the t/here; it is the t/here of its “to be” inclusive of the constitutional moments of attunement and projecting-opening). The Λόγος is the ἔν of the ἔν πάντα εἶναι spoken by Fragment 50, and which Heidegger reads as the “all-unifying-one” (“*alles vereinende Eine*”),⁹¹ “the one that joins all, the being of all, the being of beings in the whole,”⁹² and the “essential unfolding” of “beings in the whole”⁹³—“in this ἔν πάντα εἶναι shows ‘the Λόγος itself,’ namely, *as the Λόγος*,” Heidegger writes.⁹⁴ The Λόγος is “the unique-unifying-one, the laying that gathers” spoken by Fragment 32;⁹⁵ the “lightning” of Fragment 64 that “steers beings in the whole;”⁹⁶ the essential meaning of φύσις as the “never setting”/“always rising” connoted by Fragment 16;⁹⁷ the “unifying of the ἔν” of Fragment 10 that, “letting belong together,” “becomes visible in the totality from out of the totality;”⁹⁸ the meaning of φύσις spoken by Fragment 112 as “the rising [emerging/*Aufgehen*] which is at the same time essentially going back into itself [*Insichzurückgehen*];”⁹⁹ and the κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε (from whence “everything comes to be”) of Fragment 1.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁰ GA 55, 371; Maly and Davis, “Reading Heidegger Reading Heraclitus—Fragment 112,” 148-149.

⁹¹ GA 55, 269; AE-tr., 205. Translation modified.

⁹² GA 55, 286; Maly, “The Transformation of ‘Logic’ in Heraclitus,” 99. Translation modified.

⁹³ “*Das πάντα als das Seiende im Ganzen und das ἔν als der Grundzug des Seienden weben und wesen im Sein*,” GA 55, 264; AE-tr., 201. Translation modified.

⁹⁴ “*In diesem ἔν πάντα εἶναι zeigt sich >der Λόγος selbst<, und zwar als der Λόγος*,” GA 55, 286; AE-tr., 216. Translation modified.

⁹⁵ GA 7, 233; Maly, “The Transformation of ‘Logic’ in Heraclitus,” 27.

⁹⁶ GA 55, 162; Maly, “The Transformation of ‘Logic’ in Heraclitus,” 27.

⁹⁷ GA 55, 173; Parvis Emad, “Heidegger’s Originary Reading of Heraclitus—Fragment 19,” in *Heidegger on Heraclitus: A New Reading*, ed. Kenneth Maly and Parvis Emad (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986), 116.

⁹⁸ συνάψεις ὅλα καὶ οὐχ ὅλα, συμφερόμενον διαφερόμενον, συνᾶδον διᾶδον, καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἔν καὶ ἐξ ἐνὸς πάντα, Heidegger and Fink, *Heraclitus Seminar 1966/1967*, 133; which, per ME-tr., 19, Heidegger reads as: “Letting belong together: ‘...the unifying of the ἔν becomes visible in the totality from out of the totality.’”

⁹⁹ Maly and Davis, “Reading Heidegger Reading Heraclitus—Fragment 112,” 142.

¹⁰⁰ οὐ δὲ λόγου τοῦδε ἐόντος αἰεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκούσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον· γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἀπίροισιν εἰκόασι πειρώμενοι καὶ ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων τοιούτων ὁκίωιν ἐγὼ διηγέμαι κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον καὶ φράζων ὅπως ἔχει· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ποιοῦσιν ὁκωσπερ ὁκόσα εὐδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται, GA 40, 136; which, per ME-tr., 13-14, Heidegger reads as: “But whereas the λόγος remains ever λόγος; humans act as though they do not comprehend it, both before they have heard it as well as afterwards. From everything comes to be κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε, in accordance with and owing to this λόγος; however, humans are like those who venture something without experience, even though they have a go at those same words and deeds that I carry out by unfolding each thing κατὰ φύσιν, according to being, and by explaining how it is. But from other people (the others as

