

Preface*

With this book I re-enter the pathway of thinking that I traversed when writing *On the Way to Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy* (2007) and *Translation and Interpretation: Learning from Beiträge* (2012). The present undertaking further upholds and cultivates the same close connection with Heidegger's *Beiträge zur Philosophie*. In an effort to maintain the unavoidable distance required for observation, and at the same time to leave intact the experiential character of this pathway, in what follows I shall bring to the fore the markings that were my guide while traversing it.

The hermeneutic task to which the first of the aforementioned works was devoted consisted in highlighting the structure of *Beiträge zur Philosophie* for the express purpose of distinguishing it from the structure of a traditionally conceived and executed work of philosophy. Although each section of *Beiträge* carries a specific title, none of its sections singlehandedly fulfills the function of a conventional chapter which expounds upon its title in order to support and establish a central thesis. It is important to understand the reason: *Beiträge* does not espouse a central thesis to whose establishing and demonstration a number of chapters would be devoted.

What distinguishes each section of *Beiträge* from a conventional chapter is the fact that each section owes its thrust to the conjunction wherein it stands along with other sections.

* Cf. Parvis Emad, „*History*“ and „*Nothingness*“ in *Heidegger and Nietzsche: Learning from Beiträge*, Szeged-Budapest-Frankfurt am Main-Münster-Miami: Societas Philosophia Classica, 2013.

In brief, each section of *Beiträge* occupies a place in the conjunction of that section with the other sections of this work. Each section of *Beiträge* stands for itself “in order to impress more strikingly the abiding onefold” insofar as in each section “the attempt is made to say the same of the same but each time from within another abiding domain....” (GA 65/ 81-82) As an example I should refer to the section entitled “Be-ing” (*Das Seyn*). This section occupies a place within the conjunction built by other sections and in the light cast upon it by the preceding sections that interpenetrate it and uphold it. That is why speaking of *Beiträge* as a whole Heidegger emphasizes that this work is made up of conjunctions, “jointures” or *Fügungen*.

Having obtained the insight into the structure of *Beiträge* and realizing that this work differentiates itself from a traditionally framed work of philosophy, I also obtained an insight into the inner workings of *Beiträge*. While writing this work Heidegger was engaged in an *intra-lingual* translation in the German language giving words new meanings. To illustrate I shall briefly examine the word *Ereignis*.

Heidegger translates the word *Ereignis* intra-lingually and gives this word a meaning it normally does not have. In using the word *Ereignis* Heidegger takes his orientation from the construct “*eignis*” (with its allusions to “*eigen*” and “*eignen*”) and the prefix “*Er-*” that in the same vein as the prefix “*en-*” in English indicates “enabling,” “empowering” and the like. Coming together in the word “*Ereignis*,” “*Er*” and “*eignis*” denote an “enabling owning,” an “enabling ownership,” an “enabling making one’s own,” and an “enabling belongingness,” etc. However, nowhere in *Beiträge*, and for that matter in any of the other four volumes of the pentalogy of which *Beiträge* was the first to appear in print does Heidegger use the word *Ereignis* by retaining its familiar and ordinary meaning, that is, *Geschehnis* or in English

“event.” To reflect the thrust of both the prefix “Er-” and the construct “*eignis*” I rendered this keyword of Heidegger’s thought as “en-owning.”

However, the enactment of this intra-lingual translation is not undertaken by Heidegger in order to appear esoteric. This intra-lingual translation originates from within the grounding-attunement of reservedness (*Grundstimmung der Verhaltenheit*). To elucidate the unparalleled significance of this attunement let me venture to say that in writing *Beiträge* Heidegger the thinker proves to be a vehicle transferring into language virtually everything that is held in reserve in this attunement and is thus handed down to him - - everything that is sheltered-preserved in the grounding-attunement of reservedness. In this connection it was necessary to stress the ground-breaking characterization that Heidegger offers in *Beiträge* of the correlation between thinking and attunement. Holding both in his purview he emphasizes that “if the grounding-attunement stays away, then everything is a forced rattling of concepts and empty words.” (GA 65/ 21)

The emphasis Heidegger places on the grounding-attunement in general and by extension on the grounding-attunement of reservedness in particular, casts a significant light on the question concerning the translation of the keywords and key phrases of his philosophy. Translation of these keywords and phrases too arises from within the grounding-attunement of reservedness and so arising it maintains, reflects and accounts for the manner in which these keywords and key phrases are sheltered and preserved in that grounding-attunement. For instance, reserved, preserved and sheltered in that attunement is the entire issue of *die Kehre* (“the turning”) that Heidegger in *Beiträge* circumscribes concisely and precisely as “*die Kehre im Ereignis*” or “the turning in enowning.”

