ΣΧΟΛΗ [Scholé].
Plato and the economic problem.[1]

Ivo De Gennaro[a]

ἕπεται δ᾽ ἐν ἑκάστῳ
μέτρον· νοῆσαι δὲ καιρὸς ἄριστος.
Pindar[2]

Es folgt wohl in jedem
ein Maß; Gedächtnis aber
edelste Ereignung.

There may well second[b] a measure in each;
Mind, though – noblest enownment.[c]

[a] This attempt of translation has been conducted by Daniel Zaruba, Thomas O'Halloran Jr. and Jack Krasuski. The footnotes in this text have been added by the translators; the endnotes are from the author's original text. We may sometimes employ alternative translations, which we will either announce through footnotes or add in brackets. We also thank Ivo De Gennaro for his decisive suggestions and his advice during the process of translation.

[b] The Greek ἕπεται [hépetai; *folgen* in German] indicates the following of a measure as a *free* consequence of man's minding and preserving the unseizable origin of all sense and being. The word belongs to the Proto-Indo-European root **sek*ʷ-*, which is extraordinarily rich in English. It has brought forth notable words such as *to second*, *to suit*, *suite*, *suitable*, *suant* (an obsolete adjective and adverb meaning "smooth" and "proceeding smoothly"), *to sue* (which used to mean "to follow"), *to sequest*, *sequacious* (meaning 1. "Likely to follow or yield to physical pressure; easily shaped or molded"; 2. "likely to follow, conform or yield to others"; 3. "following neatly or smoothly" [i.e. the following of musical notes or poetic feet]; 4. "tending in a single intellectual direction [i.e. the following of thought]"), *obsequy*, *obsequiousness*, *sequence*, *consequence*, etc.
We suggest the English *to second* for the translation of ἕπεται and *folgen*. We hear in *seconding* the arising of a free measure as the true "offspring" (the true "being second") that springs from out of the nullibiquitous jointing-scinding One; this springing is, however, not a causal sequence, but a *free gift*, the "agreement of nullibiety" as the inceptional granting of measure. Correspondingly, we employ *seconding* for the adjective *folglich*, and *secondliness* for *Folglichkeit*, which indicates the "degree" of measure of beings in their springing to-and-fro the nullibiquitous wellspring of all sense.

[c] Another way of translating this line might be as follows: "The i-mind, though, is the most athel (athelest) i-showance." *I-mind* is an obsolete noun which expresses the gatheredness of all human acts of minding that the German *Gedächtnis* indicates. The now obsolete adjective *athel* is etymologically closely related to the German *edel*, and is, as we see and hear it, the be3ng-wyrdal word the English language elected to indicate the same as the Greek ἄριστος [áristos]. It refers to the distinguishment of man as the "knowing being", his being enowned to the immeasurability of be3ng and to the fitting measure of world-bearing things, which is what distinguishes him from gods and animals. The coined verb *i-show* was introduced as a likely translation of *Ereignis* by the original author of this text ("i-show as the 'primal, originating, generative minding'"); we modified the coinage to the noun *i-showance* in order to translate the German *Ereignung*. The coinage stems from the obsolete English word *ishow*, a variant of "issue"; like *issuance*, *i-showance* indicates the primal generosity of being towards man, him being gifted the (mindfulness for) the sense or measure of things. For further elucidations on this word, see Ivo De Gennaro, *Weighing Way-Words*, in: *Heidegger Studies*, Vol. 40. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 259–271, 267.

1. Foreword from Pindar

Τρισολυμπιονίκαν

ἐπαινέων οἶκον ἥμερον ἀστοῖς,

ξένοισι δὲ θεράποντα, γνώσομαι

τὰν ὀλβίαν Κόρινθον, Ἰσθμίου

πρόθυρον Ποτειδᾶνος, ἀγλαόκουρον.

ἐν τᾷ γὰρ Εὐνομία ναίει, κασύγνηταί τε, βάθρον πολίων ἀσφαλές,

Δίκα καὶ ὁμότροφος Εἰρήνα, τάμι᾽ ἀνδράσι πλούτου,

χρύσεαι παῖδες εὐβούλου Θέμιτος·

ἐθέλοντι δ᾽ ἀλέξειν

Ὕβριν, Κόρου ματέραν θρασύμυθον.[3]

Praising a house that has been victorious in Olympia three times,

mild to her own natives,

and hospiting guests,

I want to mind the richly blessed Corinth,

the forecourt of Ishtmian Poseidon[4],

resplendent with glorious youth.

There bide Eunomia [fittingness[d]; *Schicklichkeit*], and also her sisters, the solid, unshakable foundation of polities,

[d] We suggest translating the German noun *Schicklichkeit* and the corresponding adjective *schicklich* with *fittingness* and *fitting*. The adjective *geschicklich*, which will be introduced later in the text, will be translated with the English *comely* by us. While both terms are very similar in that they indicate the harmonic biding of things as they are, we ought to hear in *comely* the weird(-fitting) issuance of being towards man (so it can openly sway in his mindfulness). For a detailed exposition on the meaning of *fittingness* in its twofold sense, see Ivo De Gennaro, *Principles of Philosophy. A Phenomenological Approach*. Freiburg im Breisgau: Alber, 2019, 99.

Dike [the fay[e]; *Fug*] and Eirene [ownhead[f]; *Eigentum*]; who matured out of the Same,
the hostesses of the wealth for men,
the golden daughters of the fittingly counseling (reading[g]) Themis [cense-ment; *Ent-scheidung*[h]];
they are firm in fending off Hybris [arrogance], the boldly-tongued mother of Koros [surfeit].

2. Introduction

The Latin language translates the word σχολή [scholé] as otium. From out of the Romanic languages, Italian says ozio accordingly, French says loisir, wherein the Latin licere [to be allowed,

[e] *Fug* is another name for be3ng as *Seyn*. It indicates the fairing of a world of measured, wholesome, "just" things, themselves being dis-contingently adorned with the rich sense of be3ng. Etymologically related to *Fug* are the English words (*to*) *fair*, *fairness*, *to fasten* and *to fay* ("to fit, adapt, join"; "to clean, cleanse, clear away"; "to adorn"). In order to indicate the fair jointing or faying that is indicated by the German *Fug* in English, we suggest the coinage *the fay*, which gathers together all the verbal meanings that have been indicated above. *The fair* (*itself*) and *fairness* may be alternative translations for *Fug*. The modality of this element turning against itself (its being "foul" or "un-fair"), which comes as a consequence of man's forgetfulness of it, and which the text names *Un-Fug* in German, will be translated with *the un-fay* by us.
The text introduces other path-words that belong to the concentus of words around *Fug*, which we will also explain here:
-) The adjective *fügsam* and the corresponding noun *Fügsamkeit* indicate the smooth fitting-into, the yielding, the letting oneself (or itself) be gathered into the same that is *Fug* (be3ng). The German suffix "-sam" (English "-some") indicates precisely the gatheredness into what is the same (such as *Fug*). Hence, we suggest the coinages *faysome* and *faysomeness* for the translation of *fügsam* and *Fügsamkeit*.
-) The noun *Befugnis* and the corresponding verb *befugen* refer to the enowning or weirding of *the fay*; the German prefix "Be-" indicates the endowment of *Fug*. In English, the prefixes "be-" and "a-" can indicate precisely this endowment, which is why we suggest the coinage *a-faying* for the translation of *Befugnis* and *befugen* in English.
-) The verb *fügen* ("to fit, join, joint") will be translated with the verb *to fay*; *zufügen*, another word that indicates the granting of the fay, will be translated with the coinage *to en-fay*. *Verfugen*, which names the way the intricate structural linkages or joints between the traits of being-itself relate to each other and constitute the trait-whole of being-itself, will be translated with *to in-fay*.
-) Related to *fügen* are the adjectives *füglich* and *gefügig* and the noun *Füglichkeit*, which indicate the sense of the beënt in its being allotted to the *Gefüge* (harmony) of the world. We suggest the coinages *fayly* and *fayliness* for the translation of *füglich* and *Füglichkeit*, as well as *fayful* (an obsolete word that used to mean "loyal" and "reliable") for *gefügig*. Note that these words do not carry any moral meaning, but have to be understood strictly for the relation of beings to being-itself in their measure of abidingness.
[f] *Ownhead* is an Old English word that carries the meanings "right of possession; ownership".
[g] For the pathwords *Rat* and (*er-*)*raten*, see also footnote jjj (p. 44) below.
[h] *Ent-scheidung* is usually translated as *de-cision* within current Heidegger scholarship. We suggest translating the pathword *Ent-scheidung* with the obsolete English word *cense-ment* (*sensement* with an alternate spelling), which used to mean "decision", "judgment", "verdict". Accordingly, *to sense* or *to cense* also used to mean "to judge" or "to reckon"; for the translation of *entscheiden*, we will employ *to cense*. For the adjective *entscheidend* ("decisive", "crucial"), we will use the word *censive*; for the adjective *entscheidbar*, we suggest using *censible*. In general, the word *censement* comes from the Latin *censeo* ("to decree", "to reckon", "to suppose", "to advise") as well as the Proto-Indo-European root **ḱens-*, which is related to the Greek κόσμος [kósmos]. Since κόσμος is one of the first names for the originally dis-contingent and scinded dimension of sense (as the onsettingly out-showing way in which things can show themselves in the mild shine of their due, fitting light), gifted by the (weird appearances in which the) gods (abscond) and broken within the beholding mind of the mortal thinker (i.e. the clearance of the *Da*), *cense-ment* is nothing other than the assentive acknowledgment of that dimension, held open in the mutual en-eyeing and en-owning of gods and mortals.

to be licensed, to be permitted] speaks; as a modification, in English it is called leisure. In German we say *Muße* [*Musse*; æmetta[i]]. With it we mean the time that is not taken up by the taking-care of that which is necessary [*das Nötige*]. It is thus the occasion to follow after and open up within [the dimension] where there is no need in the sense of coercion [*Nötigung*] and compulsion [*Zwang*]. Æmetta is "free time" – the time in which we are open for that which freely speaks itself to us by calling us into our biding [*Wesen*]. In æmetta "we have time".

Having-time is, thought in a bidesome way [*wesentlich gedacht*], a habitude [*eine Haltung*], in which we are taken into and let into time as towardness [*Gegenwart*][j]. Towardness is the advent of the i-been[k] [*die Ankunft des Gewesenen*]. The i-been [*Das Gewesene*] is the always already biding of the inceptional earliness [*das Schon-Wesende der anfänglichen Frühe*]. The gathering upon time –

[i] The Old English *æmetta* (also related to this word are *emptiness*, *to empt*, *empty*, *emty, æmettig*) used to indicate "freedom (to do something)", "opportunity" "idleness" and "leisure", although these meanings have now become obsolete, also within the still used derivation *emptiness*. The English *æmetta* and the German *Muße* are both derived from the Proto-Germanic *mōtanᾳ*, which means "to be allowed, to be permitted, may", which, for its part, is derived from the Proto-Indo-European **med-*, which means "to measure, to take care of, to meet". Other obsolete English verbs which belong to this root are *to mete* and *to mote*, which used to mean "to have something measured out; to find room; to have the opportunity, to be permitted". In order to recover the ontological significance of *Muße*, which is attempted in this essay, we suggest translating the German *Muße* with the English *æmetta*. *Æmetta* is the dimension in which man can learn to hold himself in a relation to the measure or sense of things (the true *time*), and thus attempt to become free; *leisure*, on the other hand, characterizes the state of "having time" as opposed to the state of being at work, although in the latter the reference to the measure of things has become forgotten and cannot be sufficiently recovered. This is because of the constitutive deficiency in which modern economics is representing the human being as being "yoked" in-between work and leisure as the "socially active animal" or the "homo oeconomicus". Thus, while *leisure* says "free time" within the first onset of thinking (within the tradition of metaphysics), *æmetta* attempts to name the dimension of freedom which inceptionally lets a need for a dis-contingent measure clear. The corresponding *Müßigsein* will be translated as *being æmettig* (the Middle English spelling of *empty*, which has now discarded the traits of the metaphysically foreset *being-at-leisure* or *being leisurely*). The ligature "æ" in *æmetta* could also help to provide a wink of "the *Innigkeit* of the crossing of the countering of god and man and the strife of earth and world", a countering which could be established if man could learn to hold himself within the dimension of *Muße* or *æmetta* (see also Ivo De Gennaro, *The Weirdness of Being. Heidegger's Unheard Answer to the Seinsfrage*. London: Routledge, 2014, 34). Consider also the related coinages "ormete-ness" and "metedness" in pathword elucidation 8 in Gino Zaccaria, *The Enigma of Art. On the Provenance of Artistic Creation.* Leiden: Brill, 2021, 24–27. Finally, compare footnote rrr (p. 47–48) later in this text, which will explain the now obsolete verb *to mote*, a word that is, as indicated before, intimately related to *æmetta* and *Muße.*

[j] *Towardness* translates the German *Gegenwart*. The older meaning of *towardness* is "[a] condition or appearance of approaching in time, coming on or impending; imminence; likelihood, prospect". On the meaning of *towardness*, see also Ivo De Gennaro, *Principles of Philosophy. A Phenomenological Approach*. Freiburg im Breisgau: Alber, 2019, 358 (n. 285). For further elucidations on *Gegenwart*, see Ivo De Gennaro, *The Weirdness of Being. Heidegger's Unheard Answer to the Seinsfrage*. London: Routledge, 2014, 11–14.

[k] The obsolete English *i-been* translates the German *das Gewesene*. Following the entry from the German dictionary of the Grimm-brothers regarding the German prefix "Ge-" ("A few things that are still to be asked or remarked with respect to this most wonderful word of our language"), we attempt to hear in the now obsolete English prefix "i-" (which corresponds to the German "Ge-"; cf. also the prefixes "a-" and "y-") a hint to the absconded origin of all things, i.e. being itself. The "i-" in *i-been* indicates precisely the gathering of what has been, which, in its forever-denied initiality, does not cease to come towards us (as *towardness*), *is own-tempered to-come*, or *eigentliche Zukunft* in German. Another way of translating the German "Ge-" might be with the English letter "y-", used as a prefix, which used to have the same function as the prefix "i-". Hence, another way of saying *das Gewesene* in English might be *ybeen*.

æmetta – is the biding of man [*das Wesen des Menschen*] and the ground of his wyrd[l] [*Geschichte*]. Insofar as man abears[m] æmetta, i.e. in-stands within the biding of time, as the keeping[n] of towardness <the keeping in which towardness consists> [*das Verhältnis der Gegenwart*], he handles[o] wyrdly in an out-showing[p] [*ausgezeichnet*] way: he thinks. Thinking as the abearing of æmetta has the character of the unnecessary, the superfluous, the useless, which is, nevertheless, not in vain, as "there-being breathes [*das Dasein atmet*]", the own-temper [*das Eigentliche*] of man en-plays and man comes to himself therein. Within æmetta, there-being handles in its off-ground and is thus the resting center of attunement and the ground of the a-faying[q] [*Befugnisgrund*] for all own-tempered striving, creating and hoping [*alles eigentlichen Trachtens und Schaffens und Hoffens*]. To the useless, which is the highest doing in the sense of such a ground-handling, belongs in an out-showing way studium. There are own sites for it, scholae, schools, although æmetta is not limited to school buildings or school books. Hölderlin cultivates æmetta "at the school of eyes blue [*an der Augen Schule Blau*]"[5], he thinks in and towards time all the more insistently [*inständiger*] the deeper the study of "homelike nature"[6] becomes. Within æmetta, the following holds: We don't have to (we mustn't), we may [*Wir müssen nicht, wir dürfen*]. With this it seems peculiar [*eigen*; lit. 'ownly'] that within the word æmetta [*Mußе*] 'having to' ('must') [*müssen*; 'mote'[r]] speaks.

[l] *Geschichte* – translated with the now obsolete noun *wyrd* – does not refer to *history* or *historicity* in any sense, but to the flashing that weirds a truth of being. To this concentus of words belong the German noun *Geschick*, which will be translated with *weird* (as a noun), the verb *schicken*, which will be translated with *to weird*, and the verb *geschehen*, which will be translated with *to worth*. For a detailed exposition of the pathword *wyrd*, see section 2.3. in Ivo De Gennaro, *The Weirdness of Being. Heidegger's Unheard Answer to the Seinsfrage*. London: Routledge, 2014, 36–43.

[m] For the translations of the German noun *Austrag* and the corresponding verb *austragen*, we suggest the English words *abearance* and *to abear*.

[n] *Verhältnis* is one of the names of being as *Seyn*: what holds itself together, and withholds itself, and thus holds (intransitively) – and *as such* also holds together and holds (transitively); what is thus held together is "in relation", and *Verhältnis* is its "relationship". In this text, *Verhältnis* resonates with *scholé*, which is related to the Greek *echein* ("to have, hold, be"). We will use two translations for *Verhältnis* and *Ver-hältnis*: The first will be translated with the now obsolete *i-hold*, which was used both as a verb ("to hold, maintain, observe, keep") and as a noun ("place of shelter or abode; hold"); the second will be translated with *keeping*, which gathers the traits of holding or keeping-to-itself, of paying attention and observing (cf. *Ereignis* [enowning]), and of preserving and ensconcing.

[o] *To handle* translates the German *handeln*. *Handeln* refers to the handling, the letting things be handled in the form of Da-sein.

[p] The German *ausgezeichnet* usually indicates distinguishedness; however, as De Gennaro shows elsewhere, *Auszeichnung*, as a pathword, is a synonym for the clearance, and calls therefore for a different translation. We suggest translating *ausgezeichnet* with the English *out-showing*. For a further elucidation, see Ivo De Gennaro, *The Weirdness of Being. Heidegger's Unheard Answer to the Seinsfrage*. London: Routledge, 2014, 190 (n. 55).

[q] For further elucidations on the coinage *a-faying*, see footnote e (p. 3).

[r] This peculiarity (*Eigenheit* or, more literally, 'ownhood') of the word-complex *Mußе*, *æmetta* and *to mote* is fully explored in section 6 and footnote rrr (p. 47–48) of this text. Compare also footnote i (p. 4) before.

Æmetta stands in opposition to un-æmetta [*Unmuße*], in which man is beset by that which is necessary [*vom Nötigen festgesetzt*]. The conceptual definition of what is necessary is changeable. First of all, we understand it as the indispensable basis for the establishment and preservation of life, so to speak as the basis of the necessities of life which cannot be dispensed with in the long term. As long as what is necessary in this sense is not secured, there-being remains constrained within the mangle of needfulness [*Notdurft*] and æmetta remains denied. However, the securing of what is necessary, we are generally told, is never the ultimate purpose, but aims to free us into æmetta and thus into the likely consummation of being human.

However, even that which we consider necessary for life is neither unambiguous nor once and for all set. If, in the narrowest sense, the concept includes the most immediate needs of the body, which are connected to the basic components of life, in a broader sense it also includes the conditions for lasting health and a secure being. But what surviving means, what healthy, what secure means, changes with the conceptualization of life itself. Soon it becomes clear: As close as the matter may be and as immediately obvious its concept may be, the limit of the necessities of life withdraws – and with it the sense of æmetta as the freedom from any kind of coercion [*Nötigung*].

Where the beënt[s] as such in the whole [*das Seiende selbst im Ganzen*] appears as life, and the growth of life appears as the single-unique being-need [*als einzige Seinsnot*], all of man's sensing and striving must focus on what is useful for the preservation and the increase of life, [which is] aimed in advance on its usefulness for life. Time and space, together with everything which appears therein, are now useful conditions for the empowerment of life, i.e. of the increase of power.