The third interpretation of λόγος found in Heidegger’s reading of the fragments is commensurate with Heraclitus’s modulation between the first and other beginning; it is not rendered only from the question of the meaning of “to be.” It is “λόγος [that] discloses itself as ἐν πάντα εἶναι,”¹⁰¹ what the ἐν πάντα εἶναι says about itself from itself, which is not only about “the Λόγος itself,” as this study suggests, not just the “ownmost of λόγος” seen “from out of ἐν πάντα εἶναι,”¹⁰² but also as the “ἐν and πάντα named in what we hear from out of λόγος,” which is the tridimensional unfolding of: “one is all;” “the one unifies all that is;” and “the all consists of beings, the being of which has its essential trait in the ἐν.”¹⁰³ It is ἐν πάντα εἶναι understood as *Dasein*. “Πάντα as beings in the whole and ἐν as the basic trait of beings essentially unfold in being,” Heidegger answers in response to his question: “how can we ever arrive at a proper grasp of ἐν and πάντα if we do not clearly and specifically think that wherein they essentially unfold?”¹⁰⁴ He goes on to correspond the “that” in his question with “nothing other” than “the λόγος” and “being itself,”¹⁰⁵ which is in accord with his hermeneutical priority. This study answers differently. It interprets the entirety of ἐν πάντα εἶναι – which it coincides with the “dichotomy” Father Richardson discerns in GA 40’s rendition of λόγος as “the joining (*Fügung*) and that which is conjoined (*Gefüge*)” and “that-which-is-joined-from-itself-that-joins” (*fügender Fug*)¹⁰⁶ – as λόγος itself and the being-of-the-t/here. The meaning of λόγος taken as a whole from Heidegger’s reading of the fragments is ἐν πάντα εἶναι read across the spectrum of the hermeneutic-phenomenological problematic, and not just from the question of the meaning of being. It is λόγος understood as one-all-is, the unconcealment of all unconcealing the all, and the manifest-manifesting. It is λόγος understood as *Dasein*. The ground word λόγος, this study proposes, is another, indeed, an ancient, name for *Dasein*.

they all are, οἱ πολλοί) it remains concealed what they really do while awake, just as what they have done while asleep is afterwards concealed from them again.”

¹⁰¹ GA 55, 269; AE-tr., 205.

¹⁰² GA 55, 266; AE-tr., 202.

¹⁰³ GA 55, 264; AE-tr., 201. Translation modified. Emphasis mine.

¹⁰⁴ “Wie also sollen wir je zu einer gemäßen Erfassung des ἐν und des πάντα hinfinden, solange wir nicht das, worin sie weben und wesen, eigens und klar denken? Das πάντα als das Seiende im Ganzen und das ἐν als der Grundzug des Seienden weben und wesen im Sein,” GA 55, 264; AE-tr., 201. Translation modified. Emphasis mine.

¹⁰⁵ “So kann der λόγος, der sich im ἐν πάντα εἶναι vernehmen läßt, auch als nichts anderes wesen denn als das Sein selbst,” GA 55, 265; AE-tr., 202.

¹⁰⁶ GA 40, 169; Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 263. Richardson’s translation of “*Fügung*” and “*Gefüge*” modified.