As the matter of translation gets disentangled from its one-sided confinement to an intercourse between two languages that takes its orientation from the definitions found in a

dictionary so too does the matter of interpretation. In this way translation and interpretation of Heidegger's keywords and phrases become subservient to the grounding-attunement of reservedness. Disengaged from the simple-minded view that conceives the grounding-attunement of reservedness as a mere ornamental "decoration" not to be taken seriously, interpreting Heidegger's keywords and phrases in languages other than his own German takes on a stringency and rigor reflecting his peculiar and idiosyncratic expression. The brazen disregard of this attunement is a corollary of "associating" Heidegger's thought with historical-developmental processes. The certainty and convenience that come with conceiving Heidegger's thought as a historical-developmental process become so irresistible as to shut out all hermeneutically oriented and critically effective judgment.

In my second work mentioned at the beginning of this preface, I address the implications, repercussions and hazards of "associating" Heidegger's thought on the matter of "turning" with a historical-developmental process. In this connection, it suffices to reiterate that insofar as the matter of "turning" is sheltered, reserved and preserved in the grounding-attunement of reservedness it should be interpreted as "turning in enowning." The failure to grasp the "turning" in this way has a "history" of accumulated misunderstandings and prejudices.

In the early years of the 1960s the preconceived idea came to vogue according to which Heidegger's thought runs through an earlier and a later course, and that between the two courses there occurs a "reversal" when the early Heidegger (called Heidegger I) desists from explicating Dasein and "reverses" his course instead toward being, thus giving rise to the thought of the later Heidegger (called Heidegger II). With this preconceived idea the historicizing of Heidegger's thought as a historically developing process was inaugurated. No sooner did this happen that the hermeneutic significance of the grounding-attunement of

reservedness fell by the wayside. Thereupon the door was opened to a fanciful explication of Heidegger's thought by searching for its "zero point" departing from which this thought "receives" "historical" influences from the major figures of Western philosophy. The prime victim of this historicizing approach was the question of being or *Seinsfrage* itself that was now characterized as an "ethereal question." (Cf., *Translation and Interpretation: Learning from Beiträge*, p. xiii.)

In a series of eighteen notes dating from the time of the writing of *Beiträge*, Heidegger highlighted the question of being by taking up the matter of "turning" as entailing the relationship between Dasein and being. With these notes he offered an instructive and concise conception of the "turning" and thereby met head-on the anticipated future misunderstandings that would befall the question of the "turning." Specifically, he addressed this question in the first of the eighteen notes by deliberately and precisely divesting the matter of "turning" from the misleading assumption according to which "turning" requires a priority to be attributed either to Dasein or to being. In an unmistakably unequivocal manner he emphasized that fundamentally the "turning" should be grasped as "the turning of both Dasein and being *unto each other*." This is another way of saying that neither of the two has a priority over the other. He emphasized this "unto each other" by stating that "the turning sways in this 'unto each other.'" (*Translation and Interpretation: Learning from Beiträge*, p. 29).

With this characterization of the "turning" Heidegger once again showed that the conception of the "turning" as a "reversal of course" and along with this "reversal" the understanding of the "turning" as a historical process is bereft of all foundation and creditability. Here neither being initiates the "turning" nor Dasein. Neither of the two enjoys a priority in relation to the other. Both are sheltered, reserved and preserved in the grounding-attunement of reservedness. Sheltered, reserved and preserved in this attunement is also the

“lightning-alikeness and momentariness of being.” In sum, in the first of the eighteen notes Heidegger made it clear that being flashes within a “turning” in which being and Dasein turn unto each other.

My attempts in the second aforementioned work to elucidate the question of translation; to address the relationship between poetizing and thinking; to deal with issues concerning Nietzsche and the question of being; to observe Rilke’s and Hölderlin’s proximity to this question, all were grounded in the matter of a “turning” in whose “space” being’s lightning-alikeness-momentariness-flashing unravels the “turning” as the “turning unto each other of Dasein and being.” Being’s lightning-alikeness-momentariness-flashing is the guiding “star” whose light also guides the efforts I shall make in the pages that follow.

Foremost is the effort devoted to a thinking-exploration of the relationship between Heidegger and Nietzsche. It is not a “historical” interest that prompts me to examine this relationship but the realization that given Heidegger’s own unmistakable attestation, Nietzsche is the philosopher whose thought is in the crossing to the other onset insofar as he occupies a place within the proximity of and a simultaneous distance from the thinking of and by being (*das Denken des Seins*). Since exploration of this proximity and distance comes with the likelihood and the promise of shedding some light on our predicament in the present world-historical situation, this exploration *ipso facto* differentiates itself from an academic and merely theoretical preoccupation of philosophy. No sooner do we enter the arena of this exploration that we realize that both Nietzsche and Heidegger have a great deal to say about religion, religiosity and Christianity. Undertaking this thinking-exploration brings us to the realization that in spite of the differences in their outlook and attitude when Nietzsche and Heidegger address religion, religiosity and Christianity they speak in voices whose resonance

and discerning power will be heard and will be noted for a very long time to come. The two voices are not merely resonant, but resonating with each other.