In Nietzsche's metaphysical ground-position, which thinks the beënt as life and as will to power, and correspondingly being as value, man shows himself as the not yet established animal. Its perspectival experiencing of life is unable to will the coming reality of the global, machinal force of performance that needs to be optimized in its optimizability as the condition for the increase of life. In the high-tide of his experience of nihilism, that is the nothingness of the beënt, Nietzsche records: "As one can see, what I fight is *economic* optimism". Economic optimism rests in the nihilistic conviction that with "the fact that *everybody's* expenses rise would necessarily imply that everybody's benefits rise as well." On the contrary, the following shows itself to the consummate

[s] The pathword *beënt* translates the German *das Seiende* and *Seiendes*, which are more commonly translated with the English *the being* or *beings*. For further remarks on this pathword, see pathword elucidation 8 in Gino Zaccaria, *The Enigma of Art. On the Provenance of Artistic Creation.* Leiden: Brill, 2021, 33–35.

nihilist who has nihilism already behind and beneath him: "*The expenses of all add up to an overall loss*: man becomes *less* – so that one no longer knows *what* this enormous process was good for."[7]

Only within consummated nihilism the economic problem shows its true, long unknown face, namely its principal insolubility. As long as nihilism remains unaccomplished, i.e. [as long as] the inversion of the polarity of values [*die Umwertung der Werte*] has not been completed, the problem will continue to evade ever more into the need of the machinal optimization of procedures, which will potentiate itself into the constant rising-above[t] [*Überhöhung*] in the expenditure of means, without this rising-above being accompanied by a potentiation of value. In consummated nihilism, i.e. nihilism that has been overcome, the problem solves itself by changing its form. It now shows itself to be not a quantitative, but a qualitative problem. It [this problem] lies in the way in which the will to power governs through the beënt in the whole and how it claims man as the fulfiller of its truth. In order to shape himself into his [man's] type, man has to realize and affirm that the one-and-only need is life itself and the economy that is life's own, i.e. the empowerment of the more in power. Insofar as all is life, the problem no longer lies in the attainment of a certain degree of life and quantum of power, behind which other things are waiting and promised, rather, the problem is life itself as that which must necessarily be affirmed out of the ground of its economy (the "highest will to power").

The acknowledgement of the basic character of life and its affirmation in the abearance of the will to power through the type who is empowered to it dissolves the problem into the halcyonic releasement of life, which has been released onto itself. But as long as man cannot abear the need of the will to power, which is absconded in the indigence of the beënt, within the overcoming of himself, and thus become the "sense of the earth"[8] himself, the inevitable becoming of the machinal "overall economic management of the earth" lacks a proper goal, a real what-for. The senseless plus-potentiation[u] [*Aufsteigerung*] of nothingness, i.e. the senseless, in the "enormous process" is accompanied by the growing necessity of a redeeming, sense-endowing way out.

Nietzsche's answer to the lack of the what-for, the liberation from the nihilistic movement that is coming toward from within nihilism is the counter-movement in the form of the advent of the overman. The overman comes by over-stepping over the "last man" who has "invented happiness"[9].

[t] *Überhöhung* [rising-above] does not just indicate an increasing, but the structure of power (as will to power), to wit, the rising above in view of creating the conditions of further rising.

[u] In regards to the pathword *plus-potentiation*, see Gino Zaccaria, *The Enigma of Art. On the Provenance of Artistic Creation.* Leiden: Brill, 2021, 118–119.

To the shapes of the last man belongs the *homo oeconomicus* as it is foreset [*vorgestellt*] by modern economics. Unlike the last man, the overman is capable of the setting of time as a condition for life from out of the up-winding[v] [*Verwindung*] of the thought of the eternal recurrence of the like and thus "has" (the) time as the available time-space for the potentiation of power. The human being that is liberated into his type [the overman] is capable of saying yes to the now no longer nihilistic economic problem, that is the problem of the empowering of power as an eternal one (that means now: one that is *eternally solved in each instant*). The thus had, valuelike[w] time, [as] the way out of nihilism, is æmetta, as it is thought – still metaphysically – within the dimension of the thinking of the will to power. If the principle of being is the will to power (i.e. beënts) and being itself is value, æmetta appears as the time-spacious instant of the eternal recurrence of the like and – halcyonically – as the highest will to power. The towardness of the recurring, i.e. the comingly having-been beënt [*künftig-gewesenen Seienden*], creates the space of empowering of the will to power, which wills itself and justifies all becoming, and consummates life as a whole within the truth as justice into the perfect economy of the eternal-undevaluable.

The undisguised biding of the will to power shows itself, however, in the will to will. In it the will exclusively wills itself and its own more [to wit, its own empowerment, potentiation] as the securing of the beënt through the beënt, which is determined through the steadily new self-outincreasing [*Selbst-Übersteigerung*]. The weird [*Geschick*] of the becoming more (the potentiation) of the will through the reference of the beënt towards the beënt is senseless. The senselessness of the will that only wills itself takes hold in truthlessness, which is the withdrawal [*Entzug*] of being itself. The withdrawal of being dis-times time, de-spaces space [*Der Entzug des Seins entzeitigt die Zeit, enträumt den Raum*][x], leaves the beënt to mere makeableness [*Machbarkeit*], from which it draws what abiding it still has. The un-biding [*Unwesen*] of time and space is the un-biding of æmetta, un-æmetta. In un-æmetta the endowing and founding way of studium, art and philosophy, belong to the procedure of the drilling [*Abrichtung*[y]] of man into the execution animal of the will to will, which

[v] De Gennaro clarifies the ground-trait of *verwinden* as the "trait of letting-end-in-the-onset, that is, of letting bide in the end [...] *as* the onset [...]". *Verwindung* refers to the accomplished biding of the principle, or, in another respect, the biding of a spark of the principle within an achieved metaphysical position, such as the thought of the eternal recurrence of the like. Hence, De Gennaro (provisionally) suggests *up-winding* and *in-winning* as translations for the pathword *Verwindung*. For a detailed exposition of the "concentus of words formed on *winden*", see Ivo De Gennaro, *The Weirdness of Being. Heidegger's Unheard Answer to the Seinsfrage*. London: Routledge, 2014, 188–189 (n. 46).

[w] *Valuelike* means that time takes on the character of a value here.

[x] This means that the withdrawal of being takes time and space away in such a way that time and space are staying away, and are eventually transformed into operative, parametric categories.

[y] *Abrichtung* usually refers to the training of animals and pets, or of soldiers within the military.

calculates and has lived impacts. Æmetta as the gathering on time which is lithed[z] from what is coercing, [and] in which the own-temper of man comes to bear, is now barely more than a fleeting representation of a goal. Its biding is now to be effective as a plannable value of the historical-technical production cycles of the will to will.

There may continue to be, with increasing emphases, talk of solving the economic problem in the sense of the long-term satisfaction of "absolute" needs, i.e. needs that concern the bare subsistence. Admittedly, this talk may constantly renew its prior up-to-dateness through the unresolved nature of the problem, as evidenced by constantly updated measurements (of value). But this talk has no words for the solution to the problem, i.e. for the staying-away of the inceptional lithing [*Ent-ledigung*] of what is constraining. In this staying-away the problem has its truth and its likely up-winding [*Verwindung*]. This talk doesn't mind that what is constraining is not an extant need, [and] that the beënt at all (thus also states of "bare [naked] life") is just as incapable of a hindrance of *being* as it is of favoring it.[10]

Talk of the economic problem does not suspect that within the biding of this problem being itself absconds as the will to will, whose unminded truth is un-æmetta. This talk does not know, and yet knows, that only the biding of æmetta means the inceptional lithing [*Ent-ledigung*] of the besetting [*Aufsässigkeit*] of what is necessary, and that only the litheness [*Ledigkeit*] enowned by the abearing of æmetta lets a world rise up, i.e. second, in which things are brought into their moderation. The seconding measure is the moderation of what is necessary according to the hospitality [*Wirtlichkeit*] of the world, in which the only need, which has its truth in this litheness [*Ledigkeit*], finds its sufficiency. Thus, the unsuspecting talk of the economic problem constantly leads man anew into going astray with regard to the earliest and simplest knowledge – that being is "never [a] measure" and that "there is no measure anywhere in the beënt"[11], and that, consequently, an over-winning of the problem can only be based on the awareness of the clearance of the schism [*Unterschied*].

In the un-biding of æmetta, however, the economic problem has from the start already incorporated all perspectives, so that outside of it there is no sense and no purpose, that there is no such outside. While the long-term liberation of needfulness [*Notdurft*] presents itself still as the goal of our best efforts, in truth this goal directs liberation away from itself and everything unto itself and back unto its own biding, the will to will. Thus, instead of the faying [*Fügung*] of the biding-space of

[z] *To lithe* is an obsolete English verb that means "to release; to set free". It is etymologically related to the German verb *ledigen*.

measured things, which [this faying] draws man in <claims man into the indrawal[aa], enowns man>, there is the feeding of the mere beënt into the methodically secured increase of effectivity and will, which, on the basis of goal objectives and levels of assessment, steers itself into a continuously measurable and countable measurelessness and talelessness[bb] and thus (re-)assures itself of itself [*sich in die durchgängig mess- und abzählbare Maß- und Zahllosigkeit steuert und so seiner selbst versichert*].

The economic problem, which is setting all areas of being in advance under its self-willed calculation, overtly covers up the will as a representation of the unconditionality of the beënt and its securing. Because the will is being itself, it can – from out of its temper [*wesenhaft*] – never be satisfied through a quantum of the beënt. As long as the economic problem reigns, there can therefore never be enough of the beënt. This means: The beënt is now scarce *in its biding* [im Wesen], i.e. *only* the beënt and for this reason it is itself being, which has its satisfaction and unsatisfaction only from itself. The undisguised covering-up of this fact takes the form of a must, namely the coercion [*Nötigung*] to optimize control of the beënt that is scarce in its biding, in a constantly more optimal (i.e., more willful) manner. "Scarce" now does not mean to be unavailable in satisfying quantity in terms of an extant need, but: willed in the will to will and therefore bidesomely unsatisfying. As this unsatisfying [beënt], however, it is always and, in every respect, offsettable [*verrechenbar*] against that which is itself scarce.

The scarce beënt is foreset as something makeable out of the making, which wills itself and its own makeableness. In this ground-trait of the beënt – makesomeness [*Machsamkeit*] – the will to will speaks. Makesomeness – not as a property of the beënt, but as the biding of the will to will – in conjunction with the with-making (together-making) ways [*mit-machende Weisen*] of the steering-

[aa] *Indrawal* and *to indraw* translate the important German path-words *Bezug* and *beziehen* (cf. also the "indrawal of being" [*Seinsbezug*]). *Bezug* indicates the indrawal or traction of being towards man which constitutes the "ring" of enowning. The human being natively dwells within this traction, be it in an inert and unknowing, or in an insistent and knowing manner. This indrawal also has to do with what the Ancient Greeks called *érōs*, the initial attractiveness towards the principle (for Plato: the idea), which claims, or stresses, man into an insistent acknowledgement of this principle and into letting it sway as the heart of the polis. Other likely translations of *Bezug* into English could be *draught* or *indraught* (cf. T. Carlyle: "A draught towards the Deep, a commencing giddiness."). On the etymology of *Zug* and *ziehen*, cf. also footnote hhh on *Gezüge* later in this text (p.43).

[bb] The path-word *Zahl* (usually translated with the English word "number") will be translated with the now obsolete noun *tale*. Related to this word are the verbs *to tell* and *to talk* with their now obsolete meanings of "counting" and "reckoning". *Tale* speaks in the dimension of clearing, revealing and disabsconding, it lets "counted" (or better: *told*) things appear in their fitting light of meetness. For further elucidations of the ontological significance of *Zahl* and *tale*, which may help to provide an avenue out of the long tradition of abuse of numbers and calculus, which presumably culminates in the brute computations of the contemporary economy, see Ivo De Gennaro, Die Zahl. *Eudia*, vol. 8, 1–4.

controlling making which are needed by it, and in which the human being, who is excluded from his own biding, rises up, is makeship [*Machenschaft*]. In the appearance of the foreset out-look of the overcoming of scarcity, i.e. of beinglessness, into wealth [*Reichtum*], i.e. into being, the will obtains to the eternalization of usefulness [*Nutzen*], which unbrokenly weirds itself to itself, [and] as which the will to will bides. The element of the economic problem as the overt covering-up of the will to will, which is unbound to itself, is this – bidesome [*wesenhaft*] – errancy [*Irre*].

128. The errancy of makeship [*Die Irre der Machenschaft*]
(the will to will)

> The will to will runs[cc] [*betreibt*] the facilitation of unconditional securance in arrangements and believes that this needs to be achieved first in order to build on it the rest afterwards ("culture" – spirit [*Geist*] – also unculture and unspirit). Not the circumstance that it never comes to this goal is makeship's doom, but that it generally mistakes itself in the biding of truth and believes it can first run the beënt in order then to bring forward being (which, of course, it doesn't grasp). The will to will arranges the outermost forgottenness of being in that it is still setting the out-look on being, in the mistaking of its biding, but in such a way that before all else everything is already driven into disturning[dd] [*Verkehrung*].[12]

What about æmetta in makeship? It seems as if we are delivered over to the <untimely> carrying-away [*Fortriss*] into the economy of senselessness through the entanglement in the needs made up by the will to will, which assures itself of itself as a weird of the useful. This holyless carrying-away [*heilloser Fortriss*], the unleashed makeship, does, in fact, not let itself be stopped or reversed. But makeship bides in errancy and as errancy, which means other and more than that in it there are errors or that it itself as a whole is an error which needs to be corrected. That the inhospitable economy of senselessness bides in errancy means: *in the unconditionality of the securance of the beënt through the beënt the need of æmetta refuses itself* [*in der Unbedingtheit der Sicherung des Seienden durch Seiendes verweigert sich die Not der Mußе*]; makeship is needless in regards to æmetta. But the need of æmetta has as the need of the unnecessary nothing in common with the needs of the scarcity

[cc] This passage from Heidegger's posthumous treatise *Das Ereignis* introduces two important pathwords: *betreiben* and *treiben*. The former can be used in German to indicate the operations of a business, and is used here to indicate the "facilitation of unconditional securance" by the will to will. The latter means "to drive, to propel, to impel, to push, to force" and can be used to indicate any forceful action toward another being; in the present context, it refers to the "disturning" [see next footnote] of things. We suggest translating *betreiben* with *to run* (cf. the running of cybernetic circuits) and *treiben* with *to drive*.

[dd] We attempt to translate the German verb *verkehren* with the obsolete English verb *to disturn* (*disturning* for the noun *Verkehrung*), which has the meanings "to turn aside or away; to avert, divert, pervert". It indicates the *Verkehrung* of everything by the will to will (as the un-biding of being-qua-makeship), the setting up of an unworld of sense- and worldless brute beings and the simultaneous denying of their sense.

of the beënt, nor with nihilism as the metaphysical need in which it is nothing with the beënt. This other need, which nevertheless echoes in the unleashing of the beënt into scarcity, speaks in the midst of the beënt, although [it is] ab-scinded from it, [and] absconded within the needless exclusivity of the will and its scarcity-making biding.

As soon as the scarcity-making is recognized as the will to will, which weirds itself into makeship; as soon as the exclusiveness [*das Ausschließliche*] of this making scarce is minded as the need that it is nothing with *being*, the exclusivity breaks down and turns itself into the inclusivity and unambiguousness of the one-and-only sciency: [This sciency is] that the errancy which is willed in the will to will is the place of an omitted staying-away [*der Ort eines ausgelassenen Ausbleibens*][13], as which æmetta disturns itself into its un-biding. The biding of æmetta is itself errancy, however, in turning-back [*Umkehr*], as the place of the advent – *also* of the advent of the staying-away of being. Æmetta is the place of the advent of the bespeaking of being in its turnsome refusal [*Muße ist der Ankunftsort des Zuspruchs des Seins in seiner kehrigen Verweigerung*], from which measure and i-setnesse[ee] [*Maß und Gesetz*] of faysomeness [*Fügsamkeit*] into being find the way into the beënt and bring it into a world-sense – or it denies itself and hands the beënt over to the unwaysome measurelessness. The minding retreat [*Einkehr*; lit. 'in-turn'] into this errancy instresses the meditation [*Besinnung*] toward the place of the will to will as the biding-place of makeship. While it is running the disturning of everything, the will has, so to speak, to provide room beside itself for this meditation [*Besinnung*] just as for æmetta, and thus [provide room for] the cleaving turning-space of its biding. From the thinking after which holds itself in this turning-space and its errancy there originates a look into the wyrd of the economic problem as a weird of the will to will.

3. Plato, *Critias*

The way in which we usually think about the economic problem includes a temporal aspect which can be briefly summarized as follows: "*First* the necessary must be secured, only *then* can the unnecessary arise and be taken care of". This scheme of before and after, however, ensconces in itself

[ee] The now obsolete English *i-setnesse* translates the German path-word *Gesetz*. The OED lists the meanings "institution, ordinance, statute, law" for *i-setnesse*. *Gesetz* is another name for the enowning (the ishow) and indicates the faysome abidingness of things, the way beings are fittingly, smoothly setting themselves into their time-space of selving. This includes the i-setnesse of the biding of man, which can only come about through and as the abearance of σχολή. Regarding this, compare the mind-word on p. 50 later in this text.

another temporal worthing. The rolling-off of time in the going-away from not-yet-æmetta to not-anymore-un-æmetta is at the same time the going-over from a state of being denied time to one of being granted time. Un-æmetta is the time without time, whereas the time of æmetta is the time in which there is time. Between before and after, in the going-over, time is coming by [*kommt die Zeit hinzu*]: Æmetta *is* the coming by of time. It remains unclear, at this point, how this coming by falls into a temporal aftermath to the preceding lack of time.[14]

The coming by of time also includes a spacious worthing. When it says that *first* the basic needs must be satisfied, only *then* do the higher needs come into play, the following is meant: Where the time for the opening-up to the claimings [*Ansprüche*] for the free unfolding of biding is lacking, man is constricted by his concern for what is necessary, in that the un-biding [*Unwesen*] of time denies him the space in which those claimings can reach him and find a gain-speaking[ff] [*Entsprechung*]. Æmetta is above all the advent of time and space, is the time-space of an advent. In what relation time and space stand here then, what time and space are in the first place, is the question. How is it with time when time and space are lacking? How is the flipping [*der Umschlag*] of the time of the lack [*Zeit des Fehls*], which reigns over us by taking space away from us, into the time when we are granted the space to freely reign over time, to be thought? What is worthing in, what *is* the advent of σχολή?

In the late Platonic dialogue Critias, we find a passage that deals with the connection between æmetta and the necessities of life. At this point in his narrative, Critias gives the reason for the fact that of the ancients – meaning the original Athenians that were planted by Athena and Hephaestos – only the names, but not the virtues and rules, have been handed down. This reason is: The progenitors which lived in the mountains and were unfamiliar with writing, and into which those original generations eventually passed, not only knew little and were in the dark about their ancestors, but also did not strive for such knowledge, insofar

> ἐν ἀπορίᾳ δὲ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπὶ πολλὰς γενεὰς ὄντες αὐτοὶ καὶ παῖδες, πρὸς οἷς ἠπόρουν τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντες, τούτων πέρι καὶ τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι, τῶν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν καὶ πάλαι ποτὲ γεγονότων ἠμέλουν. (109e-110a)
>
> as they themselves and their descendants were for many generations in the pressing surge [*Bedrängnis*] of what was necessary, without any way out, so that they focused their mind on that by which they were oppressed, and brought their speeches forth about it, while they were not caring for the weird that was en-fayed to the ancestors, and that had long been biding from out of the earliness.