Λόγος (λόγος) meant as *Dasein* coincides with the “κόσμος” of Fragment 89,¹⁰⁷ which, according to Heidegger, does not mean the universe or cosmos thought in the Newtonian or Cartesian sense, but, rather, as he remarks in *Wegmarken* (GA 9) (1919-1961): “World” (“Welt”).¹⁰⁸ It corresponds to φύσις understood not only as being, but as the “essential unfolding that rises [from concealment] and the enduring realm under its sway,” which, as Heidegger points out, comes closer the meaning of φύσις belonging to the first beginning.¹⁰⁹ Λόγος (λόγος), interpreted as such from Heidegger’s reading of the fragments, is the being-of-beings-in-the-whole, or, said to underscore the ownmost of being to transcendence (transcending), the being-of-the-t/here, and also corresponds to the hermeneutic-phenomenological meaning of πάντα. Thought hermeneutic-phenomenologically, πάντα (beings in the whole) always includes the meaning of “to be,” albeit with an emphasis on the “ecstatic-horizonal disclosure of the World” (τὸ λεγόμενον) over against its “self-akin-ecstatic disclosure” (ὁ λέγων) that together as one constitute the essential meaning of transcendence (τὸ λέγειν).¹¹⁰ There is no beings in the whole without *Dasein* (transcendence) and no *Dasein* without beings in the whole. In the final analysis they are the same. Beings in the whole, the hermeneutic-phenomenological reading of πάντα – as Heidegger suggests when he writes, “the πάντα as the whole of beings unfolds essentially in being” while, “at the same time, and more essentially so, the ἔν unfolds as the basic trait of all beings that are”¹¹¹ – explicitly implies its being and, more radically, *Dasein* as its instantiation. Πάντα, beings in the whole, corresponds to the “Da-’ (t/here) in the compound *Da-sein*,” which, as Kalary clarifies:

stands for disclosure (*Erschlossenheit*) but not only for the disclosure of the being of *Dasein*, that is, existence (*Existenz*), and its constitutive elements, namely the existentials (*die Existenzialien*), but also for the disclosure of ‘beings in the whole’ (*das Seiende im Ganzen*) or being as such.¹¹²

¹⁰⁷ τοῖς ἐγρηγορόσιν ἓνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσμον εἶναι, τῶν δὲ κοιμωμένων ἕκαστον εἰς ἴδιον ἀποστρέφεσθαι, Martin Heidegger, *Wegmarken* (1919-1961) GA 9 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976) (hereafter: GA 9), 142-143; which, per ME-tr., 53, Heidegger reads as: “The world is one and therefore common to those who are awake; but each one who is asleep turns to a world all their own.”

¹⁰⁸ GA 9, 143. Translation mine.

¹⁰⁹ GA 40, 17; RM-tr., 14-15. Translation modified.

¹¹⁰ Kalary and Schalow, “Attunement, Discourse, and the Onefold of Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Recent Heidegger-Literature and a New Translation of His Work in Critical Perspective,” 202.

¹¹¹ “*Das πάντα als das Ganze des Seienden west im Sein. Ingleichen und erst recht west das ἔν als der Grundzug des Seienden im Sein*,” GA 55, 265; AE-tr., 202. Translation modified.

¹¹² Kalary, “New Access to Being and Time: Focusing on Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann’s Commentary on *Sein und Zeit*,” 190.

The transcendental-horizonal counterparts of λόγος, the Λόγος, and λέγειν respectively are *Dasein*, being, and discourse (*Rede*). These corresponding moments, regardless their iteration, are indissoluble. There are no partitions among the phenomena, nothing separating or segregating one moment from the other moments. Hermeneutically dislodging them from each other signifies a metaphysical (dualistic) appropriation of transcendence. Λέγειν, in the final analysis, is λόγος relating back to itself from itself. Ὁμολογεῖν is λόγος relating back to itself from itself in such a way that it inhabits (*inständig*) its ownmost: the Λόγος (being or the being of beings in the whole). There is no division between λέγειν and the Λόγος as might be wrongly inferred from the understanding, as articulated in GA 55, “if human λέγειν” is to “heed” and “gather itself unto” the Λόγος, “then ‘the Λόγος’ must itself foregather this human gathering in itself and foregather beings in the whole and be present as the originary foregathering of beings in the whole in beings in the whole.”¹¹³ Λέγειν and the Λόγος are originally immanent to *Dasein*. The distinction between them (λέγειν and the Λόγος) correlates to orientation. It reflects the attempt to think being as being itself (be-ing), as the originary foregathering (*die ursprüngliche Versammlung*) and essential unfolding. Foregathering (*Versammeln*) is gathering (*Sammeln*) thought to its ownmost. Their differentiation does not imply their segregation, as Heidegger connotes when he asserts: “‘human λόγος’ must never be thought of, as the name too easily implies,” as a “gathering” that is “cut off” from the “the Λόγος” (foregathering) as if “delimited by a boundary.”¹¹⁴