Occupying a place in Nietzsche's purview, religion and religiosity prove to be devoid of any credibility and guiding power since for him both religion and religiosity are essentially nothing other than a mistake of assessment and an aberration. When addressing religion, religiosity and Christianity Nietzsche adopts a shrill voice that seems to be angrily asking "in the face of overwhelming evidence against Christianity, religion and religiosity how could anyone still believe in religion and Christianity, and be enthusiastic about religiosity?" When addressing Christianity, religion and religiosity Heidegger's voice resonates with criticism and discernment yet at the end remains utterly bereft of reverence. As we shall see in the pages that follow, whereas Nietzsche takes on religion, religiosity and Christianity as in part manageable and in part unavoidable consequences of nihilism, Heidegger takes on Christianity, religion and religiosity as the inescapable consequences of the forgottenness and abandonment of and by being and preordained through the domination of technicity and machination. In Heidegger's estimate Christianity, religion and religiosity are essentially and basically contrivances of technicity whose origin lies in machination understood as "a manner of the abiding-swaying-trait of being." (GA 65/ 126) This estimation shows that from Heidegger's viewpoint Christianity is not "being-less" but stands in light of being's withdrawal from and refusal to appear: it stands in light of "nothingness."

We find a plethora of textual evidence concerning Nietzsche's vehement rejection of Christianity, religion and religiosity throughout his writings. Aphorism number 84 of *Der Wanderer und sein Schatten* entitled "Die Gefangenen" ("The Prisoners") is one telling example of this rejection that we find in the Nietzschean corpus. However, coming to Heidegger the matter of religion appears in two unmistakably different directions. While in and around 1927 he takes up the question of religion in light of Christianness (an instance of

the facticity of existence) and allocates it a place in his fundamental ontology, with the breakthrough of being-historical thinking, Heidegger's stance on religion and Christianity changes drastically. The unmistakable insight guiding Heidegger in his being-historical explication of religion is no longer the insight into "Christianness" of the 1927 but the insight into a "countering" that is the hallmark of the relationship between man and god. When he addresses religion and Christianity from within the being-historical perspective, he takes his fundamental orientation from this "countering." At times directly and at times indirectly and implicitly, Heidegger differentiates this "countering" from the traditional approaches to the question of god oriented to the notions of existence and non-existence of god. Ultimately neither notion is capable of guiding man toward god because neither has any inkling of that "countering."

The "countering of man and god" occurs concomitantly with the lightning-alikeness, momentariness of the flashing of being. This flashing comes to pass and by so doing sustains the "countering of man and god" upon which theism, pantheism and atheism (the well-known theological preoccupations of philosophy) unnoticeably rest. Moreover, this flashing leads to a domain totally untouched by religion and religiosity and inaccessible to both. Heidegger stresses this point when he holds in his purview the lightning-alikeness, momentariness of the flashing of being and ascertains that the countering of man and god "can not be 'religion' any more just as the guardianship of man in the sense of the groundership of Dasein can not be anymore the same as human beings living their life to the full as *animal rationale*." (GA 66/243) The "countering of man and god" is neither religion nor a token and indication of religiosity in the same way that the guardianship cum groundership of Dasein is not a task assignable to man conceived as *animal rationale*. As long as man is conceived as *animal rationale* Dasein is neither guarded nor grounded. Similarly as long as "the countering of man and god" is mistaken with religion the lightning-alikeness, momentariness of the flashing of being remains obfuscated.

However, the lightning-alikeness, momentariness of the flashing of being does not cancel and remove the “nothingness” that comes to the fore in the wake of being’s refusal to appear and its withdrawal from appearing. Interestingly and instructively, this flashing allows the “nothingness” to shine and unfold. This shining and unfolding entails consequences for both Nietzsche and Heidegger. In light of this “nothingness” Nietzsche’s doctrine of nihilism appears in the vicinity of Heidegger’s discovery of the forgottenness and abandonment of and by being. Nowhere does this appearing shine more clearly than in the conception of history that these thinkers espouse.

Given Nietzsche’s fundamental orientation to life’s unhurried reposefulness, he examines “history” in order to determine the extent to which “history” may be harmful to life’s unmitigated and unhurried reposefulness. In spite of the fact that the pathway that leads Nietzsche to life’s unmitigated and unhurried reposefulness ultimately leads him to the vicinity of Heidegger’s thinking of and by being, Nietzsche falls short of obtaining an awareness of the “history” that comes to fruition concomitantly with the lightning-alikeness, momentariness flashing of being. Nietzsche comes close to perceiving this flashing but at the end does not obtain an awareness of it. Perhaps Nietzsche’s utmost proximity to the thinking of an by being comes to the fore when we consider his remarkable yet ultimately barren struggle with nihilism. Heidegger is fully aware of Nietzsche’s struggle and its ultimate inability to lead beyond nihilism. Here is the junction where historicalness of being casts its inestimable light on Nietzsche’s entire output and the course of his thought.