[ff] For further remarks on the pathword *gain-speaking*, see Ivo De Gennaro, *The Weirdness of Being. Heidegger's Unheard Answer to the Seinsfrage*. London: Routledge, 2014, 186 (n. 25).

Man is addressed here as νοῦν ἔχων [noūn echōn] and λόγους ποιῶν [logous poiōn], as the one who is biding in the habitude of the mindful, naming disabsconding of the beënt as such in the whole [*als der Wesende in der Haltung des sinnend-nennenden Entbergens des Seienden als solchen im Ganzen*]. Noûς [Noūs] is the sensing minding of the disabscondment [*Entbergung*] of the beënt [which is] bespeaking itself [to man], λόγος [lógos] is the naming and building, [which is] in-gathered in mindsome gain-speaking, of the beënt itself in its disabscondedness [*Unverborgenheit*]. The ground-trait of the twofold disabsconding, and thus the onehead[gg] [*Einheit*] of the biding of man, is μέλειν [mélein], caring [*das Sorgen*], through which man is let into the whole of the beënt as disabsconded and, before that, into the worthing of disabscondedness itself. This worthing has a temporal biding: the μέλειν, which can always also just be reduced to that which is most near and lies right in front of our feet, and its urging for completion [*dessen Drängen auf Erledigung*], is at heart [*im Grunde*] μέλειν τῶν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν καὶ πάλαι ποτὲ γεγονότων, the heeding taking-over of the always already biding [*des von jeher schon Wesenden*] which has en-fayed itself upon the previous ones as a weird of the inceptional earliness.

The en-fayed is the comely towardness [*Das Zugefügte ist die geschickliche Gegenwart*] of ἀλήθεια [alétheia], in which the pre- and post-born, as belongers to this weird, have their wyrdal biding. In the brightness of the weird the forebears [i.e., those who are indigenous of the towardness of the before] come toward the next ones, in that these, according to each[hh] manner in which towardness has already claimed them and taken them into responsibility, are handed over into the abearance of ἀλήθεια. The forebears are the i-beeners [*die Gewesenen*] from the earliness. The earliness, as the time-space of the inception which has to be casted out each-whilingly, is the longest-lasting towardness. The μέλειν as a wyrdal ground-trait of man, which is turned toward the advent of earliness, is the upright taking-into-heed of this advent of the earliness into a [respective, an each-whiling] nearness of dwelling. Only from there the beënt in whole clears itself as the beënt of a

[gg] *Onehead* is an obsolete English word which used to mean "unity".

[hh] The German *jeweils* (also *jeweilig*; *je-weilig*) is still in want of a fitting English translation. *Je* refers to the at each time unique instant in which the i-been claims man into the abearance of a respective while ("*-weilig*") or measure of æmetta for the selving of things as things, and of men as mortals. *Je* is also the respective time-play-space that each being has been granted for "interpreting" what is ownmost about itself, for its selvingness; this includes, however, the unlikelihood of degenerating into the un-fair or the un-fay, in which the "eachness" shows itself as a brute constancy that obstructs the fair, fitting biding of all things in an accomplished harmony. Our tentative suggestion for the translation of *jeweils* (*je-weilig*) is the coinage *each-whiling*.

tradition. From out of this μέλειν, man is up-righted [*aufgerichtet*] into his human abiding, and thus is out-right [*aufrichtig*] man.

That which has been en-fayed upon the forebears is thus not the incidents and occurrences of the past as a closed, countable collection of facts that has done away with the here-and-now. Rather, what has been en-fayed is the weird itself of the truth [*Wahrheit*] – which needs to be taken over – of the fay [*Fug*] for the whole of the beënt. In this weird, there reveals itself the inception, which is absconded in the far-out vagueness [*Schwebe*] of its biding, and whose nearness is always in the coming, is own-tempered to-come [*eigentliche Zukunft*]. The to-come [*Zukunft*] always issues itself (measures for itself) <in an each-whiling wise> the time-space of a nearness that is in itself ab-scinding[ii] [*abschiedlich*] (i.e. ensconced back into the off-ground), in which man can dwell as the keeper of nearness, by founding a site [for this nearness] which be-homes the keeper as such and is, above all, open to the visitation[jj] by the guests as the messengers of the estrangement of the inception.

In the μέλειν, there becomes perceivable [*klingt an*] the biding of man as being uprighted, ingathered-astanding[kk], [and] mindsome [*merksam*], in the turning toward the one-and-only toward-countering [*das einzig Entgegenwartende*], from whose once founded truth a seconding word-measure finds its way into the beënt. Μέλειν is the custoditing [*das Warten*][ll] as the expectation [*Vermutung*] of the inception (μέλλειν [méllein]) and therefore never merely a taking-care of the given. It is gathering-minding disabsconding of the beënt as such from the insistent surrender to (the letting-oneself-into) [*Einlassung*] the advent of the i-been into a disabscondedness, this surrender [is] as [the] attuned [and] silence-tempered belongingness [*gestimmt-verschwiegene Gehörigkeit*] to the inceptional word (μῦθος [mūthos]) that over-owned itself in the bespeaking of silence. Critias therefore does not mean by "what has not been delivered over by the mountain dwellers" any historical-documentative knowledge about past generations. Rather the basic way of νοῦς and λόγος, which was denied to those people, is in view, namely the way from out of which and

[ii] We suggest translating the pathword *Abschied* as *ab-scission*, and the adjective *abschiedlich* as *ab-scinding*. According to the OED, *abscission* refers to "the natural detachment of a part of a plant", like a dead leaf or a ripe fruit. We hear in *ab-scission* the trait of being itself in its perpetual withholding and ab-scinding itself into its own dis-contingent, inviolable asylum, which is the Same as the ascendant nearness for a fair, fayed world.

[jj] *Visitation* translates the German *Heimsuchung*. It does not refer to any theological context here, but to the enowning of the nearness for the encountering of mortals and immortals, of men and angels.

[kk] We suggest translating the German verb *ausstehen* with the now obsolete English verb *to astand*, which carried the meanings of "to stand up, stand forth, rise up, rise, continue, endure".

[ll] *To custodite* is an old word that indicates care and protection (cf. *custody*, *custodianship*), cf. Gino Zaccaria, *The Enigma of Art. On the Provenance of Artistic Creation.* Leiden: Brill, 2021, 36.

thanks to which man himself is freed into a tradition and claimed by it. The being of the mountain dwellers is discussed from out of the sciency of the biding of man as the mindsomely gathering astanding of the weird of the inceptional time-space [*aus dem Wissen um das Wesen des Menschen als merksam sammelndes Ausstehen des Geschicks des anfänglichen Zeit-Raums*] (the far-out nearness of the inception), from which the whole of the beënt is fayed [*gefügt*] and offered in the measure of its secondliness [*Folglichkeit*] toward the schism.

The inceptional time-space disabsconds the beënt into the way of this secondliness [*Folglichkeit*] (to the world-measure), by allotting to it the sense of a fayliness [*Füglichkeit*] (to the world-harmony). The surrender [*Einlassung*] toward the thus disabsconding time is opposed to the ἀπορεῖν [aporein] or the λέγειν [légein] and νοεῖν [noein] in the relatedness to that, πρὸς οἷς ἠπόρουν [what was necessary]. This, too, namely the way of encountering the ἀναγκαῖα [anankaia] that is meant here, is characterized temporally, namely as the currently urging [*das aktuell Bedrängende*]. This is not already that which counters towards us [*Dieses ist nicht schon das Gegenwärtige*]; but the now of current actuality is the derivative time [*das Jetzt der Aktualität ist die abkünftige Zeit*] (the untime [*die Unzeit*]), which is obstructing [*verstellt*] the towardness [*Gegen-wart*] for the (seconding [*folgend*]) whole of the beënt, such that it (the beënt) is not brought out of the time-space of the en-shaking toward the courses and ways of its disabscondedness [*Entborgenheit*] and counters from there as the beënt *from the* schism.

In that the flagrancy of towardness [*das Offene der Gegenwart*] outlines the ways for the perception and from there the courses of the taking-care of the beënt, it lithes [*ent-ledigt*] man, [and it] says him free from the coercion through the necessary. In the now, on the other hand, the indrawal [*Bezug*] to the ἀναγκαῖα is the ἀπορεῖν, the pressing surge of waylessness, or unwaysomeness. In that in the ἀπορία the word of the en-faying [*Zufügung*] of the disabscondedness [*Entborgenheit*] of the beënt, which (that word) lithes and calls man into gain-speaking [*Entsprechung*], remains unheard, and the courses of disabscondment of things are not clearing themselves, the dwelling is constricted. Instead of the freeing indrawal [*befreiender Bezug*] into the disabscondment, that which is obtrusive [*das Aufdringliche*] of the necessary completion of what is gradually accruing and falling due for the steady securance of a ready stock [*Bestandsicherung*] reigns. This completion, however, never leads into such lithing. The completion remains

fundamentally averted to the lithing, i.e. the inceptional free-grant into the a-wayed letting-alight[mm] [*der anfänglichen Freigabe ins bewegte Gelangenlassen*] to the things that rest in themselves according to measures.[15]

The guiding view of Critias' account does not go towards the ἀναγκαῖα as a somehow certain basic endowment of necessary goods, on whose secured stock other things can be added. Rather, the focus is on a way of encountering, namely the urgency and the obtrusiveness of what is necessary [*die Vor- und Aufdringlichkeit des Nötigen*] in the inescapable now of the staying-away of the lithing, which transforms its coerciveness [i.e., the coerciveness of the necessary]. How? By saying man lithe [*ledig*] into the indrawal [*Bezug*] to time, and by only thus wising what is necessary as such into the measure-giving of the disabsconded whole, in which it is not merely satisfying a need of the somehow given human being, but by sufficing – through the need of being itself and the indrawal [*Bezug*] of man to this need – to the one-and-only faying of the world-harmony (the steering of the world-jointure). Within it the need of the clearance of the inception has its sufficiency. Thus, needful within the lithing means: be-weirded with the absconded measure of the sufficiency of the one-and-only need, seconding [*folglich*] from out of it and thus brought into a (world-)sense. As the wending of this pressing need [*Als Wendung der drängenden Not*] of what is necessary *from out* of the inceptional need of being, the lithing is the only own-tempered need-worthy[nn] [*das einzig eigentlich Not-wendige*], to wit, necessary for the life *of man*.

The need of ἀπορία is not conditioned by the mere fact of the quantitatively unsatisfactory availability of beings. Rather, the need is the staying-away of the time-space of the measure-grant [*Maß-Gabe*], which, insofar as it is ownsomely casted out and kept open [*sofern er eigens entworfen und offengehalten ist*], brings the beënt on the path of sufficing and releases it into a sense that is not the meager sense of the satisfaction of a "need", but the rich sense of hospitality for the dwelling of man.[16] Within the aporetic needfulness [*Notdurft*], the ἀναγκαῖα are that which is on-surging within the uncensedness [*Unentschiedenheit*] of the open, which besiege man in his time-en-opening

[mm] The obsolete English verb *to alight* is etymologically related to the German *gelangen* and means "to arrive". See also see Ivo De Gennaro, *Weighing Way-Words*, in: *Heidegger Studies*, Vol. 40. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 259–271, 262 (n. 16).

[nn] We suggest translating the German *not-wendig* with the now rare English word *need-worthy* ("worthy of a particular need"). *Not-wendig* refers to the wending, turning or instressing of the one-and-only need of being in man. Note that *-worthy* is etymologically related to the Proto-Indo-European **wert-* ("to turn, bend") and, furthermore, points to four traits which characterize the life of the one who has learned to abear the need of being in himself: 1.) "Of sufficient worth for, deserving of"; 2.) "Suitable or safe for; able to bear"; 3.) "Able to be, fit to be"; 4.) "Having the permission or freedom to".

biding and obstruct him the ways for the free out-cast of the sojourn [*Aufenthalt*] that ensconces itself in homelike things. This sojourn is only likely as an out-cast of towardness as the advent of earliness that bespeaks itself toward man, on which man within the turning-back must let himself in, in order to turn into his mortal biding.

The following says the temporal dimension of the biding of man, whose site to be fulfills the purpose of what the Greeks call πόλις (110a):

> Μυθολογία γὰρ ἀναζήτησίς τε τῶν παλαιῶν μετὰ σχολῆς ἅμ' ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις ἔρχεσθον, ὅταν ἴδητόν τισιν ἤδη τοῦ βίου τἀναγκαῖα κατεσκευασμένα, πρὶν δὲ οὔ.
>
> The gathering on the word of the inception and the re-winning[17] of the earliness (the old) namely comes together with æmetta into the cities, when it becomes mindable for Some how what is necessary for life is already fully prepared, but not before.

The sentence reads itself at first like evidence for the usual conception of the economic problem: Through the founding of something like a πόλις [pólis], i.e. the creation of appropriate normative, political, military and economic "framework", the basic needs of life are covered more and more effectively and sustainably. The consequence of this is that more and more citizens have to spend less and less time for the procuring of the necessaries for bare life, so that soon Some will have sufficient time or can be granted enough time to devote themselves to things that are not essential for bare survival, but are nourishment for spirit and soul, such as mythology or the study of pre-times. This uplifting [matter] is itself regarded as a separate and higher need, provided it is recognized that it belongs to the perfecting of the single human being as well as the community of human beings to understand oneself from out of a provenance and to cast oneself out into a to-come [*Zukunft*].

All of this has its correctness, but in the end, it says nothing, namely nothing bidesome [*nichts Wesentliches*]. The passage, however, wises (points) into the ground-keeping of the wyrdal human being [*weist ins Grund-Verhältnis des geschichtlichen Menschen*]. It says the enowning, in which the venture of the founding of the πόλις reaches its goal and man comes to stand before the unobstructed there-being [*vor das unverstellte Dasein*]. It is the instant when the πόλις itself openly becomes the πόλις, i.e. the site of nearness, in which the human being, by being over-owned to the contending [*Erkämpfung*] of this site, can enter into his free biding and can come to himself as the custodian of the truth of being as schism. The custodianship for this truth, and thus for the comely

granting of the beënt [*die geschickliche Gewährung des Seienden*] (τὰ πάντα), is in itself the guestly[oo] freedom vis-à-vis the divine hostesses [*Gast-Freiheit gegenüber den göttlichen Wirtinnen*], who allot the whole as wealth into the safekeptness of its biding [*die das Ganze als Reichtum zuteilen in die Gespartheit seines Wesens*].

The now unobstructed there-being [*Dasein*], from which only the πόλις is delivered over into its nearing inscape [*ihr näherndes Wesen*], the πολιτεία [politeía], is σχολή. Μυθολογία [Mythología] and ἀναζήτησις τῶν παλαιῶν [anazētesis tōn palaiōn; the re-winning of the earliness] are for their part out-showing ways of the abearing of σχολή while standing in it [σχολή]. In such λέγειν and νοεῖν man remembers himself into the inception, lets himself tune on its word and becomes insistent [*inständig*] in the mindsome gathering of the inceptional [*in der aufmerksamen Versammlung des Anfänglichen*]. Only now the beënt in whole is disabsconded for him as wealth, i.e. as that which is sufficing in measure and light in its wholeness, which has been handed over from out of the inceptional dislocation [*als das Genügende im Maß und Licht seiner aus der anfänglichen Entrückung gereichten Ganzheit*], whose in-rooming and ensconcing (of this dislocation [*Entrückung*]) is the πόλις itself in its inscape [*im Wesen*]. Πόλις [Pólis] is the whole of wealth, where the beënt is fore-let into its sufficing, [and] man is let into his saving biding. Own-tempered saving is saving of the safekeptness of wealth out of its i-setnesse. [*Eigentliches Sparen ist Sparen der Gespartheit des Reichtums aus seinem Gesetz*]. Safekept wealth is hospitality [*Gesparter Reichtum ist Wirtlichkeit*].

But if the inscape [*das Wesen*] of the πόλις only becomes free through σχολή and the saying and minding that comes with it, then this circumstance implies that man is only prompted towards the founding of the πόλις from the inkling of the absconded enownment of σχολή as the time-space of the schism, in order then, unexpectedly, in Some and through Some, to be ownsomely taken into this enownment, to be overcome by the need of σχολή and to be called into the astanding gain-speaking [*ausstehende Entsprechung*] to its inscape [*Wesen*] (i.e. the inception itself) in the indrawals [*Bezüge*] of νοῦς and λόγος. The enownment of the schism into its truth is cense-ment [*Entscheidung*]. The overcomingness [*Überkommnis*] of the dis-location of man into the inceptional indrawals of biding [*die anfänglichen Wesensbezüge*] is named in the quoted passage as the Same with the becoming mindable [*Merklichwerden*] of the fact that everything is prepared [(fore-)readied; (*vor-*)*bereitet*] and appointed, and i.e. cleared in the coming meetness [*Eignung*], in the likely sufficing for the one-and-only venture which is the inceptional itself and the dwelling

[oo] *Guestly* is an obsolete adjective which means "suitable for guests" and "hospitable".

being-on-the-way to it. "Readied (Prepared)" does therefore not mean here: ready for the covering of needs that are extant in themselves, but: *lithed into the abeyance of measure, which only seconds from out of the mind of the cense-ment, and thus simultaneously rich in the need of the cense-ment and poor in the endowment of wealth from out of the founding winning of the inception*[pp]. The becoming mindable [*Das Merklichwerden*] of the readiness (preparedness) of what is necessary, as the clearance of its off-settedness [*Ausgesetztheit*] into the abeyance of meetness [*Eignung*] is at the same time the minding of man on the being minded and the being on-owned of his biding through that which absconds itself in this becoming mindable [*Merklichwerden*], namely the claim of the inceptional itself and its need to be founded.

If one grasps the being-prepared of what is necessary as the prerequisite for the lithed [*ent-ledigt*] and therefore "higher" νοεῖν and λέγειν, again something right is hit and yet the truth is missed. For what appears as a condition is cleared unto its awaitingness (abeyance) (its hoping [*Verhoffen*] that stands in the word of the need of the one-and-only [*das Einzige*]) only from out of the need of being, thus in its coming meetness [*in seiner künftigen Eignung*] only mindable [*merklich*] from a fore-going (preceding), fore-worthing, into whose be-standing [*Beständnis*] man is called. This fore-worthing is σχολή and that which claims the human being into abearing it. The minding of the fact that what is necessary for the life *of man* is prepared in whole *for being* [namely, for the being of the truth of beings], is only likely as the enowning of σχολή as the flagrancy for the over-ownment of man unto the belongingness to the inception. It is only in this truth that the true meetness [*Eignung*] of things flashes for the bodying there-being [*das leibende Dasein*]. Being-prepared therefore does not mean material conditions of life taken for themselves, but the coming wealth of the meetness of the beënt [*den künftigen Reichtum der Eignung des Seienden*]. This meetness [*Eignung*] and thus the own-tempered sufficing, only seconds, simultaneously with it, from the sufficiency of being, i.e. from the enownment, which is the sciency of σχολή and the outlining of the dimension in which ways and means of the frugal economizing are inscribed.