The same goes for the difference between λόγος and the Λόγος. Λόγος (λόγος), understood as *Dasein*, the third meaning of the phenomenon this study proposes can be found in Heidegger’s reading of Heraclitus, is the World disclosed by its ownmost, λέγειν, an originary gathering (*die ursprüngliche Sammlung*) whose essential meaning is the Λόγος (being) (originary foregathering), or the “originary gathering” GA 65 coincides with “*Ereignis*” (enowning) (“*Durchherrscht ist es vom je verschiedenen Walten des Ereignisses, worin sich eine ursprüngliche Sammlung vorbereitet...*”).¹¹⁵ To clarify further, following Heidegger: “λόγος, said unto its essential meaning,” and discerned here as an ancient name for *Dasein*, is indeed, as Heidegger’s continues: “ὁ λόγος” (being), or the ownmost of λόγος (*Dasein*) disclosed by listening carefully to discourse (“*Rede*”) (“λόγος ist schlechthin gesagt: ὁ

¹¹³ “Das eigentlich zu Wissende ist >der Λόγος<. Wenn das menschliche λέγειν auf ihn achten, auf ihn sich sammeln soll und auf ihn sich soll sammeln können, dann muß >der Λόγος< selbst von sich aus diese menschliche Sammlung in sich versammeln und als die ursprüngliche Versammlung des Seienden im Ganzen gegenwärtig sein im Seienden im Ganzen,” GA 55, 332; AE-tr., 248. Translation modified.

¹¹⁴ GA 55, 353; AE-tr., 265. Translation modified.

¹¹⁵ GA 65, 97; EM-tr., 67.

λόγος, der Logos; die Rede ist von einem »Hören« – ἀκούειν, genauer von einem Zuvor-gehört-haben, nämlich den Logos”).¹¹⁶ The exposition of the Λόγος as the ownmost of λόγος (as well as λέγειν) does not prescind the interpretation of λόγος as *Dasein*. It does not pose the rendition of λόγος as an “either-or,” as either being or *Dasein*. It only reveals the essential meaning of λόγος: being, which invariably also means, the being-of-the-t/here.

3. Λόγος, being, and the ontological difference

Although λόγος, as rendered by Heidegger, can indeed be thought as being (as well as be-ing (*Seyn*)) and the being of beings in the whole, being (or be-ing), thought hermeneutic-phenomenologically, does not occur independently of beings. The thesis, as initially stated in SZ, is unassailable within the context of the hermeneutic-phenomenological problematic: “being is always the being of a being” (“*Sein ist jeweils das Sein eines Seienden*”),¹¹⁷ and *Dasein*, as Father Richardson remarks, is its “instantiation.”¹¹⁸ Being, thought hermeneutic-phenomenologically regardless the iteration, transcendental-horizonal or being-historical, and in line with the basic phenomenological principle, no t/here-being (*Dasein*), no World, and no World, no t/here-being,¹¹⁹ is always, invariably, and inescapably the being-of-the-t/here, and, correspondingly, the “ownmost” of *Dasein*, regardless the hermeneutical cynosure, is its “to be” (*Zu-sein*).¹²⁰

When Heidegger discerns πάντα as the whole of beings that the Λόγος, regardless whether individuated as φύσις, ἀλήθεια, or ἔν, brings forth into unconcealment from concealment, he is not proposing to decouple being and beings, which would amount to a reflective (metaphysical) act that opposes the a-theoretical encounter with the World. Instead, he is endeavoring to think being on its own terms, namely, as be-ing – which includes laboring to circumvent the metaphysical connotations of the genitive “of” and its intimation of being as a “predicate’ (*Prädikat*)...of the extant”¹²¹ – while inabiding the one-fold, or, that! t/here (*Da*)! which, as Emad emphasizes in his analysis of Heidegger’s being-historical thinking, “*must be thought at all costs*” to safeguard thinking

¹¹⁶ GA 55, 243; AE-tr., 187. Translation modified. Emphasis mine.

¹¹⁷ GA 2, 12; MR-tr., 29.

¹¹⁸ William J. Richardson, “An Interview with William J. Richardson Part 1/3.” The full remark Richardson quotes reads: “*Das «Wesen» dieses Seienden liegt in seinem Zu-sein*,” GA 2, 56; MR-tr., 67.

¹¹⁹ Kovacs, *The Question of God in Heidegger’s Phenomenology*, 61-62.

¹²⁰ Richardson, “An Interview with William J. Richardson Part 1/3,” GA 2, 56; MR-tr., 67.

¹²¹ George Kovacs, “The Ontological Difference in Heidegger’s *Zum Ereignis-Denken*,” *Heidegger Studies* 35 (2019), 181.

against the hermeneutical privations affiliated with the “perspective of beings” and the metaphysical frame of mind.¹²² Thinking λόγος, like all hermeneutic-phenomenological thinking, and notwithstanding Heidegger’s hermeneutical priority (the elucidation of being, ultimately the disclosure of the truth of be-ing, enowning), does not forgo the meaning of *Dasein* (the World). It enjoins a “reservedness [*Verhaltenheit*] that,” as explicated by Heidegger, “grounds care [*Sorge*] as the inabiding [*Inständigkeit*] that sustains the ‘t/here’ [*Da*].”¹²³ The hermeneutical power of Heraclitus’s sayings, as revealed by Heidegger, includes this reservedness. “Heraclitus’s thinking is a phenomenological thinking,” as Maly and Emad write. It “heeds the phenomenon [*φαινόμενον*],” or “that which shows itself by itself and from out of itself,” the manifest, the being-of-the-t/here,¹²⁴ within its “interplay” between the first and other beginning.¹²⁵ It says, accordingly, the meaning of being *and* the meaning of *Dasein*. It is not only about being itself (the Λόγος). The meaning of λόγος disclosed by Heidegger’s reading of Heraclitus appears to say both: λόγος is *Sein* and λόγος is *Dasein*.

Thinking being is not devoid of the meaning of *Dasein*. It only strives to let being say its ownmost as be-ing, as enowning, the essential unfolding. Heidegger’s discernment of the essential meaning of λόγος as the Λόγος, as being *and* the being of beings in the whole, notwithstanding that beings in the whole always implies its being, emanates an enactment of enowned thinking (*Erdenken*). It intimates thinking that strives, indeed, struggles, to liberate itself to be “enowned, enabled, or ‘impelled’ by ‘to be,’ by be-ing [enowning] itself.”¹²⁶ That attempt at liberation includes the endeavor to free thinking being from the hermeneutical impediments affiliated with the ontological difference. As assessed here, Heidegger’s reading of Heraclitus rides the awakening power of the ontological difference – it does not metaphysically “press” the difference “into service”¹²⁷ – to “leap” (*springen*) over the distinction between being (*Sein*) and beings (*Seiende*) and escape its metaphysical grip on thinking. It surges beyond the ontological difference to avoid “getting bogged down even more in ‘ontology,’” as Heidegger writes in GA 65,¹²⁸ not sequester thinking to the perspective of beings, and “attempt at a more originary question of being.”¹²⁹ “The ontological

¹²² Emad, *On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy*, 138-139.

¹²³ GA 65, 35; EM-tr., 25.

¹²⁴ Kenneth Maly and Parvis Emad, “Introduction: Heraclitus and Essential Thinking,” in *Heidegger on Heraclitus: A New Reading*, ed. Kenneth Maly and Parvis Emad (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986), 5.

¹²⁵ Emad, *On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy*, 106.

¹²⁶ Kovacs, *Thinking and Be-ing in Heidegger’s Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, 17.

¹²⁷ “The Ontological Difference in Heidegger’s *Zum Ereignis-Denken*,” 180.