That which is cleared in the minding [*Aufmerken*] has its center of origin in the need, to which νοῦς and λόγος are brought into the open gain-speaking [*in die offene Entsprechung*] through σχολή. In that with σχολή the belongingness of man into the inceptional word becomes mindable [*merklich*]

[pp] In German: "[…] *geledigt in die Erharrung des Maßes, das nur aus dem Gedächtnis der Ent-scheidung folgt, und also zumal reich an der Not der Ent-scheidung und arm an der Stiftung des Reichtums aus der gründenden Gewinnung des Anfangs.*"

and a wyrdal humanity becomes over-owned into its biding, so that the indrawal [*Bezug*] of man into the inception freely sways out, the beënt shows itself in its likely sufficing for the thus indrawn and brooked biding of man [*zeigt sich das Seiende in seinem möglichen Genügen für das also bezogene und gebrauchte Menschenwesen*], i.e. in its receptivity for the measure of sufficiency of the inception. Thus, in the over-ownment of man into the time-space of σχολή, whose site is the πόλις, that which is necessary is disabsconding itself as that which it always already was, and i.e. *is* in its biding: the beënt *of the* need of σχολή and thus that which is prepared in the whole for the dwelling, which en-founds itself in the abearance of σχολή. Because this abearance is the insistency [*Inständigkeit*] in the belongingness into the inceptional word, therefore what is necessary in life is what it is – namely the what is placed for the need-worthy [*das Bestellte für das Not-wendige*] – only in the gain-speaking toward the word of the inception, whose claim wends the need of ἀπορία into the measure of hospitality.

If one separates the necessary from this worthing of the measure-grant and considers it "in itself" [*an sich*], the erroneous misconception easily arises that what comes "before" σχολή – namely the "phase" of ἀσχολία – can, as a precondition of σχολή, follow rules that are in themselves, i.e. independent of it. <It thus appears that> the requirements of this precondition must first of all – admittedly without losing sight of the long-term goal of σχολή – be obeyed by ignoring the "virtues" and "freedoms" that will later unfold thanks to σχολή, while, as soon as σχολή is achieved through the carried-out provision of what is necessary, at the same time, the ill of ἀσχολία is at least largely overcome. Thus, the unpostponable, which is always already steadfastly countering towards man, appears as such, which must *first* be renounced, which must be postponed *for now*. Because the biding of time, according to which σχολή waits in an "after" that follows a "before" of ἀσχολία, is derivative from out of the towardness of σχολή [*abkünftig ist aus der Gegenwart der σχολή*]; therefore ἀσχολία, as a matter of principle, cannot lead to σχολή. In σχολή, however, lies the i-setnesse of biding: In that the need of σχολή breaks open, *there* – in this mindableness [*Merklichkeit*] – what is necessary for man (as the bodying warrantor of the nearness of the inception [*als den leibenden Bürgen der Nähe des Anfangs*]) moves over into the dimension of its likely sufficing. The necessity of what suffices in the whole attunes itself by the need of being that is en-founded from out of the abeared σχολή. Σχολή itself is at first and at last attuned from this need.

The Some [*Die Einigen*], through whom μυθολογία and ἀναζήτησις τῶν παλαιῶν as sciencing insistency [*als wissende Inständigkeit*] within σχολή comes into the πόλις, form the tale of those who

are openly called into this mindableness [*Merklichkeit*] and thus into the custodianship of the inscape of the πόλις. These mindsome ones are the founders and keepers of the *provenance* of hospitality. As such they keep the truth of the original measure-grant, from which everything is lithed into its measure of sufficing, so that absconded in this sufficing the claiming need of sufficiency of the lithing speaks, into which the biding of man is brooked. On the other hand, the concept of those Some is inadequate as long as they are foreset in their biding as those who, because they are freed from the compulsion of the satisfaction of basic needs, finally have the leisure to devote themselves to the study of myths and the more distant past, out of a now awakening urge [*Antrieb*].

It is a fact that the pressure of life's necessities may interfere with and hinder the a-seizing of the likelihood of σχολή. However, this fact does not justify, quasi as a reverse conclusion, to posit the handling of those necessities as a prerequisite that is extant in itself for the access to σχολή. Why? Because there is no such thing like a pressure of life's necessities, extant in itself – because "pressure of life's necessities" *is not an ontic determination*. The own-tempered conditional [*Das eigentlich Bedingungshafte*] of the ἀναγκαῖα only flashes in the litheness [*Ledigkeit*] for the meetness [*Eignung*], enowned in the instant of the over-ownment of man into σχολή. Accordingly, the sense of "handling necessities", ἀ-σχολία, attunes itself each time from the indrawal [*Bezug*] to σχολή, i.e.: that handling has, as to its biding, everything to do with the lithing from the surge of the necessary [*der Entledigung vom Andrang des Nötigen*], but such lithing has, as the to-itself ab-scinded provenance of the measure-grant of sufficing, nothing to do with that handling. In the mindsomeness [*Aufmerksamkeit*], in which a humanity minds itself in Some out of the ground-trait of σχολή, lithes itself from the coercion through what is necessary and sees itself [as] over-owned into the keepership of the provenance of wealth, this humanity stands up in its wyrdal biding. Because everything depends on the instant of minding and the insistency in σχολή – and not on the ascertainment of the accomplished satisfaction of needs (in fact, one would not know from where it [this ascertainment] could take its measure) – that is why Plato writes: ὅταν *ἴδητόν* τισιν ᾖδη [hótan idetón tisin éde; as it becomes *mindable* for a few ones that] …

Thus, the Some are those who mind one thing: the appearing of the beënt as such as prepared, in abeyance of the meetness [*der Eignung Harrendes*] *from out of* the fay of the enownment of fittingness that claims the biding of man [aus *dem das Menschenwesen beanspruchenden Fug der Ereignung der Schicklichkeit*], [and] from which ownhead finally clears itself. The time-space of the

enownment of fay, fittingness, and ownhead is the truth of the hospitable. This [the hospitable] is pre-pared (fore-readied) [*vor-bereitet*] as such, i.e. allotted through and kept by the hostesses[18]. The Some are the mindsome ones who, by bethinking the provenance of hospitality, en-found and ward the πόλις as the one-and-only wealth. This provenance is the cense-ment as the enownment of the schism. [*Diese Herkunft ist die Ent-scheidung als Ereignung des Unterschieds.*] That is why Εὐνομία [Eunomía], fittingness, is in itself *scindsome* [schiedsam], in that every human statute fays itself to the weird of the schism; moreover Δίκη [Díke], the fay, is *scindly* [schiedlich], in that through her the censement obtains as the all-clearing to-owning of the truth for the whole; finally Εἰρήνη [Eiréne], ownhead, is *chaste* [bescheiden], in that from the withheld harmony of the time-space of enownment [*aus dem verhaltenen Gefüge des Zeit-Raums der Ereignung*] the i-owned[qq] (the i-risen[rr]) [*das Geeignete*] shines in the mild glamour of the absconded ab-scission [*im milden Glanz des verborgenen Abschieds scheint*].

The νοεῖν and λέγειν of the Some is the mindsome insistency in σχολή as the building of the truth of the schism, from which the measure of the lithe beënt seconds [*das Maß des ledigen Seienden folgt*]. Σχολή and its need is overcoming once the inceptional (ἤδη) preparedness of what is necessary in the whole (κατα- [kata-]) becomes mindable [*merklich*] *as the claim of the need of being*. Therefore, the being-prepared does not rest upon the mere set-up-ness or availability of means, but is in itself already the awaiting for the sufficiency of being, from which the sufficing of things of the world-harmony dis-encumbers itself [*der sich das Genügen der Dinge des Welt-Gefüges entringt*]. In the mindableness [*Merklichkeit*] of the being-prepared as the clearance of sufficing, the lithing from the coercion through what is necessary has already worthed itself. The minding on the awaited meetness [*Eignung*] is already allottedness [*Verwiesenheit*; lit. 'inwisedness'] into σχολή and the sciency that belongs to it, as the mind of the fay [*als Gedächtnis des Fugs*]. As the bearer of the mind, man goes into the inceptional earliness of his biding, which finds its one-and-only site in what the Greeks call πόλις.

The sciencing in-breaking into the inceptional word of the time-biding as the abearance of σχολή is named in the text, in an ownsome way, as the instant – and i.e.: as the Same – of the minding on the preparedness of the beënt:

[qq] For the pathword *i-owned*, see Ivo De Gennaro, *The Weirdness of Being. Heidegger's Unheard Answer to the Seinsfrage*. London: Routledge, 2014, 113.

[rr] The obsolete English verb *to i-rise*, which has carried the meanings "to become", "to suit", "to be suitable to", may be another likely translation of the German *geeignet*.

ἔρχεσθον ὅταν ἴδητον
… comes, *as* it becomes mindable …
[… kommt, *da* merklich wird …]

The ὅταν [hótan] says the flagrant time-space of that which is a single-unique worthing: the advent of the insistent sciency of the a-faying [*das Kommen des inständlichen Wissens der Be-fugnis*] *as* the minding on the preparedness (the need of meetness [*die Eignungsnot*]) of the whole. This time-space is, according to the sense of the ὅταν[19], betuned through the comely vagueness of the cense-ment [*die geschickliche Schwebe der Ent-scheidung*]. That the sciency comes, is over-comingness, says: This sciency is above all the advent of the brooking say of the disabsconding and the gain-saying [*ent-sagend*] insistency in it – μυθολογία; and: the gain-cast of the over-ownment of the i-been is, as the re-winning of its advent, the fulfillment of the disabscondedness of the inception – ἀναζήτησις τῶν παλαιῶν. Both arrive, in the biding-onehead [*Wesenseinheit*] indicated by the dualis ἔρχεσθον [erchesthon], *through*, i.e. simultaneously with, σχολή, which is nothing other than the flagrant i-hold [*Ver-hältnis*], gathered into the inceptional word, of the abearing of the time-space of vagueness, *as* such worths. The there of vagueness, σχολή, which has to be overtaken in its need, enowns itself simultaneously with the minding of what is necessary, and thus lithes itself into the "well-placedness" [*Wohl-Bestelltheit*[ss]] that is in abeyance for meetness [*Eignung*].

In that within the enowning of σχολή the sojourn of man becomes a mindsome one – a-fayed [*befugt*] into the mindsomeness of the necessary habitude [*die Aufmerksamkeit der notwendigen Haltung*] of λέγειν and ἀναζητεῖν –, man is set free [*ent-setzt*] from the obtrusiveness of the τοῦ βίου ἀναγκαῖα, i.e. from their encountering in ἀπορία [aporía], which, at each time, coerces into the exclusive handling of the next and the urgent. Such a liberation, being set free [*Ent-setzung*] from the over-surge [*Überdrang*] of the ἀναγκαῖα, cannot be achieved ontically, for example through the provision of goods and services: only the minding on that which claims man through the need of σχολή into his biding, is that which is setting free [*ent-setzend*], in which being-set-free [*Entsetzung*] the coercing way of encountering the ἀναγκαῖα has already collapsed. Of course, this collapse cannot miraculously solve a material need. Rather, only in the advent of the word-flagrancy of being breaks the threat of the unleashed and most besetting fore-surge of the beënt [*die Gefahr des entfesselten*

[ss] This word refers to the poem *Ein Winterabend* by the Austrian poet Georg Trakl. It means that everything is well taken care of, ready for the advent of its truth, ready to shine in its truth.

und aufsässigsten Vordrangs des Seienden], namely the confusion of the beënt with being in the utmost degeneration of the say and the word. The Greeks call this threat ὕβρις [hybris].

In the ὅταν the ἀναγκαῖα show themselves as what is necessary for life, lithed out of the need of being, which has its sufficing in the hospitable measure, (and) thus ensconces the sufficiency of being and its truth. What is necessary in the measure of sufficing is bespoken to the dwelling of man in æmetta (i.e., the astanding insistency in the time-space of the advent), while it is, at the same time, left over to the hybris [*Vermessenheit*] of the un-biding of being in the grimmest refusal.

The question of economy as the interrogation of the measure-grant for the beënt in whole arises out of the over-comingness of the need of the cense-ment, which clears itself as the preparedness of what is necessary in whole – πρὶν δὲ οὔ [prin de oú; but not before]. The question arises when the golden threefold of the hostesses of wealth, which is in-fayed into the absconded cense-ment, instresses man into the heed of hospitality [*Die Frage entsteht, indem die goldene, in die verborgene Ent-scheidung verfugte Dreifalt der Wirtinnen des Reichtums den Menschen in die Hut der Wirtlichkeit nötigt*]. This corresponds to the instressing [of man] as the indweller in the mind, which, fore-thinking the hostesses, abears σχολή as the time-space of the advent of the cense-ment. As this fore-thinker, man is the guest-host. Economy is sciency *of* σχολή and its need, hearkening to the word that is tuned toward the time-space of the inception, upheld in a single-unique νοεῖν and λέγειν, which commemorates[tt] [*gedenkt*] in a-fayed attentiveness [*in befugter Achtsamkeit*] the advent of the i-been as the gift of hospitality – as the original be-hosting [*als der ursprünglichen Be-wirtung*].

The Some are the inceptional economists of the πόλις. They mind the following: So, that *was*, and that means: that is *in the biding*, the taking-care of the ἀναγκαῖα in the πόλις: ἀσχολία, awaiting preparation and appointing *for* the to-be-founded enownment of the whole. This minding, however, is as such already the ab-scinding insistency in the need of σχολή as the i-hold [*Ver-hältnis*] of the abearance of the truth of the schism in the ways of μυθολογία and ἀναζήτησις τῶν παλαιῶν. In the over-taking of this need the venture of the πόλις-foundation comes to the end, i.e.: into the inception. Being set free into the inceptional end [*Ins anfängliche Ende ent-setzt*], man is openly delivered over into the censement of being-human and is thus – unlike the περιλειπόμενον ἀεὶ γένος [perileipómenon aeì génos; the stock that survived on each occasion] of the mountain dwellers

[tt] *To commemorate* is our suggested translation of the German *gedenken*. It indicates the gathering of thinking and thanking toward the gift of hospitality. The obsolete English words *i-think* and *i-thank* may also be capable of saying *gedenken* and *Gedächtnis* in English.

(109d) – in threat of losing it, i.e. of falling out of his biding. Thus the indweller of the πόλις, as the place of becoming human – because he is placed in a game, in which is at play the a-faying to hold and stand within the indrawal of being [*die Befugnis zu Halt und Stand im Seinsbezug*] – is in his biding (as Sophocles dights in *Antigone*) ὑψίπολις ἄπολις [hypsípolis ápolis]: [the indweller is] over-towering[20] the πόλις in the mindsome erring towards the fay, as whose fortress the πόλις is the site of the disabscondedness of wealth; at the same time [he is] as this over-towering [one] thrown into the threat of the un-fay [*Un-Fug*], in which the πόλις as this site [of the disabscondedness of wealth] falls apart, and man loses the mild homeland, as the god avoids the inhospitality that seconds.

4. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*

The venture of the πόλις, which through μυθολογία and ἀναζήτησις τῶν παλαιῶν openly enters into its wyrd, shapes itself into the likelihood of philosophy. The πόλις-foundation is, as the absconded censement of man unto his biding, a thinking handling [*eine denkerische Handlung*]. Through it, a humanity openly casts itself out towards the indrawal of being and lets itself tune into the errancy of the en-founding and keeping of the time-space of the cense-ment. That before and after the Greeks, cities were built and destroyed, states and empires were founded and dissolved, without the developing of a sciency of the kind that philosophy is, does not contradict this. Πόλις means: Site of the sciencing abearance of σχολή, in which what is necessary for life is committed to the need of the a-faying censement [*darin das Nötige des Lebens sich der Not der befugenden Entscheidung fügt*] and receives its measure of meetness from out of it [from out of this cense-ment].

Aristotle introduces σχολή in the first chapter of the first book of his *Metaphysics* (981 b 20–25) in the context of those ἐπιστῆμαι [epistēmai] that are not directed towards what is immediately necessary. The consideration is analogous to that of Critias, right down to the choice of words:

> ὅθεν ἤδη πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κατεσκευασμένων αἱ μὴ πρὸς ἡδονὴν μηδὲ πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εὑρέθησαν, καὶ πρῶτον ἐν τούτοις τοῖς τόποις οὗ πρῶτον ἐσχόλασαν. διὸ περὶ Αἴγυπτον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ πρῶτον τέχναι συνέστησαν, ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἀφείθη σχολάζειν τὸ τῶν ἱερέων ἔθνος.
>
> Whence everything <useful and pleasant> has already been showing itself as fully prepared, there the ways of insistent sciency were opening up, which is directed neither to what is necessary nor to what is pleasant, namely [the ways of this sciency] opened up at first in those places where æmetta first came to be upheld. That is why the mathematical ways of knowing developed first in Egypt; for it was there that the priesthood was appointed to the abearing of æmetta.

Sciency that goes beyond the useful and the pleasant, i.e. sciency that is concerned with the useless, is what Aristotle calls σοφώτερον [sophóteron], i.e. a sciency that is ownsomely insistent in the holding-out of the clearing indrawal, in which man remains wised into his biding, which is precisely that indrawal [*Bezug*]. The highest form of such an insistency, which even otherwise remains attuning and measure-giving for all sciencing of things, is philosophy as the ἐνέργεια [enérgeia] of the νοῦς that is in-owned into the fay of the schism and into the keeping [*Verhältnis*] of its truth. The over-ownment of νοῦς into this ground-keeping [*Grund-Verhältnis*] is, however, only likely in and through σχολάζειν [scholázein], i.e. in the abearing of σχολή out of the ab-scindingly indrawing middle [*aus der abschiedlich beziehenden Mitte*], whose time-space is σχολή itself. The own-tempered εὐδαιμονία [eudaimonía] rests upon such σχολάζειν.[21]

Aristotle explores the relation [*Verhältnis*] between σχολή, εὐδαιμονία and νοῦς in the seventh chapter of the tenth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Νοῦς is the mindsome meditation [*die merksame Besinnung*] *in* man – the mind of the schism, through which man is beyond himself by minding the request of the cense-ment [*das Ansinnen der Ent-scheidung*]. This awakens man into the advent of the i-been (the cense-ment itself as towardness), [and] takes him into his time-wake, time-thinking biding [*holt ihn ein in sein zeitwaches, Zeit denkendes Wesen*]. The biding of man, the mindsome meditation toward the request, is [the] biding indrawal *of* being, and i.e. being itself *as* the indrawal of meditation, out of which indrawal the courses and measures for the dwelling of man clear themselves. As this meditation is νοῦς "the divine (godly)" in man, i.e. the likely capacity of the in-rooming of the nearness of the god and the founding of dwelling in the encounter with him [*das Vermögen der Einräumung der Nähe des Gottes und der Gründung des Wohnens in der Entgegnung mit ihm*]. The wake astanding of this nearness, εὐδαιμονία, rests upon σχολάζειν as the abearing insistency in σχολή. It [σχολή] bides as the time-spacious keeping of nearness for the encounter of god and man [*als zeit-räumliches Verhältnis der Nähe für die Entgegnung von Gott und Mensch*].

Philosophizing is the ἐνέργεια of the ἀρετή [areté] of νοῦς. The word ἀρετή says the over-ownedness into the indrawal of being, i.e. into the out-showing capacity of letting be [*ins ausgezeichnete Vermögen des Seinlassens*]. The ἀρετή of νοῦς is therefore not something human, i.e. not one human doing among others, therefore also not "leisure" in the sense of the mere liberation from being-active. Rather, ἀρετή is biding indrawal of being and as ἐνέργεια θεωρητική [enérgeia theōretiké] the a-borne indrawal of the provenance [*der ertragene Bezug des Ursprungs*] (ἀρχή [arché]) *towards* man, in which the provenance itself, brooking man, is warded in its flagrancy. The

time-spacious keeping [*Verhältnis*] of this flagrancy is σχολή. The originary νοῦν ἔχειν [noūn echein] as σχολάζειν therefore has, as the out-holding of σχολή, brooked by σχολή itself, as the time-space for the encounter of man and the gods, its attuning out of the inception of σχολή, into whose biding it belongs. Because the ἐνέργεια of ἀρετή of νοῦς is the abearance of the nearness of the non-human middle for that encounter, philosophizing has nothing to do with mere being-human. The following therefore applies to the εὐδαιμονία of νοῦς: it is κεχωρισμένη [kechōrisméne] vis-à-vis the human being and *its* εὐδαιμονία (cf. X 8, 1178 a 22), and i.e.: schismed into its own χώρα [chóra], biding as the nearness *of the* schism *for* the comely encounter of man and gods [*die geschickliche Entgegnung von Menschen und Götter*]. The εὐδαιμονία of νοῦς and the ἐνέργεια of σχολή are the Same.

So while philosophizing has, in terms of its likelihood, nothing to do with being-human, being-human has, in turn, everything to do with philosophizing. For only through it (i.e. biding in the indrawal to the schism), man turns into the onefold of his wyrdal biding [*kehrt der Mensch in die Einfalt seines geschichtlichen Wesens ein*]. The Greeks call this retreat [*Einkehr*] παιδεία [paideía]. From out of this onefold [*aus dieser Einfalt*], human awaiting and caring, remembering and festing, receive their own measure and light of dwelling in the nearness of the schism.

The fact that philosophy needs the one who philosophizes and this [philosophizing] one needs what is necessary for the life of man, does not already place philosophizing as such on the basis of the mere being-contingent of man. The σχολάζειν as θεωρεῖν [theōrein] is in itself αὔταρκες [aútarkes], i.e. from out of itself sufficient for itself and ensconced in its own biding – the ab-scinding sufficiency of being. In contrast, φύσις [phýsis], the being-human in whole, is, in regards to the out-holding of θεωρεῖν not αὔταρκες, but requires some θεραπεία [therapeía], i.e. en-holding (preserving) care and hospitality (X 9, 1178 b 35). However, this θεραπεία is attuning itself from out of the αὐτάρκεια [autárkeia] of σχολάζειν: The fitting measure (μετρίως [metríōs]) of that which is needed for the bodying ἐνέργεια of philosophizing only shows itself out of the – within the sufficient θεωρεῖν – envisaged and held open "whence" (ὅθεν [hóthen]) of meetness, from out of which the useful and the pleasant have cleared themselves as already pre-pared (fore-readied) in the whole [*als schon im Ganzen Vor-Bereitetes gelichtet hat*].

The being of man therefore stands under the i-setnesse of biding, which Aristotle expresses most succintly as follows (X 7, 1177 b 4–5):

ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολάζωμεν. [ascholoúmetha gàr hína scholázōmen.][uu]

Because an i-setnesse of biding comes to language here, we must not misunderstand what is being said by basing ourselves on the common understanding of σχολή as leisure. According to it, Aristotle would affirm the universally known fact that we are holding off from leisure (i.e. work and are busy), in order to – at some point in time – know the true promise of leisure (i.e. the freeness from all busyness). Already Aristotle would have known what the guiding belief of the modern economist is: the prospect of non-leisure is the leisure (to be postponed for the time being). In this way, Aristotle's dictum would once again point to the ultimate orientation and driving motivation of the useful being-active, which would always remain a path and a means to an end that lies outside of it.

In fact, σχολή can be laid out as a goal and as an end of ἀσχολεῖσθαι [ascholeisthai] which is scinded from the latter. But the truth of this determination only shows itself when we understand the end as an achievement [*als Vollendung*[vv]], in which that which ends in it has its biding. The medially used ἀσχολεῖν [ascholein] (to hold off from σχολή, to occupy) does not mean the voluntary or on-forced renunciation of a state of being æmettig [*den freiwilligen oder aufgezwungenen Verzicht auf einen Zustand des Müßigseins*], which is indeed already present by the fact that doing is refrained from, but which must precisely be broken in order to establish itself lastingly as a result of the activities that aim towards it [i.e. the initial, but precarious state of being æmettig]. Rather, the ἀσχολεῖσθαι is attuned as a being whose *biding* rests upon σχολάζειν, i.e. whose sense and measure, non-sense and un-measure is determined by the extent to which it ensconces the swaying indrawal [*Bezug*] of σχολάζειν and hearkens to it. Every ἀσχολεῖσθαι is already somehow or other a being in σχολή, i.e. mediated through σχολή into the brooking of the inception. The brooking mediating into the biding-place is the own-tempered sense of ἵνα [hína; there-fore; *da-mit*].[22] The ἀσχολεῖσθαι is what it is for the sake of σχολάζειν.

The word σχολάζειν names the biding of man, which carries itself out as νοεῖν and holds open, in εὐδαιμονεῖν [eudaimonein], the flagrant nearness of the encounter toward the god's hosting. This nearness is the time-keeping itself [*Diese Nähe ist das Zeit-Verhältnis selbst*]. From it, the

[uu] This dictum remains untranslated in the German original of this text. For further elucidations of this dictum and its likely translation, see Ivo De Gennaro, *Principles of Philosophy. A Phenomenological Approach*. Freiburg im Breisgau: Alber, 2019, 18–25.

[vv] Another translation for the German *Vollendung* could be the now obsolete English word *fullending*.

meetening[ww] moderation springs toward things [*entspringt den Dingen die eignende Mäßigung*]. The σχολάζειν that carries itself out as νοεῖν is nothing human in its biding. As the abearance of σχολή it attunes itself from out of the way of gain-speaking toward the a-faying word [*Weise der Entsprechung zum befugenden Wort*] that is fore-sketched within σχολή itself (i.e. in the temporally kept flagrancy of the cense-ment [*in der zeitlich ver-haltenen Offenheit der Ent-scheidung*]). The σχολάζειν is as the biding of man – to speak in the language of *Being and Time* and from its sake, that is, there-being as cast out towards time – the last what-for of every human way of being, thus also of the νοεῖν and λέγειν of ἀσχολία.

The πόλις-foundation responds to the cense-ment of σχολή, out of which man is weirded on the erring-course of the a-seizing of his biding [*aus welcher der Mensch auf die Irr-Bahn der Ergreifung seines Wesens geschickt ist*], so that man's biding brings the truth of the πολιτεία ownsomely to light and thus puts the absconded source of all measure-granting in-between the useful and pleasant errands. These serve the dwelling, in that they are, within what is necessary, awaiting and ensconcing the measure of meetness [*das Maß der Eignung*] and are thus, in their own way, awaiting and ensconcing σχολή (the time-space for the seconding of measures [*den Zeit-Raum für das Folgen der Maße*]), and are in this respect themselves a σχολάζειν. Everything in the πόλις (i.e. any πολιτεύειν [politeúein]) is ἀσχολία [ascholía]. However, with the flaring up of philosophizing within the mythological and winning sciency [*mit dem Aufbrechen des Philosophierens im mythologischen und gewinnenden Wissen*] – with the taking-over of the advent of the cense-ment and the belongingness of man into the provenance of the whole, ἀσχολία is openly brought under its i-setnesse of biding [*offen unter ihr Wesensgesetz gestellt*].

Only with the flagrancy of this i-setnesse of biding the own-tempered venture of the πόλις-foundation begins – the game, on which the cense-ment has placed man. In one with the σχολάζειν there also arises the likelihood of its un-biding [*Unwesen*] – let us call it, in contrast to the mere ἀσχολεῖσθαι, the δυσχολάζειν [dyscholázein]. The latter first arises in the manner of sophistry, against which, in turn, philosophy stands up with Plato and Socrates. The δυσχολάζειν is the counter-biding to the ἐνέργεια of σχολή. In it, the brooking, which bides as the faying-indrawing middle [*als die fügend-beziehende Mitte*] of σχολή, is directed against itself in such a way that it attempts an open

[ww] *To meeten* translates the German *eignen* ("to make meet, fit, or apt"). This sentence from the Oxford English dictionary provides a fitting example of how we ought to hear *meeten*: "If she be meeten'd for that world of light: Where are her fondest, best affections plac'd?" (J. Taylor, *Essays in Rhyme*, 1853).

rejection [*Absage*, lit. 'off-say'] of σχολή. This takes place as a derivative [*abkünftig*] νοεῖν and λέγειν, which runs the disfiguring of the πόλις into the effect-site of the un-biding [*zur Wirk-Stätte des Unwesens*] of σχολή. That which bides in the temptation of this rejection (off-say) is the off-turning of the weird of disabsconding [*Das Wesende in der Versuchung dieser Absage ist die Abkehr des Entbergungsgeschicks*], which brookes and attunes the ἐνέργεια of σχολή for its own advent and *is* itself this ἐνέργεια. It is only the δυσχολάζειν that finally unfolds into the kind of thinking that asserts the primacy of the economic problem and brings it in opposition to the minding on the provenance of hospitality [*Erst das δυσχολάζειν prägt sich schließlich in jenes Denken aus, das den Vorrang des ökonomischen Problems behauptet und gegen das Aufmerken auf die Herkunft der Wirtlichkeit in Stellung bringt*].

5. Plato, *Theaetetus*

At the heart of the dialogue *Theaetetus*, Plato contrasts philosophy with sophistry along the lines of σχολή. The dialogue in whole unfolds itself as an ἀγών [agōn], namely as a contention [*Kampf*] *of* ψυχή [psyché], i.e. the indrawal of being to man, *for* ψυχή itself. The ἀγών *is* the ψυχή as the contention of the astanding taking-a-stand in the flagrant and free of the in-itself contentious indrawal of being [*als Kampf der ausstehenden Standnahme im Offenen und Freien des in sich strittigen Seinsbezugs*], that is, in the truth of σχολή. This agonal taking-a-stand is the ἐπιστήμη [epistéme], here in the out-showing way of the fore-standing into the likelihood of ἐπιστήμη itself. Only the ἐπιστήμη of the likelihood of ἐπιστήμη – philosophy – is an original astanding of the indrawal of being in σχολή. It is only from out of this astanding that the wising[xx] [*Weisung*] arises in which every ἐπιστήμη finds its each-whiling measure and likelihood in the πόλις.

To the ἀγών [agōn] of ψυχή, which is philosophy as the highest ἐπιστήμη, belongs, that the ἀγών itself is as such about the agonal character. The ἀγών is always also for the ἀγών itself to be carried out as a real ἀγών, namely as the gathering on the beënt as such (on being) from out of its contentious provenance [*aus seiner strittigen Herkunft*]. In contrast, the fall-off [*Abfall*] of the ἀγών is the falling out [*Herausfallen*] of the indrawal of being as the fall-back [*Rückfall*] into the mere beënt (i.e. the beingless [*Seinlose*]). In the off-falling [*abfällig*] ἀγών, man is no longer on-the-way into the freeness

[xx] For further elucidations on *wising* [*Weisung* in German], see Ivo De Gennaro, *The Weirdness of Being. Heidegger's Unheard Answer to the Seinsfrage*. London: Routledge, 2014, 173–174 (n. 51).

of the indrawal of being [*ins Freie des Seinsbezugs*], but subjugated to the fulfillment of the staying-away of that which has its advent in the ἀγών. The subjugation into the unfreedom of δυσχολία [dyscholía] is different from the conditioned freedom of ἀσχολία. In δυσχολία, man is, without indrawal [*bezugslos*], entangled into the threat of the un-biding of being, in which the beënt is left over to itself and its senselessness.

Because this un-biding is the disturning [*Verkehrung*] of the inceptional word, sophistry takes place as an incessant talking-to-death (dissection) [*Zerredung*] of being into the measurelessness of the beënt. Philosophy, on the other hand, the ἀγών of the astanding fore-standing into σχολή, is the belonging answer to the claim of being in the setting-off from ἀσχολία and the setting in sunder from one another [*Auseinandersetzung*] with δυσχολία and its grimness.

5.1 Sophistry as the subjugation of man within the disownment of ψυχή

Δυσχολία only appears in conjunction with σχολή as the un-biding of σχολή. Said differently: as the counter-biding to σχολή, δυσχολία is just like σχολή a phenomenon of the πόλις as the home-site of the philosopher. In the passage of the dialogue considered here, the contrast between philosophy and sophistry – the latter as the form of speech required in court and as the drill towards it – is specifically depicted as a matter of σχολή and the ἀγών. If philosophy is the astanding contending [*das ausstehende Erkämpfen*] of the enownment of the time-space of the disabscondment of the beënt, sophistry shows itself as the being-excluded from this time-space, which, spellbound in the zeal of overpowerment, accomplishes the disownment of time and space.

The fall-off [*Abfall*] of the ἀγών settles into a temporality which denies the space for the abearing of contention [*in eine Zeitlichkeit, die den Raum für den Austrag des Kampfes versagt*] and challenges man into the un-biding of ψυχή and its λόγος (172d):

> οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ τε ἀεὶ λέγουσι – κατεπείγει γὰρ ὕδωρ ῥέον – …
>
> But these [i.e. those who speak in court] always speak in un-æmetta – [because] there presses in the whole the flowing (running) of the water – ….

The water clock (κλεψύδρα [klepsúdra]), which regulates the speaking time in court, sets the νοεῖν and λέγειν under the condition of time as the succession of now-moments which are falling due. The now occurs [*das Jetzt fällt vor*, lit. 'the now is fore-falling'] as a piece (a "bit") from an already allotted and limited, thereby declining and expiring number, and it draws its obtrusiveness from this

character of falling (due) [*Fälligkeitscharakter*]. The water clock not only measures the supposedly given time in itself, but is itself the device for the setting-up of "time" as the expiring-pressing falling (due) [*Fälligkeit*], in short, as the afalling[yy] [*Gefälle*]. Because time for the Greeks is disabscondment, the afalling is also disabsconding, albeit in a derivative way [*in abkünftiger Weise*]. In the afalling, everything is set into the abiding in such a way that it is denied the claimable sense-space and it is left over to the need to secure itself as the mere beënt in its occurring [*Vorfallen*]. Its disabscondedness rests upon procedural validity in a dimension without ways and routes of disabscondment, in short: in the impassability [*Unwegsamkeit*; lit. 'unwaysomeness'] (ἀπορία [aporía]), which at the same time signifies the absurdness [*Abwegigkeit*; lit. 'offwayness'] of the disabsconding λόγος.

The afalling is the time that has been made scarce of its biding, to wit, – the disabsconding towardness. This time is scarce [*knapp*]. As such, it can be rationed for the respective use, and it can be set up as a parameter for the continuous making scarce of the beënt [*der durchgängigen Verknappung des Seienden*]. The incessantly falling (due) now sets up the λόγος to foreset that which has been made scarce according to its appeal[zz] [*Gefälligkeit*] and it thus asserts itself within the now as appealing [*als Gefälliges*]. Thus, speech, parameterized by the afalling of time [*am Gefälle der Zeit parametrisiert*], is also subjugated to scarcity and challenged to the immediately valid appeal [*zur unmittelbar geltenden Gefälligkeit herausgefordert*], through which the obtrusive afalling must, as it were, pass through. The λόγος, the gathering and keeping of being in the spoken word, is now a value that constantly measures itself through the appeal of the flow of speech.

The water clock foresets time as a succession that can be set and made available in sections. In this way time becomes foreset as an assigned contingent, as a quota. The apportioned [*kontingentiert*; lit. 'contingented'] and quoted time is a utensil that establishes continuous

[yy] We suggest the English *afalling* (from the obsolete verb *to afall* – "to collapse", "to fall down", "to drop") for the German *Gefälle*. In ordinary German, *Gefälle* means "slope", "incline", "descent"; in the present text, *Gefälle* indicates the gathering (indicated by the German prefix "Ge-" or the English prefix "a-") of falling. Within the weird of *Gefälle*, time is always pressing, urging, "falling due", leaving the beënt within the modality of *Gefälligkeit* [see footnote zz just below], their appeal for the fallenness of the will to will.

[zz] We suggest the word *appeal* as a translation for the German *Gefälligkeit. Appeal* is related to the Latin *appellare*, which is formed by the prefix *ad-* ("at", "to") and the verb *pellare* ("to drive", "to impel", "to push", "to hurl", "to propel", "to expel", "to thrust out"). Within the modality of *Gefälligkeit*, the beënt (including man) is foreset in such a way that it appeals to man (i.e. drives, pushes, propels him), and, as a consequence, man falls for the beënt and its (value-based) appeal into a condition of "eternal" fallenness. The foulness of the will to will is precisely concealed in the "positive" appeal of the beënt that is foreset in such a way. Furthermore, we believe it is no coincidence that the English language has elected this word for charges or applications within a court.

apportionment [*Kontingentierung*; lit. 'contingentment'] and scarcity: In the time that is scarce everything has been made scarce towards the value of the afalling. This set-up ἀσχολία is, as the time that has been made scarce, a censement [*Entscheidung*] over being. In the fact that the beënt shows itself as scarcity and is set off for the calculable effectivity in the beënt, which, in turn, wants to be fixed in words that have been made scarce, being itself plays out everywhere, absconded as appeal. In the exclusive appeal [*Gefälligkeit*] of the beënt that has been made scarce, whose value lies in the relative degree of appeal, the cense-ment [*Ent-scheidung*] refuses itself.

The word no longer thinks, in gain-speaking [*Entsprechung*] to it, after being, but, while being torn away from itself, tears to the light the carrying-away of the afalling. This light, in which the accruing-incurring and occurring [*das An- und Vorfallende*; lit. 'the to-falling and fore-falling'] becomes conspicuous, is its own way of disabscondedness, the clearance of being as appeal [*die Lichtung des Seins als Gefälligkeit*]. The disabscondedness of the afalling is inceptionless and endless, i.e. eternal. Within the ἀσχολία of the afalling that has been set up, nothing reaches its end and nothing comes to the rounding [*kommt nichts ins Ziel und zur Rundung*], nothing is enough, nothing can rest in a sufficing. Everything is unleashed into the coercion of over-increasing itself in terms of appeal and thus of validity within the duration assigned to it.

The λόγους ποιεῖν [lógous poiein] in the apportioned-apportioning time [*kontingentiert-kontingentierenden Zeit*; lit. 'contingented-contingenting time'] is subjected in another way to the restriction through the ἀναγκαῖα than the λόγοι [lógoi] of the mountain dwellers. The ἀνάγκη [anánke] that is empowered by the scarce time is used as a means of controlling that the speech remains within the bounds of the afalling. The cited passage continues:

> … καὶ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσι τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκην ἔχων ὁ ἀντίδικος ἐφέστηκεν καὶ ὑπογραφὴν παραναγιγνωσκομένην ὧν ἐκτὸς οὐ ῥητέον, ἣν ἀντωμοσίαν καλοῦσιν· οἱ δὲ λόγοι ἀεὶ περὶ ὁμοδούλου πρὸς δεσπότην καθήμενον, ἐν χειρί τινα δίκην ἔχοντα, καὶ οἱ ἀγῶνες οὐδέποτε τὴν ἄλλως ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος·
>
> … and there is not [scil. in the time which is scarce] the space to bring forth the speeches about what the expectation may be about, but <the speaker> is approached by the opposing party, holding a means of coercion in his hands, a signed protocol – the summoned statement of claim – which he reads out point by point and beyond the limits of which there is no talking; but the speeches are always about the fellow servant and are addressed to a presiding master who administers an arbitrary law; thus the fights never en-fay themselves to the indrawal to the extraneous fay [*dem Bezug des antrischen Fugs*], but refer themselves [– degenerated into mere exchanges of arguments in the pursuit of appeal –] always to the law <,which> is <applicable> in the vicinity of that master[23]; but often it is in such vying about the soul itself. (172e)

What Plato sketches here in a few lines is the un-biding of the ἀγών in the staying-away of the χώρα [chóra], the time-space of σχολή. The references of word, man and the beënt are truncated in their biding and set off for the appeal. Speaking from the heart of the dialogue about the ἐπιστήμη, this sketch shines a light far ahead into the temptation [*Gefahr*] that the ἐπιστήμη itself ultimately understands itself from the valuelike of appeal and falls into devoting itself to the running [*Betrieb*] of its makeshiply biding <i.e., its biding which is itself run and constituted by makeship> [*ihres machenschaftlichen Wesens*].