¹²⁸ GA 65, 467; EM-tr., 328.

¹²⁹ GA 65, 468; EM-tr., 329.

difference' is a passage [*"Durchgang"*],¹³⁰ and not a layover or terminus, of hermeneutic-phenomenological thinking. Loitering or domiciling in it attenuates "the possibility (and capacity)" to disclose the ownmost of "to be."¹³¹

When differentiating the Λόγος from λόγος (as well as λέγειν) and cycling through its understanding as being itself, the being of beings in the whole, and occasionally as being as such (i.e., beings in the whole), while at same time, apparently, inabiding its essential meaning as λέγειν and that-which-is-joined-from-itself-that-joins, as the being-of-beings-in-the-whole (i.e., the being-of-the-t/here), Heidegger seems to be moving along moments continuous with an attempt to leap over the ontological difference, as well as contending with the privations ingredient to language, to inabide being as such. He appears to be striving to circumvent the objectification of being commensurate with its appropriation as something that can be separated, decoupled, or detached from beings – laboring "to divest thinking of the metaphysically-shaped understanding of the ontological difference" and discharge it (thinking) from the hermeneutical "fetters" affiliated with "formal-representational" reflection¹³² – while not forgoing the meaning of the World (transcendence). Heidegger is not destroying or annihilating the ontological difference or implying a "coalescing and mingling" of being and beings, as Kovacs further notes in his impressive study of the meaning of the ontological difference in Heidegger's *Zum Ereignis-Denken* (GA 73.1; GA 73.2) (1932-1976).¹³³ Instead, he seems to be attempting simply to let the difference go ("to abandon or relinquish it") to free thinking to inabide being as be-ing (as enowning), to cross over into the other beginning, enowned thinking, and insulate the enduring silence of be-ing from the cacophony of metaphysical speaking and reflection, to let the meaning of be-ing itself say its "primordial, originary 'differing'" from beings rather than imposing the ontological difference on being and muzzling its meaning.¹³⁴

The uncertainties evoked by Heidegger's dialogue with the thinking of Heraclitus – the different, often seemingly equivocal, articulations of the essential meaning of λόγος as the Λόγος, as being itself and the being of beings in the whole, even sometimes as beings in the whole, his investigation of the fragments yields – do not appear to be the products of any surmised inconsistencies in his thinking

¹³⁰ GA 65, 467; EM-tr., 328. Translation slightly modified.

¹³¹ George Kovacs, "The Ontological Difference in Heidegger's 'Grundbegriffe,'" *Heidegger Studies* 3/4 (1987), 70.

¹³² "The Ontological Difference in Heidegger's *Zum Ereignis-Denken*," 179, 175-176.

¹³³ Martin Heidegger, *Zum Ereignis-Denken* (1932-1976), GA 73.1 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2013); *ibid.*, GA 73.2; Kovacs, "The Ontological Difference in Heidegger's *Zum Ereignis-Denken*," 179, 181.

¹³⁴ "The Ontological Difference in Heidegger's *Zum Ereignis-Denken*," 179, 187.

or a hypostatized bifurcation of being and *Dasein* affiliated with the metaphysics of the ontological difference, as might be inferred from the “fogged up” relation between *Dasein* as *Lichtung* and *Lichtung* as such Father Richardson imputes to Heidegger’s hermeneutics. They do not imply a neglect of the phenomenological mandate to think the manifest (that-which-is-open, the one-fold) at all costs, to yield discourse (λέγειν) to the *Da* regardless the matter to be thought. Instead, they intimate the effort to let being say its meaning from itself (as be-ing) in “polymorphous and multi-sounding ways” as it essentially unfolds.¹³⁵ The ambiguities suggested by Heidegger’s reading of the fragments appear to coincide with the attempt to relinquish the ontological difference and free thinking to be enowned by be-ing. They speak to the endeavor to let being be thought as be-ing, as the essential unfolding, and say by itself and from itself its ownmost, including its distinction from beings.

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¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 175.

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