In the apportioned [*kontingentiert*; lit. 'contingented'] time, the inceptional word denies itself and thus also denies the space of the answering disabsconding. Where it is not the case that the time-space that is a-fayed from the wholly other (ἄλλως [állōs]) [*der aus dem ganz Anderen befugte Zeit-Raum*] bides as the truth for the measured world-harmony [*das maßvolle Welt-Gefüge*], the thinking and saying that belong unto the cense-ment (as the over-ownment of disabscondment) is unlikely. Thus, it is not only nothing with the beënt, but before that it is nothing with the time-space, in which the beënt, cleared as such, comes into the measure of its meetness [*Eignung*].

The making scarce of time as the withdrawal [*Die Verknappung der Zeit als Entzug*] of the χώρα of disabscondment not only inhibits the off-erring wandering of thoughts, but the λόγοι are hindered from going where the θυμός [thymós] carries them. The θυμός is the inceptionally in-geniated[aaa] and enheartened mod[bbb] [*das anfänglich angemutete und ermutigte Gemüt*], the awakened and alert and therefore awakenable receptivity for the exhortation[ccc] of being [*die Zumutung des Seins*]. The θυμός is the tuneability of man through and toward the voice of being as the cense-ment. This voice first

[aaa] *To in-geniate* is our attempted word for the translation of *anmuten*. This coinage has been introduced by Gino Zaccaria in *The Enigma of Art. On the Provenance of Artistic Creation.* Leiden: Brill, 2021, 201.

[bbb] The Old English *mod* [*mōd, mód*] is derived from the PIE **mō-tó-s* ("to endeavor; will, temper") and the Proto-Germanic **mōdaz* ("mind"), and it belongs to the same etymological root as the English *to measure* (as "to intend", "to strive"), the Latin *mōs* ("will, humor, wont, inclination, mood") or the German *Mut* ("courage, keenness, boldness"). Hence, the word *mod* intimately belongs to the concentus of words that has been explored in this text, and will therefore be suggested by us as an apt translation for the German *Gemüt*. It does not refer to any contingent disposition or psychological state of man, but to his ownmost core of awareness and his original keenness, which is his tuneability to the voice of being. *Mod* provides the basis for all modalities of awareness towards being and is the foundation in man for the (thinking, minding, reminding, measuring) relationship to being-itself. Interestingly, the Old English knows some words which preserve the stem *-mod* (*-mut*), which is still preserved in many words in modern German (such as "anmod" [*einmütig*; unanimous], "langmod" [*langmütig*; patient], "ofermod" [*übermutig*; presumptuous, proud] or "ge-mód" [the mind, heart], which presumably corresponds to *Gemüt* itself). The same stem is employed by Heidegger to indicate the minding heart of the human being within the exhortation (*Zumutung*) of being. An alternative translation for *Gemüt* may be "soul" (*Seele*) as it has been dighted by Friedrich Hölderlin. For further elucidations on the nearness between *Gemüt* and *Seele*, see HGA 52, 150–155.

[ccc] *Exhortation* and *to exhort* translate the German *Zumutung* and *zumuten*. For a detailed exposition of these words, see section 11.2. in Gino Zaccaria, *The Enigma of Art. On the Provenance of Artistic Creation.* Leiden: Brill, 2021, 189–208.

binds man into his biding, betunes [*verfügt*] him into the answer and capacitates him to the speaking that in-tunes into the soundless voice of the schism and the gain-saying of the word. Through the θυμός, the courage [*Mut*] to the abearance of the cense-ment, the ψυχή is whiling while being indrawn into the schism [*auf Zug in den Unterschied*]. The staying-away of the time-space of disabscondment in the reign of the making scarce, conditions the absurdness [Abwegigkeit; lit. 'offwayness'] of the indrawal of being in man which is originally in-gathered in λόγος. Thus, within the afalling, everything drifts into the censementless (the dimension of the lack of censement) [*im Entscheidungslosen*], while in the procedures that are set up towards the increase of appeal, everything counters in the set-up ἀπορία [aporía] of its bidesome unsatisfaction, from the "principal" needfulness [*Notdurft*] of its scarcity.

The time that is deprived of its biding and de-temporalized – the untime – takes up the case before the court as a contingent of sworn facts. Under the control, exercised by the opponent, only that which lets itself be reckoned against the points listed in the statement of claim is appealing and admissible. The scope of the sayable is not the senseful outline of the respective subject matter of the dispute – its in-itself contentious truth [*ihre in sich strittige Wahrheit*] –, but the exclusivity of what can be counted and added to the books in a parametric regime of scoring and counting. Thereby it has already been censed what the such countable is, namely a degree of appeal or value. Because the worthiness of interrogation of the What, that is, of being, does not arise, the question after the What falls into the void within the untime. In that the question about the ὄν [ón] (172d9) – the Only [*dem Einzigen*], to which the λέγειν remains indrawn to in σχολή – is not permitted, philosophy as such remains impermissible [*unstatthaft*].

The parametrized and apportioned [*kontingentiert*; lit. 'contingented'] matter provides the material for the debate of the opponents in front of the judge. Instead of focusing on the contentious truth [*statt auf die strittige Wahrheit*], the speeches are directed on the opponent himself, i.e. on that which has been stated, insofar as it is something that is stated *by him* and *he* <as he states it> resists the over-powerment [*Übermächtigung*].[24] The polarization of the contention [*Die Polarisierung des Kampfes*] to the speakers is a consequence of the fact that the focus is no longer on the beënt itself, i.e. being, but on achieving and securing increasing degrees of appeal [*Gefälligkeit*] within the procedure that is controlled by the judge, which plays itself out within the mutual going-against and going-over of the perspectival poles of appeal.

The untime subjects those who are standing in the dispute to mutual control. The controlled and the controlling are in the same way δοῦλοι [doūloi], servants, in that they mutually set themselves off and fix each other to that which speaks in the afalling. Because speech itself is degraded to value, the speakers are not mutually liberated into the contentious-binding realm of censement [*befreit in den strittig-verbindlichen Entscheidungsbereich*], from which the measure of sufficing grows for the beënt. Whoever stands in the free-setting indrawal of disabscondment (λόγος) in such a way that he uses this indrawal and thus the disabscondment itself as a means of increasing value, is thereby deprived of his own freedom and is therefore a servant. The being-a-servant rests upon δυσχολία as the excludedness from the word of disabscondment.

The judge who is presiding over the procedure is the superior enforcer of the apportionment [*Kontingentierung*; lit. 'contingentment']. This judge has τινα δίκην [tina díken], some kind of law, namely one that is not attuned by the inceptional permission [*Befugnis*], but which establishes the self-willing un-fay [*Un-Fug*] into the ongoing procedure of determining value.[25] Because this law does not reach into the cense-ment, is blind for the truth of the beënt and is therefore a means of enforcing the exclusive choice of the will, it is bidesomely insufficient and wanton. From such wantonness [*Willkür*] it provisionally [*notdürftig*] regulates the insufficiency of the set-up ἀσχολία by giving the verdict in favor of one or the other of the servants, without anything bidesome ever being censed. Τινα δίκη [Tina díke] is, in its biding, law-of-procedures: the establishing *of the temptation of the un-fay* (*the un-fair*) [*das Einrichten der Gefahr des Un-Fugs*] into the sequences of the process, handled by the one who is presiding. The ἀγῶνες [agōnes] of δυσχολία revolve around the law, which has its fulcrum in the master's handling of it.

The own-tempered δίκη is named as ἡ <δίκη> ἄλλως [hé <díke> állōs]. This means the fay of (the) cense-ment [*Fug der Ent-scheidung*], from whose truth the whole of the beënt is secondingly disabsconded [*aus dessen Wahrheit das Ganze des Seienden folglich entborgen ist*]. The fay itself is in its biding ἄλλως, we say: *antrisch*[ddd] [extraneous, fremd]. The fay is extraneous in that it en-fays, as *its* fay (fayness, fairness) [*als* dessen *Fug*], the unhomely, the unfamiliar of the schism that is in-fayed into the ab-scission [*das Unheimliche, Ungeheure des in den Abschied verfugten Unterschieds*]. Δίκη

[ddd] The trait of *antrisch* refers to *das Andere*, which is another name for be3ng. Linked to it is the German verb *ver-andern*, which is introduced further down in this text. It refers to the peculiar strangeness, weirdness, uncommonness, extraneousness of be3ng. We suggest translating *antrisch* with the English *extraneous* and *ver-andern* with the obsolete verb *to extraneize* ("to make extraneous, to remove"). *Ver-andern* refers to the transformation of the human being into man as such, *Da-sein*, *there-being*; man's acknowledgement of his intraneous belongingness to what is utterly extraneous and weird, namely be3ng. Another translation for *antrisch* may be the obsolete English adjective *fremd*.

[Díke] is the fay of the one-and-only cense-ment [*der einzigen Ent-scheidung*], the truth of which, in-fayed towards the off-ground [*dessen zum Abgrund verfugte Wahrheit*], lets second that whole of the world in which the abiding is located in its i-ownedness (i-risenness) [*Geeignetheit*] from and for δίκη itself and its ruling [*Bescheid*].

Δίκη is, as this fay, always a censement about the human being: The censement, in which the It [*Es*], i.e. the tidement[eee] of the disabscondment [*Zeitigung der Entbergung*], censes itself with the biding of man (νοῦς – λόγος). Because in the extraneous fay the truth weirds itself, [and] to be the site of which is the inscape of the πόλις; because the fay therefore obtains as the comely inscape-ground [*als geschicklicher Wesensgrund*] of the πόλις; because it is in such a way the biding-sway [*das Wesende*] of the fitting en-shaking of the beënt in the whole; all of that is why the dighter can name δίκη the βάθρον ἀσφαλές [báthron asphalés] of the πόλεις [póleis]. Within the contention [*Kampf*] of δίκη it censes itself whether the πόλις remains warded as the site of the cense-ment that enowns itself in the golden threefold of fittingness, fay and ownhead, and thus as the place of the disabscondedness of the beënt in the whole, or whether, in the un-biding of truth, everything falls prey to the measurelessness of the appeal[fff]. The biding of ψυχή, philosophy as the founding contention [*die Philosophie als Gründungskampf*] of the truth of the πόλις *in* σχολή, is the ἀγών of the indrawal of the extraneous fay. The ψυχή stands, as the contention of insistency [*als Kampf der Inständigkeit*] in σχολή, in the extraneizing [*ver-andernd*] indrawal, which is attuning to the wholly other, which is casually indicated by the word ἄλλως as the biding-sway [*als das Wesende*] of δίκη.

Ἄλλως is the denied Other *towards* the beënt, biding in its ab-scissioned place as the schism, wended into the off-ground, to which there is only errancy. Its truth, to be astood by man, is contention [*Seine vom Menschen auszustehende Wahrheit ist Kampf*]. The one-and-only Other weirds itself into the towardness as finitely incepting vagueness, where the fay obtains and bides off, fittingness is granted and denied, ownhead in-turns [*einkehrt*] and stays away. Ἄλλως is the flagrant and unsupported of the off-ground of disabscondedness, in which the contention [*Kampf*], which *is* the ψυχή as insistency in σχολή, has its origin, i.e. inception and end. Σχολή itself is the in-itself agonal time-space, astood in un-ending errancy, of the ἄλλως, the extraneous vagueness, and nothing else.

[eee] *Tidement* is our attempt of translation for the German *Zeitigung*. Tidement refers here to the coming of time in its respective or each-whiling constellation of disabscondment, which, in turn, provides the way, or sense, for the unfolding of the beënt in accordance with that tidement.

[fff] In this regard, also consider the role which technical devices, such as smartphones, play within the "measurelessness of the appeal" in our current epoch.

Δυσχολία is the un-biding of σχολή as the dis-owned time-space of the censing-itself of the censement against itself: it is the time-space of censementlessness. Δυσχολία tempts man into the temptation which is the ἄλλως itself. The human being that has fallen out of the indrawal to the ἄλλως remains locked into the regime of censementlessness that is run by him, i.e. at the same time locked-out from the sojourn in the time-space of the vagueness that denies itself and the world that is disabsconded from out of it. Fay, fittingness and ownhead remain unnoticed within the radius of the master of the procedure in favor of appeal. The censementlessness that winds itself into itself corresponds to the acceleration of the afalling. The λόγους ποιεῖν [lógous poiein] is forced into the growing coercion [*Nötigung*] of the competing servants, in which the σχολάζειν of the ψυχή, the time-spacious i-hold of vagueness [*das zeit-räumliche Ver-Hältnis der Schwebung*], is forgotten and delivered over to the unwill against the censement. Thus, in the driving of the censementlessness from out of the nescience of the censement it is precisely about the indrawal into the censement itself, namely often in immediate grip [*Zugriff*] on the one who is "all soul [*ganz Seele*]", i.e. hearkening insistency in the indrawal to the vagueness of the schism.

The competing in the whole, the running of δυσχολία, excludes man from the ψυχή and forces him into "soullessness". The censementless does not want man to up-right himself in ψυχή and to up-rightly take over σχολή in order to found the truth for the ὄν in its abearance. The drilling from youth onwards for the capacity to perform in the talking in front of the un-a-fayed [*unbefugt*] court <the court that has been denied the weirding of the fay> within the lasting dis-ownment of the indrawal of being thus necessarily leads to a crippling of the being-human,

> [so that] as a result of all this, the [drilled] speakers become tense and shrewd; they know how to wheedle their master with words and gain his favor by acts; but in their souls they become small and warped. For they have been deprived of growth and straightforwardness and independence by the slavery they have endured from their youth up, for this forces them to do crooked acts by putting a great burden of fears and dangers upon their souls while these are still tender; and since they cannot bear this burden with uprightness and truth, they turn forthwith to deceit and to requiting wrong with wrong, so that they become greatly bent and stunted. Consequently, they pass from youth to manhood with no soundness of mind in them, but they think they have become clever and wise.[26]

5.2 Philosophy as the retreat of man into the freedom of ψυχή

The Greek word παιδεία [paideía] says the turning-back and the habituation of man into the onefold of his wyrdal biding [*die Einfalt seines geschichtlichen Wesens*]. This biding is the acknowledging holding-out of σχολή as the time-space of the inceptional weird. The onefold turning-

back within the indrawal of the inception is philosophy. Because the time-space of σχολή – before all beings – is the astood dimension, from where the moderation of the abiding into meetness seconds, the one who grows up in the abearance of σχολή remains untouched from youth onwards by the entanglement of that which occurs [*vorfällt*; lit. 'fore-falls'] and urges in the uncensedness of being. This is the un-beënt [*das Unseiende*] for him, which he does not mind, because he is forestanding into the open of the cense-ment. His minding interrogating toward the ὄν [ón] – the always already cleared as the beënt of the censement – does not perceive that which is merely lying close and that which is urging as what is nearest, which is, for him, only the nearness itself as the disabscondedness of the vagueness of being, from which the meetness [*Eignung*] is growing toward the beënt.

To that which is falling on and falling due, to that which is befalling and that which is coincidental, to all that is ensnaring and procedural, in short: to the ἀσχολία of the πόλις the pupil is initially attached in a certain way in his bodying wakeness[ggg] to the true [*in seiner leibenden Wachheit zum Wahren*], σῶμα [soma]. As an insistent belonger to that, however, what each-whilingly awakens in this wakeness, as an accommodating [*zuvorkommend*; lit. 'before-coming'] minding of the schism – in short: as ψυχή – he is not caught up in the cases [*in den Fällen*; lit. 'in the fallings'] of the πόλις. His sojourn [*Aufenthalt*] is in such off-fall, which is towering through the πόλις [*in jenem die* πόλις *durchragenden Absturz*], i.e. the time-space of the contention [*im Zeit-Raum des Kampfes*], within which it is censed whether the fay of the unfamiliar turns into [*einkehrt*] the πόλις within the in-gathering of the inceptional word and the winning sciency of the earliness, and whether the i-owned (i-risen) life-fitting wakeness en-raises itself and en-holds itself uprightly from out of the fertile soil of the bodily σχολάζειν; or whether everything disturns itself into the un-fay [*alles sich in den Un-Fug verkehrt*] and the πόλις falls into the measureless over-driving of the needs of life and limb, in which the measure-granting indrawals are obstructed.

Plato characterizes the time-space of the cense-ment – the extraneous vagueness, out of whose upheld need only the beënt as such in the whole clears itself in its meetness – with a reference to a word of Pindar as the dimension in which the world-shaping thinking, [while] measuring through and experiencing this dimension, has its element (173e4ff.):

> ἡ δὲ διάνοια … πανταχῇ πέτεται κατὰ Πίνδαρον «τά τε γᾶς ὑπένερθε» καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα, «οὐρανοῦ θ' ὕπερ» ἀστρονομοῦσα, καὶ πᾶσαν πάντῃ φύσιν ἐρευνωμένη τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου, ὅλου, εἰς

[ggg] *Wakeness* (which is translating the German *Wachheit*) is an obsolete noun that indicates the state of being awake.

τῶν ἐγγὺς οὐδὲν αὐτὴν συγκαθιεῖσα.

> But the mindsome interrogating … is borne along in all directions, according to Pindar, bringing "the subterranean depths" and the out-stretched expanses into the measure of the earth, and envisaging the <the tale of> stars "across the sky", and thus investigating everywhere in the whole the steady arising of [each and] every being, and the assurgency of the whole, and it does not deal with anything immediately present.

The διανοεῖν [dianoein] that bears out σχολή – belonging to vagueness and therefore itself vaguing – measures through the space between earth and sky. This between-space is not a region that is delimited by heaven and earth as circumscribed zones. The between is, more originally than these two, pre-geometric and pre-astronomic, and thus calling and bearing thinking into its geometrizing and astronomizing biding. The between goes through earth and sky as the inceptional dimension, from which they are cleared into the extraneous nearness of their encounter. By letting the whole be shown out in such a way that each arises into its own measure, the between is everywhere scinded-towarding [*geschieden-gegenwärtig*] and binds everywhere beforehand the interrogation that starts out from the abiding as such.

The διανοεῖν vagues through, attuned to the extraneous between, the unhomely [*das Unheimliche*] of the dizzying off-falls and the expanses of the earth that lose themselves, the unfamiliar [*das Ungeheure*] of the vaults of the sky that over-rise into the open, and that is to say: the high and deep of the *one* through-towering off-ground [*des* einen *durchragenden Abgrunds*]. Thus vaguing, it fays those that are counter-wending in the fay of their nearness. It carries the measureless, into-itself-going earth towards the sky, so that it may moderate itself through the immeasurable [sky] into the fayly-soothed teeming[hhh] of its bearing-ensconcing spaces [*sie am*

[hhh] The German word *Gezüge* is still in want of a fitting translation in the English language. *Gezüge* (literally the gathering ["Ge-"] of tracting or drafting ["-züge"]) indicates the whole of the physical forces of the earth, the harmonic all-side drawing-and-being-drawn-by, which, as this gathered whole, may also be said to be the vigour, the restfully waving rhythm of the earth. This drawing has a fundamentally erotic tone (as in "being drawn into, being drawn toward", cf. *Bezug* [footnote aa, p.10]), which is the mother and unity of a variety of other tones; from placid and soothing to restless and raging. Within the German language, the noun *Zug* ("draft, traction, pull") and the verb *ziehen* ("to tract, to pull, to draw") can refer to the way the earth articulates itself (cf. *Gebirgszug* [mountain chain], *Windzug* or *Luftzug* [a draft of wind]; "*der Nebel zieht herauf*" [the fog emerges], "*die Wolken ziehen übers Land*" [the clouds are drifting over the land]). *Gezüge* refers to the mutual attracting and repulsing of earthly elements and their attempting to constitute a harmony while abiding in their own self-concretion. The same word-complex is also used to indicate the raising, breeding or cultivating of plants and animals; the German *erziehen* is used to refer to the education and bringing up of children. The German *Zug* and *ziehen* belong to the Proto-Indo-European root **dewk*-, which is the root of many cognate words within the English language: *taut*, *teem*, *team*, *tee* (a now obsolete word meaning "to draw, to proceed, to lead"), *tether*, *tie*, *touch*, *tow*, *toy*, *tuck*, *tug*. The Latin *ducere* ("to lead, to guide, to conduct; to draw, to pull; to think, to consider; to prolong; to march, to command"), which can be heard within words such as *to abduce*, *to abduct*, *deduct*, *duchy* (*duchess*, *duke*), *to educate*, *to endue*, *to induce*, *to introduce*, *to produce*, *to reduce*, *to seduce*, *to subdue*, *to transduce*, or *viaduct*, also belongs

Unermesslichen sich mäßige ins füglich-gediegene Gezüge ihrer tragend-bergenden Räume]; it leads the unbound sky towards the earth, so that it may bind itself through the censed [earth] in the mildly-shining drawing of the untold tale[iii] of starry faces [*dass er an der Entschiedenen sich binde in die mild-glänzende Zeichnung der ungezählten Zahl der Sterngesichter*]. In that the thinking through-vaguing abears the extraneous [*Indem das denkende Durchschweben das Antrische austrägt*], it marries earth and sky in the nearness of the between, in which they traverse each other as the measure-holding and the measure-giving. The open of the marriage of earth and sky lithes everything into its i-owned (i-risen) measure. The intimacy of earth and sky is hospitality.

The mindsomeness [*Aufmerksamkeit*] that en-measures the dimension in hovering [*Flug*] is not concerned with that measure. Rather, the hovering [*Flug*] seconds the ground-trait of the vagueness itself and its nearing roominess. Only in the roominess of the between as the marriage of earth and sky there is, as a free seconding, steady arising and thus abidingness of the beënt as such in the whole and in one [*Anwesenheit des Seienden als solchen im Ganzen und im Einzelnen*], φύσις and ὄν (οὐσία). The whole of the beënt arises as own-tempered wealth, insofar as it holds in itself the measured-counterwending of the earthly-skylike roominess, which the vagueness of the between – as it brooks the minding that en-reads[iii] the cense-ment [*das die Ent-scheidung erratende Sinnen brauchend*] – en-rooms for itself. Therefore the a-faying [*Befugnis*] is for a thinking of the beënt as such in the whole only there, where previously that between is measured through within the en-reading hovering of errancy [*im erratenden Irr-Flug*] and thus the extraneous vagueness – the wholly other to φύσις, οὐσία and ὄν – is en-sensed from out of the fitting read of the cense-ment [*aus dem schicklichen Rat der Ent-scheidung ersonnen ist*].

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to the same root, which, as we can see, unfolded in a very rich manner within the English language. Intimately related to *ziehen* are the now obsolete verb *to tee*, the Middle English *teen* and the Old English *teon* and *i-teon*. A word which may be able to say *Gezüge* in English, and which we attempt for the translation of this word in this text, is *teeming*. With its meanings "to abound; to be rife; to bring forth young, as an animal; to produce fruit, as a plant; to bear; to be pregnant", we believe that this word can fittingly express the earthly vigour which we indicated before. *Teeming* expresses the rich fecundity of the minded earth; we hear in it the gathered drawing-forth or bodying-forth, the vigorous abounding of all phenomena that constitute physical life on earth. Shakespeare uses the word (adjectivally) in his play *Richard II*: "This blessed plot, this earth, this realme, this England, This nurse, this teeming wombe of royall Kings."

[iii] *Tale* and *to tell*, as they are used in this sentence, are related to the obsolete meanings of these words which we have clarified in footnote bb (pp. 10).

[iii] *Rat* [*read* in English] is the element for the generation (the originating) and preservation of what is censed in the censement, hence also that generation (originating) itself and that which is censed itself. *Er-raten* [en-reading] is to originate what is censed by preserving the censing itself in its withdrawing-absconding. Cf. the complex of *Rat*, *Ratsal*, *erraten* in the *Black Notebooks*.

This a-minding[kkk] has the ground-trait of flight [*Dieses Ersinnen hat den Grundzug der Flucht*]. The ψυχή of the one who is within the retreat into the onefold, escapes from the local place, i.e. from the πόλις, which is beset by the unleashed δυσχολία. However, the escaping [*Flüchten*] of the ψυχή is not a getting away and running away from something. Rather, it is the escaping into the refuge [*Flüchten in die Zuflucht*] of that which remains untouchable from the beënt in the midst of the beënt and thus everywhere the locating (in-spacing) mediation [*die verortende Vermittlung*] for it. This is being as the schism. The out-held refuge of the schism – its truth, withheld in the keeping [*seine im Verhältnis verhaltene Wahrheit*] as the disabscondedness of the extraneous vagueness of the between for the assurgency of the beënt in whole in the encountering of sky and earth – is σχολή. The escaping into σχολή, i.e. the refuge of being, is only likely, however, insofar as the ψυχή itself is already in its biding out-flight into this refuge. The refuge is the time-space, enowned from being itself for itself, for its bidance [*Wesung*] as the vaguing flight and the flighting vagueness, into which flight the ψυχή as out-flight goes back as that to which it originally belongs.

Being itself, however, is not something fleeting [*etwas Flüchtiges*] in the sense of the transient (fugacious) beënt [*im Sinne des vergänglichen Seienden*], nor is it a supposed escaping or passing-by as itself, but pure elusiveness (fleetingness[lll]) [*Entgängnis*] as flight[mmm] [*Flucht*]: flighting-faying fleeing [*fluchtend-fügendes Fliehen*]. Being as flighting-faying fleeing and as flight of earth and sky – in short: being as flighting [*Fluchtung*] is what lets arise the other to it, the beënt in the whole as φύσις, as the abidingness that is in abeyance of measure, and hands it over to thinking for safekeeping it within the question of ὂν ᾗ ὄν [ón hé ón] – the only question of incipient philosophy. But the πόλις is, what it is, in that it is the site of σχολή as the refuge of flighting [*als Zuflucht der Fluchtung*] and therefore the sconce of the out-flight into this refuge [*Herberge der Ausflucht in diese Zuflucht*], and it is therefore, on the one hand, hospitable housing, home- and dwelling-place for those who belong into the out-flight of the refuge, on the other hand, it is the be-hosting and dignifying guest-site to the haunting messengers of the extraneous.

[kkk] For the translation of the German verb *ersinnen*, which indicates the mindful preservation (the preservation in mindfulness) of the censing itself within the quadrifugal spaciousness of sky, earth, gods and mortals (as the time-space of their relation), we suggest the coinage *to a-mind*.

[lll] *Fleetingness* may be another likely translation for *Entgängnis*. For further remarks regarding *fleetingness*, see also Ivo De Gennaro, *Principles of Philosophy. A Phenomenological Approach*. Freiburg im Breisgau: Alber, 2019, 159.

[mmm] *Flight* [*Flucht* in German] is that which gathers while it absconds or descends into its own "vanishment". Cf. a "suite" of rooms; the "flight" of chords in a fugue.

The ψυχή is as such out-flight into the refuge of flighting [*Ausflucht in die Zuflucht der Fluchtung*]: φυγή [phygé] (cf. 176b1). Thinking as the bidesome handling of ψυχή is hearkening in-flighting[nnn] [*Verfluchtung*] into the refuge, in which the thinking one disappears. This in-flighting is, by bringing earth and heaven into nearness, ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν [homoíōsis theō kata to dynatón], likement[ooo] [*Angleichung*] with the god according to likelihood. The likement [*Angleichung*] with the god is the nearing toward him in the en-founding of the nearness of encountering from out of the out-held middle of the keeping [*aus der ausgehaltenen Mitte des Verhältnisses*] of σχολή. The likement [*Angleichung*], the letting encounter the god in the ways of flight of the nearness, bethinkingly en-founded, rests upon δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι, the becoming faysome to the fay and docile [*hörig*] to the nearness of the god through the expectant insistency [*vermutende Inständigkeit*] in the open time-space of the flighting [*im offenen Zeit-Raum der Fluchtung*] (176b1–3).

Thanks to the faysomeness into the flighting [*Dank der Fügsamkeit in die Fluchtung*] man comes into the Same, from which the encounter with the god fays itself. The φυγή as ὁμοίωσις θεῷ [homoíōsis theō] is not the awkward attempt [*der sonderliche Versuch*] to lay off the being-human and slip into the form of a god. It is the flighting en-founding of the flight [*die flüchtende Ergründung der Flucht*], which brings man and god into the nearness of the encounter where they are *alike* [*gleich*] in the sense of the in-flighting [*Verfluchtung*] into the Same. As those who flighted into the Same and thus those who are alike to each other, god and man are carried apart into the differentness[ppp] [*Verschiedenheit*] of their biding, in that only man has to a-mind and hold open the flighting in which the sensing-hosting biding of the god comes and stays away. Because man comes into the likelihead[qqq] of the encounter [*in die Gleichheit der Entgegnung*] through, at first, abearing that which makes it likely [*ihr Ermöglichendes*], i.e., the faying flighting [*die fügende Fluchtung*], that is why the likement with the god is κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν [kata to dynatón].[27]

[nnn] *In-flighting* as the attempted translation of *Verfluchtung* refers to the insistency within the (peculiar spaciosity of the) flight.

[ooo] We suggest the obsolete noun *likement* for the translation of the German *Angleichung*, which, in our employment of the word, does not only mean the becoming alike of man and god, but also the mutual "(en-)liking" of their respective likelihoods, the establishment of a bidesome resemblance between them.

[ppp] For further elucidations on *differentness* (as the translation of the German *Verschiedenheit*), see Ivo De Gennaro and Ralf Lüfter, 'Fostering differentness', *Eudia* 17, 2023, 7.

[qqq] *Likelihead* is an obsolete noun which indicates "the quality of being similar or equivalent", and serves as our suggested translation of the German *Gleichheit*, the peculiar "equality" or "equivalence" of man and god which is discussed in this part of the text.

The sense of this likement is, δίκαιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι [díkaion metà phronéseōs genésthai], to become faysome to the fay through the thinking insistency in the truth of the flighting middle [*die denkende Inständigkeit in der Wahrheit der fluchtenden Mitte*], which is the schism itself. Faysome is [the one] who is capable of δικαιοσύνη [dikaiosýne], the faysomeness in the δίκη as the fore-saying fay and the flighting a-faying for the truth [*die fluchtende Befugnis zur Wahrheit*]. The flighting a-faying is the Same with the keeping of σχολή [*Die fluchtende Befugnis ist das Selbe mit dem Verhältnis der* σχολή], which i-holds the countering of earth and sky [*die Begegnung von Erde und Himmel ver-hält*] with the encountering of the gods and men and thus releases the Four into their biding. The faysomeness into the fay is the Same with the brooked abearance of σχολή. Φρόνησις [Phrónesis], the expectant insistency in the flighting middle [*die vermutende Inständigkeit in der fluchtenden Mitte*], which is the core of man's biding, is only likely in the way of σχολάζειν. Σχολάζειν is the vaguing abearing of the open flighting; this abearing [is] as the a-minding of the time-spacious i-hold [*das Ersinnen des zeit-räumlichen Ver-Hältnisses*] of the refuge of flighting; this a-minding [is] as the en-founding of the time-space, in which the arising into abiding is originally let be and kept, i.e. is made likely [*ist ermöglicht*]. The human being, who, docile to the voice of the out-flight, lets himself be brooked by the flighting, by abearing its refuge, is free. [*Der Mensch, der, hörig der Stimme der Ausflucht, von der Fluchtung sich brauchen lässt, indem er deren Zuflucht austrägt, ist frei.*]

6. Æmetta [*Muße*] and σχολή

At the beginning it was said: "Within æmetta, the following holds: We don't have to (we mustn't), we may [*Wir müssen nicht, wir dürfen*]. With this it seems peculiar [*eigen*; lit. 'ownly'] that within the word æmetta [*Muße*] 'having to' ('must') [*müssen*] speaks." What about this peculiar characteristic [*Eigenheit*; lit. 'ownhood'] now? How are æmetta and musting related?

In the word æmetta [*Muße*] there still speaks the original meaning of musting: *müssen* [to must, to have to] is related to [the German] *messen* [to measure] and actually means [*heißt eigentlich*; lit. 'own-temperedly means']: to have measured something for oneself <to admeasure something to oneself, that is, to elect and hold the measure which makes it apt for oneself and oneself apt to it>; to have the occasion, the space, the time, the freedom to…; to be allowed to, to be able to do something. This is based on the root *me[d] "to wander, to walk, to mark out, to measure", which speaks from deep within the language-spring [*Sprachquell*], [and] from which the words *Mal* [point

in time] and *Maß* [*Mass*; measure] (cf. μέτρον or metiri, modus, meditari) are formed. Therefore, in musting there does not lie a coercion, but the occasion of being-brooked in the truth of the flighting of being [*die Gelegenheit des Gebrauchtseins in der Wahrheit der Fluchtung des Seins*] <and may, therefore, be named moting[rrr] hereafter>, which is the biding of man. The truth that is abeared in the brooking, the time-space *of the* schism, is æmetta. Moting is the hearkening-answering enwandering of æmetta, which abears as the flagrancy of the vagueness for the gift of measure. In this flagrancy, there draws as a ground-trait not a coercion [*Nötigung*], but the off-break as the abscissioned need of vagueness [*der Ab-Bruch als die abschiedliche Not der Schwebung*], which concerns [*belangen*] man in such a way that it wants him, [while] be-meaning him [*ihn bemerkend*], into his biding [*in sein Wesen verlangt*], i.e. brookingly a-fays him into the mindsome en-bearing of the off-break in its truth.

Moting is the faysome taking-over of the wanting concern of the need of æmetta as the time-spacious flagrancy of the off-break of the flighting vagueness [*Müssen ist das fügsame Übernehmen des verlangenden Belangens der Not der Muße als der zeit-räumlichen Offenheit des Ab-Bruchs der fluchtenden Schwebung*]. Only where man motes [*muss*], i.e. is free in the hearkening abearance of æmetta, does the wealth of things once bespeak itself from out of the inceptional flighting. This wealth is, what it is, as the hospitality of the flight of earth and sky, immortals and mortals that is enfounded in moting. A bidesome economy can only be an economy of wealth, i.e. the beholding

[rrr] The obsolete English verb *to mote* ("may, might"; but also "must") belongs to the same root that is explored in this paragraph, as well as footnote i (p.4). De Gennaro explains the promise of the word-complex around the German *Muße* and the English *æmetta* and *to mote* as follows: It – the promise – lies in the coincidence of the traits of permission (possibility) and obligation (necessity) that echoes through this word-root. In contingent and metaphysical terms, this coincidence is forbidden: as long as we consider beings, we distinguish between possibility and necessity as two modalities of beingness (the third modality being effectiveness [actuality]): when something is possible, it cannot be necessary, and vice versa. However, as we consider being as *Seyn* (i.e., be3ng), the latter shows itself to be sheer "possibility" (or rather: likelihood – grace, gratuity, sooth), which, *as such*, consists in a trait of necessity (or rather: need, stress, instress – denial, withdrawal). The coincidence of likelihood and instress makes the peculiar ("other-initial" [*andersanfänglich*]) *eros* of be3ng. All while man's being is drawn into, and in its turn bears, the instress of likelihood (the grace of pure denial), æmetta is the spaciousness (i.e., the gift of time-offering space) for the selving of world-gathering things, and as such the abode for mortals as the wardens of be3ng's sooth. Man "comes to" as the mortal *while* instantly indwelling æmetta *qua* sooth of sheer denial, wherein not "something" is denied or refused, but denial itself holds sway as nullibiquitous soothingness. Here is a poetic expression of *to mote* from the first Canto of Lord Byron's "Childe Harold's Pilgrimage":

> Oh, thou, in Hellas deemed of heavenly birth,
> Muse, formed or fabled at the minstrel's will!
> Since shamed full oft by later lyres on earth,
> Mine dares not call thee from thy sacred hill:
> Yet there I've wandered by thy vaunted rill;
> Yes! sighed o'er Delphi's long-deserted shrine
> Where, save that feeble fountain, all is still;
> Nor *mote* my shell awake the weary Nine
> To grace so plain a tale—this lowly lay of mine.

[*Schonen*] of that flight from out of the abearance of the truth of flighting. The beholding [*Schonen*] of the wealth of hospitality saves the right ways and measures for the frugal economy of things [*die genügsame Wirtschaft der Dinge*]. On the other hand, in the reign of scarcity – where the latter is not an ontic character, but the bidance of being in the omitted staying-away – it is too late for the own-tempered economizing [*für das eigentliche Wirtschaften zu spät*]. The calculative economy of scarcity is the over-driving [*Übertreibung*] of the inhospitable trait of makeship, which is willed by the will to will.

The time-spacious biding of æmetta as the truth for the extraneous vagueness can already be heard in the ordinary meaning of the word. In temporal terms, æmetta means the halting [*die Zögerung*] (lat. mora), the between-time as the vaguing while of being unbeset [*die Zwischen-Zeit als schwebende Weile des Unbesetztseins*], and therefore, like Lat. tempus, the occasion, the favourable instant for the weird of a sense [*den günstigen Augenblick für das Geschicht eines Sinnes*]. Æmetta is the meanwhile (meantime) of the indrawal-taking <the take, or claim, of indrawal> of the schism [*das Unterdessen der Bezugnahme des Unterschieds*]. In spatial terms, æmetta, like Lat. spatium, says the granted play-space [*den gewährten Spielraum*], the flight that can take up a sense from out of the keeping of its biding [*die Flucht, die einen Sinn aufnehmen kann aus dem Verhältnis seines Wesens*]. The temporal and the spatial aspects are originally united in the onehead of æmetta [*ursprünglich einig in der Einheit der Muße*] as the time-spacious freyness[sss] [*Freiung*] of the bidance of the schism that is scinded from all over-surging falling (due) and constraining span [*als der zeit-räumlichen, von aller überdrängenden Fälligkeit und einzwängenden Erstreckung geschiedenen Freiung der Wesung des Unterschieds*].

Because this bidance is a vagueness as flighting, there is a wanting need within æmetta, as the flagrancy of this bidance. In order to be able to bide as such, the inceptional flighting brookes the acknowledgement [*Eingeständnis*] of its off-brokenness [*Ab-gebrochenheit*]. That being which, broken towards it, ownsomely stands in the claim of this brooking, in such a way that its biding rests upon the brooking of the flighting and in the insistent acknowledgement of it [the flighting] as off-broken, in short: the being whose biding rests upon the be-claiming brooking of the break, we call man. This means: Æmetta is need-worthy [*not-wendig*] for the being of man, insofar as he – the

[sss] *Freiung* refers to a dimension or spaciousness which is free-freeing. For further remarks on the translation *freyness* [also *Freye* in German], see Ivo De Gennaro, *Weighing Way-Words*, in: *Heidegger Studies*, Vol. 40. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 259–271.

breakable [one] to the brooking break [*der Gebrechliche zum brauchenden Bruch*] – has to abear æmetta from out of the exhorting claim of the flighting [*aus dem zumutenden Anspruch der Fluchtung*] in order to become bidesome [*um wesentlich zu werden*].[28]

"Abearance of æmetta [*Austrag der Muße*]" is the bidesome name of being-human, the biding of which is æmetta itself. Through the mod [*Gemüt*] man is attuned unto æmetta. Moting has now discarded every trait of compulsion in favour of the over-ownment into the freedom of the abearing letting-oneself-be-brooked in the off-break of the freyness [*Freiung*] as the going-through of the en-shaking-meetening moderation of the beënt [*als Durchgang der erschütternd-eignenden Mäßigung des Seienden*]. Æmetta is what man cannot not acknowledge, to what he cannot not be bedrawn to <into what he cannot not be enowned in; to what he cannot not be claimed by>, to which he cannot not break himself, since it is, as the biding between, the inceptional biding-middle of the homo humanus. What has been said gathers itself in the simple mind-word [*Merkwort*]:

das Wesen des Menschen: Muße [the biding of man: æmetta]

How does æmetta, determined in this way, differ from the Greek σχολή? In the word σχολή there speaks the verb ἔχειν [échein] (aor. σχεῖν [schein]), to have, to hold, to hold within (to possess), to behave, to hold oneself upright, to take a pause. To the same word-root also belong ἕξις [héxis], habitude, and ἐποχή [epoché], holding (keeping) to oneself. Σχολή as a philosophical ground-word speaks in the biding-dimension of φύσις [phýsis] as steady assurgency [*Aufgängnis*]. It says the time-space of the to-itself-keeping biding in self-withholdance [*den Zeit-Raum des an sich haltenden Sichverhaltens*] of the ἀρχή [arché], as the need-worthy roominess [*als not-wendige Geräumigkeit*] (χρή – χώρα: ἀλήθεια [chré – chóra: alétheia]) for this assurgency [*Aufgängnis*], so that for the disabscondedness in the whole the gift of the steady arising is in-roomed and en-held. This roominess is a temporal [one] (a time-space), insofar as it bides as a lingering [*Verweilung*], in which the advent of the i-been weirds itself into the one-and-only towardness.

The inceptional and most absconded trait of σχολή, its own-tempered ground-trait, is the in-itself – i.e. into its refused schisming-itself – off-broken vagueness as flighting. The Greeks, which are called into the holding-out and setting-up of φύσις, do no longer think and found this trait as such. Admittedly, as the interpretation (out-lay) after Plato has shown, the vagueness, i.e. being itself, is constantly touched upon; admittedly, man is determined by the Greeks as βροτός [brotós], the mortal [one], in which his biding is intimated in the brooking off-break. Yet the break of the vaguing

flighting is not ownsomely experienced and thought in its references. Thus, thinking sets on in the claim of the enowning of the beënt as such (ἴδητόν τισιν ἤδη …) and goes back into this enowning only in so far as in it the ab-scissioned [and] clear way-out and the ground of the whole of the beënt is posited.

But if thinking sets on with the brooking break, then σχολή shows itself ownsomely as the open time-play-space – the in-itself ab-scissioned and as such out-held truth – for φύσις, in such a way that σχολή is the truth of such vagueness itself and not – like in the Greek inception – the clearness of disabscondedness *of* the whole that steadily arises from out of itself. The in-itself broken vagueness – the enowning of the schism – is the inceptional cense-ment of ἀλήθεια, which takes back φύσις as the steady being of the beënt and transforms it, from the enowned disabscondment, into the worldhoodly [*ins Welthafte*] of the unhindered-still lingering [*Verweilens*] of things in the frugality of the hospitable. In this way, we hear in σχολή the Greek fore-word for there-being [*Da-sein*] as it is thought in the other inception.

7. End

What the endtime of metaphysics addresses in the name "economic problem" is founded upon a matter that is obvious to everyone at all times and without further ado: as long as the basic stock of life is not secured, it remains futile [*müßig*] to turn to the higher human virtues. For in this case the virtues lack the foundation on which they stand, the object itself to which they can refer themselves to, namely man in his naked givenness, or in other words: the factum brutum "man". All discussions about the "actual" [*das "Eigentliche"*] are in vain as long as care is not taken to ensure that man can first of all "be there" and remain "there". Who would deny that? And yet: everything lies in what is said in this "first of all there" [*"erst einmal da"*]. In what sense of "being there" [*"da sein"*] can the factum brutum be ascribed precedence within there-being [*Dasein*]?

What is censive [*Das Entscheidende*] about the economic problem is not the way needs are differentiated and ordered, but the primacy of the beënt (i.e. the in-itself beingless- and senseless) before being, which constitutes the problem as such, i.e. as an obstructing fore-throw. To this corresponds the positing of extant needs, which looks away from æmetta as the biding of man and wants to delay something like æmetta – that which inceptionally be-fore-vagues and transforms all "existence", the there-being that extraneizes "existence" into itself [there-being] [*das anfänglich allem "Dasein" verwandelnd vor-herschwebende, es zu ihm selbst ver-andernde Da-sein*] – to an after

in opposition to the satisfaction of needs. But these needs are bidesomely measureless, i.e. unreceptive for a measure, and they are in their hybris [*Vermessenheit*] the foundation for the setting up (framing) of man towards the fulfillment of being as the will to will. This will to will is the unconditional enforcement [*Durchsetzung*] of the exclusivity of "existence" [*"Dasein"*] as the valuelike validity of the beënt vis-à-vis there-being [*Da-sein*] as the truth of being. The new-timeish (i.e. methodical) economy is the executive knowledge of this will, in which man, by foresetting the whole of the beënt as a parametrized stock that has to be, by way of calculating and planning, optimized ever anew in its actuality, succumbs to the illusion that wealth, namely the hospitality that cannot be based on and within economics, could be achieved by means of the incessant increase of the wantability of the bidesomely scarce [*mittels der unentwegten Steigerung der Wollbarkeit des wesenhaft Knappen*].

The parameterization necessary for this requires the making available of space and time as parameters, which foreset the beënt in whole as a totality of scarcity and needfulness, without any way out. The (out-)running [ttt] untime [*Die ablaufende Unzeit*], the afalling of the spaceless contingentment [*Kontingentierung*], delivers everything as a value for the compulsive calculating of the escapeless man. The escapelessly calculating human being is the subject that has stepped into its outermost form and is banished[uuu] [*gebannt*] into the evacuation (off-flighting) [*Entfluchtung*], thus holding the god in the flight, unleashing the earth into measurelessness, [and] disabsconding the sky as a starless wasteland. The un-biding of this in-flighting [*Verfluchtung*], the planetary dispersion of star-desert and dis-measured[vvv] earth, of false (foul) gods and inhumans – this, together – is the inhospitality of the will to will [*Dieses Unwesen der Verfluchtung, die planetarische Versprengung von Sternwüste und zermessener Erde, von Abgöttern und Unmenschen, ist die Unwirtlichkeit des Willens zum Willen*].

The will to will is the refugelessness [*Zufluchtslosigkeit*] of the flighting [*Fluchtung*], that is, the flighting itself, insofar as it renounces itself from its refuge and disturns itself into the oversaturation of the mere beënt [*sich verkehrt in die Übersättigung des nur Seienden*], which is left to the wordless

[ttt] The German verb *ablaufen* means "to run out", but it also refers to the way structured processes (in society, institutions etc.) are "running".

[uuu] *Gebannt* means being banished as in being exiled or driven away, but it also carries the meaning of being enthralled, as if man is banished into the enthrallment, or enthralled in the banishment, of the unworld of subjectity.

[vvv] The coinage *to dis-measure* translates the German *zermessen*. The German prefix *zer-* is cognate with the English prefix *dis-* and denotes an aspect of dissolvement and asunderness. *Zermessen* refers to a measuring beyond, or without, any measure, a measuring that measures everything for its own sake, which is the sheer accumulation of measurable things for calculative thinking.

unmeasure of the "world's cry for wheat and petrol"[29]. Within the unmeasure of oversaturation is – irrespective of the quantity of what is available – everywhere gruff coercion [*unwirsche Nötigung*] and sheer needfulness [*blanke Notdurft*] and compulsive talking-to-death (dissection) [*zwanghafte Zerredung*], in which nothing reminds any longer for the mild need of beholding [*die milde Not des Schonens*], in which man remains exhorted [*zugemutet*] to the saysive[www] wealth of freyness [*der sagenhafte Reichtum der Freiung*]. The meagerness of what is scarce can only spread itself as the principle of the measure-grant where man has forgotten the inceptional need of æmetta and with it moting [*das Müssen*] as the extraneous abearing of the earliness of the inception, which only extraneizes him into man <as such> [*zum Menschen ver-andert*]. A sufficing of the beënt, however, is only from out of the inceptionally attuned answer of man to the need-worthy sufficiency of being [*die not-wendige Genüge des Seins*]. The sufficiency of being is its up-winding into the enowning of wealth.

Hospitable says the guestly-mild site of the flight of earth and sky, gods and mortals from out of the truth of the gift of earliness, which is ensconced within the ab-scission, which the moting human being <i.e., the homo humanus,> [*der müssende Mensch*] en-founds. Hospitality – the truly worthy of the world – seconds out of the fitting counsel (read) of the cense-ment, which is to be seconded from within æmetta, as the onefold of fittingness [*Schicklichkeit*], the fay [*Fug*] and ownhead [*Eigentum*]. Where man saves out of faysomeness [*Fügsamkeit*] what the tale of the goddesses inceptionally hosts, all is unsayably rich, finitely-immeasurable from out of the absconded gold of the sufficiency of the ab-scission.

Endnotes

[1] Beyond the few references given in the footnotes, this attempt is indebted throughout to the thinking of Martin Heidegger, in particular the six posthumous treatises that have appeared since 1989 within the scope of the *Gesamtausgabe* (Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, 1976–). From the sake, which has been projected out of this thinking, [and] which can be indicated by the titles "enowning" [*Ereignis*] and "schism" [*Unterschied*], follows, from the view of the author, the likelihood of an interpretation (out-lay) of the first or Greek inception and thus of a setting in sunder with what the heirs of this inception call the economic problem.

[2] Pindar, *Olympic Ode XIII*, v. 47f.

[3] Pindar, *Olympic Ode XIII*, vv. 1ff.

[4] Poseidon is the "earthshaker", i.e. the god of the en-shaking of being or the en-shaking of the schism, in which the beënt as such in the whole clears itself. Where Poseidon appears, the whole of the beënt lays open in the en-shaking. The en-shaking is the clearing of the fay of the schism and the fay itself (δίκη) is the biding-sway of the en-shaking. This is why Pindar names the goddess Δίκη "unshakeable".

[5] *Griechenland* [*Greece*].

[www] For the German *sagenhaft* we suggest the coinage *saysive* as a likely translation. *Sagenhaft* usually means "fabulous, legendary, mythical", but we believe that these meanings would obstruct the hearing of the true wealth, which originates in and through the Say [*die Sage*], and which has been forgotten by the tradition of metaphysics.

[6] Letter to Casimir Ulrich Böhlendorff (November 1802).

[7]Friedrich Nietzsche, *Nachlaß* [*Unpublished Fragments*] *1885–1887*, in: *Kritische Studienausgabe*. Published by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, Vol. 12, München: dtv/de Gruyter, 1988, p. 462f.

[8] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Also sprach Zarathustra* [*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*], in: *Kritische Studienausgabe*. Published by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, Vol. 4, München: dtv/de Gruyter, 1988, p. 14.

[9] Ibid., p. 19f.

[10] Un-æmetta cannot be set up through the beënt. It is a refusal and an obscuring of the bidance of being, in which it [being] is degraded towards the beënt.

[11] Martin Heidegger, *Besinnung* [*Mindfulness*], HGA 66, Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, 1997, p. 318 (88. Seyn und Maß [Beyng and measure]).

[12] Martin Heidegger, *Das Ereignis*, HGA 71, Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, 2007, p. 93f.

[13] Compare to this Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche II*, Pfullingen: Neske, 1961, p. 335ff.

[14] Can one speak, in the strict sense, of a coming by "of" time? Is it not rather the case that in æmetta less of the given time is occupied and therefore more time is remaining ("free"), thus also enough for that which goes beyond what is necessary? This is how it seems to the historical eye, which is detached from the experience (originating-fare) [*Erfahrung*]. But the phenomenon says otherwise: the fact that there is no time means that time itself does not bide, while conversely in æmetta "all time is" ("there is all the time") ["*alle Zeit ist*"]. Æmetta is the advent of time, is time as advent.

[15] Ledig ["single", "unmarried"; "free"] belongs to the idg. root *liđu- (Gelenk ["joint"], Glied ["limb"]); it therefore means "gelenkig ["limber", "supple"], geschmeidig ["lithesome", "flexible", "lithe"]", i.e. "unhindered, unbound, free", cleared. The lithing is the inceptional free-grant of the in-itself fayed flagrant (open) [element], in which there is no hindrance for the unsayable faysomeness [*Fügsamkeit*] of the thing into the world-jointure [*Welt-Gelenk*] and for the biding of the fitting [*das Wesen des Ringen*], in which the adornment of the world-play [*das Geschmeide des Welt-Spiels*] en-shines. What are the ἀναγκαῖα τοῦ βίου [the necessities of life], if the bodying [*leibend*] life is steered into the up-right biding of man and fayful [*gefügig*] to the measure-grant of the lithing? Into which ungainliness [*Ungelenke*] does life drift, however, if it remains steered away [*abgelenkt*] from that uprightness?

[16] The threat of needs is that they are left to themselves and human beings, in turn, are left to mere needs. This threat, however, is a threat of being. "The threat of famine, for example, and of the meager years does not consist in the fact that many people perish, but in the fact that those who make it through only live, in order to eat, so they can live. Life revolves around itself in its own vacuity, which surrounds it in the form of barely noticed and often unacknowledged boredom. In this vacuity man degenerates" (Martin Heidegger, *Zum Ereignis-Denken*, HGA 73.1., Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, 2013, p.707)

[17] Ζητεῖν [Zetein] says the interrogating winning of that which shows itself from itself, from its provenance of biding that denies itself, thus the prior saying-toward this provenance, the letting oneself belong to it and its winning(ness).

[18] The word used by Pindar in Ol. XIII,7 (see above) for the goddesses Eunomia, Dike, and Eirene, ταμία [tamía] (namely πλούτου [ploútou]), means custodian. Τὰ ταμιεύματα [Tà tamieúmata] (τὸ ταμιευτικόν [tò tamieutikón]) denotes that which belongs to the economy, to the household economy as a whole. Ταμίας [Tamías] is the custodian or treasurer, i.e. the one who reigns over the hoarded and the safekept by saving it in the allotting and allocating. Ταμία [Tamía] is related to τέμνω [témnō], teilen [to divide], (so also Latin tempus, templum), which does not mean the cutting up of a whole, but says the allotting of this whole from out of the clearance of the schism, in which the biding is safekept. Such frugal allotment is the meaning of the custoditing, which we call with the old word *Wirten* [hosting]. The original hosting is the fore-seeing (pro-viding) [*das Vor-sehen*] which clears everything in its wholesome, undiminished biding and keeps it as a cleared whole. The life of such a fore-seeing (pro-viding) – the providence as breaking into the midst of the beënt – are the gods. Thus, ταμίας [tamías] is said of Zeus in the sense of the one who allocates out of clearing pro-vidence <as the [non-metaphysical and non-religious] glimpse which, in advance, kindles the clearance for the measured appearing of

things> [*aus lichtender Vor-sehung zuteilt*]. The clearance of the beënt in the whole is godly, insofar as it occurs as the unsayable allotment of the wholesome (the οἶκος [oikos] as the one-and-only treasure) in the pro-vidence which, from its inceptional earliness, keeps this wholesome in healing sight as i-owned (i-risen) [*als Geeignetes*] and beholds it thus in the biding. Thus, the living οἶκος [oikos] is in truth the work of the τέμνειν [témnein] of the gods and in this sense a templum (a temple). Man does nothing to the clearing hosting of the gods. But he is called to out-cast and found the clearance, in which the godly hosting enowns itself, and thus, in his own way, to accomplish the hosting and the beholding, out of which things are offered in the absconded measure of the wholesome. Part of this accomplishing is that man casts out the nearness of encountering for the guests and builds a site for this nearness (τέμενος [témenos]), in the middle of which a temple may stand. Man is thus in his biding first of all a guest-host and only from out of this being

a host, the host of himself and of others, [and] at the same time the frugal cultivator and en-earner of things [*der sparsame Bewirtschafter und Erwirtschafter der Dinge*].

[19] Ὅταν (ὅτε+ἄν) means "whenever", "at the time where", "every time when". In this word speaks the biding of χρόνος as disabsconding by saying the time-space of the advent of the cense-ment.

[20] Cf. Heidegger's translation and interpretation (out-lay) of the first choir song of Sophocles' *Antigone*, in: *Einführung in die Metaphysik* [*Introduction to Metaphysics*], Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1987, p. 112ff.

[21] *Nikomachische Ethik* [*Nicomachean Ethics*], 1177 b 4.

[22] Ἵνα [Hína] means, as a place-adverb, here, there. The σχολάζειν is the self-sufficiently (autarkically) scinded biding-place of ἀσχολεῖσθαι.

[23] In another reading: "… and the fights never extend into the extraneous – into vagueness – but always remain limited to the process as it applies to the vicinity of that master." The extraneous [*Das Antrische*] is the unhomely, the unfamiliar [*das Unheimliche, Ungeheure*] as the wholly Other, which denies itself in the earliness of the inception as its inceptionality.

[24] Cf. Heraclitus, Fr. 50 Diels-Kranz. This, like the manifold Heraclitean references in the Theaetetus, will not be discussed here.

[25] The arbitration award is made in the Greek court by the voting of the appointed heliasts, after the presiding judge has prepared and conducted the hearing of the case.

[26] 173a–b [English translation from http://www.pub22.net/avilla/Theaetetus.html].

[27] In one of her *Carnets*, Simone Weil records: "*Théétète*, 176b. *Phugê*, «fuite» [fr. flight], conversion" (Simone Weil, *Oevres*, Paris: Gallimard, 1999, S. 887).

[28] Breakable [*Gebrechlich*] here does not mean – in relation to human "life" – decrepit, fragile or deficient, but rather, with reference to the *biding* of man, its inceptional indrawability and tuneability into the enowning break [*Bruch*].

[29] Martin Heidegger, *Das Ereignis* (cf. n. 12), p. 80.