Λόγος and Everydayness (*Alltäglichkeit*)

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Abstract

An earlier study, also published in *eudia*,[1] contends three (conjoined) interpretations of λόγος are discoverable in Heidegger's hermeneutic-phenomenological (hermeneutical) reading of Heraclitus's fragments. They are λόγος meant as λέγειν, λόγος meant as being (*Sein*) itself, and λόγος meant as *Dasein* (t/here-being, transcendence). This article discerns a fourth understanding: λόγος meant as everydayness (*Alltäglichkeit*). The report (1) lays out the hermeneutical considerations situating its analysis; (2) reviews the fundamental-ontological (*fundamentalontologisch*) (transcendental-horizontal) rendition of everydayness, including its kinship with fallenness (*Verfallenheit*) and inauthenticity (*Uneigentlichkeit*), and; (3) examines Heidegger's readings of the fragments whose saying of λόγος it proposes corresponds to the meaning of everydayness.

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[1] Joaquin Trujillo, "Λόγος and *Dasein*: A Fresh Reading of Heidegger's Reading of Heraclitus," *eudia* 18 (2024), http://www.eudia.org/wp-content/uploads/Trujillo_A-Fresh-Reading.pdf.

1. Introduction

The original meaning of thesis, of thesis as such, or θέσις, is to put forth, propose, or table (for consideration). Two variables the strength of a thesis are commonly correlated to, in addition to its interpretability, parsimony, and rigor, are its consistency with associated theses *and* remedy of inconsistencies among related ones. A separate study of Heidegger's hermeneutic-phenomenological (hermeneutical) investigation of the meaning of λόγος spoken by Heraclitus's fragments, and which was also published in *eudia*,[2] contends to effect progress against both variables. That report – which associates the challenges of reading Heidegger's analysis to his polyvalent exhibition of λόγος and effort (struggle) to leap over the ontological difference to dwell openly within the truth (ἀλήθεια) of being (*Sein*) (within being as truth) – propounds three interpretations of λόγος are discoverable in Heidegger's reading of the fragments. The first is λόγος meant as λέγειν, which is the meaning of λόγος that corresponds to the interpretation of *Rede* (discourse) articulated in *Sein und Zeit*[3] (*SZ*) (GA 2) and serves as the point of departure for Heidegger's analysis of Heraclitus. The second is λόγος meant as being itself, which in the Heraclitus studies – particularly as reported in *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (GA 40) (1935),[4] *Heraklit* (GA 55) (1943/1944),[5] and "Logos (Heraklit, Fragment 50)" (1951), Section III of *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (GA 7)[6] – Heidegger commonly differentiates as "ὁ Λόγος" (also, "the Λόγος," "the λόγος," and "the Logos") and is the chief interpretation of λόγος he wrests from the fragments. The third is λόγος meant as *Dasein* (t/here-being, the being-of-the-t/here, transcendence).[7]

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[2] Ibid.

[3] Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (1927), GA 2, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977) (hereafter GA 2 and *SZ*); *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1962) (hereafter MR-tr.).

[4] *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (1935), GA 40, ed. Petra Jaeger (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983) (hereafter GA 40); *Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Mannheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959) (hereafter RM-tr.).

[5] *Heraklit: Der Anfang des abendländischen Denkens. Logik. Heraklits Lehre vom Logos* (1943/1944), GA 55, ed. Manfred Frings, third ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994) (hereafter GA 55); *Heraclitus: The Inception of Occidental Thinking and Logic: Heraclitus's Doctrine of the Logos*, trans. Julia Goesser Assaiante and S. Montgomery Ewegen (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018) (hereafter AE-tr.).

[6] *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (1936-1954), GA 7, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000) (hereafter GA 7), 211-234; *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1984) (hereafter KC-tr.), 59-78.

[7] Trujillo, "Λόγος and *Dasein*: A Fresh Reading of Heidegger's Reading of Heraclitus."

This report discerns a fourth understanding of λόγος it contends is also discoverable in Heidegger's reading of Heraclitus. It is λόγος meant as *"everydayness"* ("Alltäglichkeit").[8] It is "everyday [*alltägliche*] *Dasein*,"[9] or *Dasein* "lost" to its "inauthenticity" ("*Uneigentlichkeit*");[10] thought fundamental-ontologically, the phenomena of everydayness and inauthenticity are essentially synonymous. The fourth understanding of λόγος proposed to emanate from Heidegger's analysis of the fragments is *Dasein* falling (*Verfallen*) as a mode (*Modus*) of forgottenness (and abandonment) of being, transcendence, and its potentiality-to-be correlated to its "circumspective preoccupation" ("*Besorgen*") with – "circumspective absorption" ("*besorgende Aufgehen*") in – beings and the "publicness of the 'they' [*die Öffentlichkeit des Man*]."[11] It is the way of *Dasein* operating in a mode of "*averageness*" ("Durchschnittlichkeit"),[12] where "the phenomenon of the World [*Weltphänomen*] gets passed over,"[13] and its ownmost (*Wesen*), namely, its "to-be" ("*Zu-sein*"),[14] is lost. This "fourth understanding" is contended in three parts that (1) lay out the hermeneutical considerations situating the analysis; (2) review the fundamental-ontological (*fundamentalontologisch*) (transcendental-horizontal) interpretations of everydayness, including its kinship with fallenness (*Verfallenheit*) and inauthenticity (*Uneigentlichkeit*), and; (3) examine Heidegger's readings of the fragments whose saying of λόγος is proposed to correspond to the meaning of everydayness.

2. Hermeneutical considerations

Three postulates support the thesis prescinding *Dasein* as one of the meanings of λόγος spoken by Heidegger's dialogue with Heraclitus. The same considerations situate this study. Their bearing here – plus the fact they support an argument that departs from prevailing renditions of Heidegger's analysis of Heraclitus – recommends their review. They are: (a) Heidegger's hermeneutical priority may be fortuitously obscuring the broader understanding of λόγος discernable in the fragments; (b)

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[8] GA 2, 68; MR-tr., 76.

[9] *"Das alltägliche Dasein verdeckt zumeist die eigenste, unbezügliche und unüberholbare Möglichkeit seines Seins,"* GA 2, 341; MR-tr., 301.

[10] GA 2, 233-234; MR-tr., 220; William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, fourth ed. with a new preface by the author (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), 70, https://fordham.bepress.com/phil_research/38.

[11] GA 2, 76-77, 90-91, 95-96, 172-173, 222; MR-tr., 83-84, 95-96, 101, 167, 210. Translation modified.

[12] GA 2, 58; MR-tr., 69.

[13] GA 2, 173; MR-tr., 168. Translation modified.

[14] *"Das 'Wesen' dieses Seienden liegt in seinem Zu-sein… Das 'Wesen' des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz,"* GA 2, 56; MR-tr., 67. Translation slightly modified.

the hermeneutic-phenomenological imperative to inabide (*Inständigkeit*) the "onefold" ("*Einheit*") (World) regardless the matter thought liberates other understandings of λόγος to come to light in Heraclitus and clarifies ostensible equivocations intimated by Heidegger's thinking, and; (c) the rendition of λόγος as λέγειν contributes to the redress of the misconception of discourse as a third existential (*existential*) (constitutive moment, structural element) of *Dasein*'s disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*).

The understanding of λόγος as *Dasein* is propounded to emanate from Heraclitus's contrapuntal illumination of the phenomenon within the context of the "interplay" of his "phenomenological thinking" between the first and other beginning. [15] It was proposed to be one of three phenomenological relata intimated by Heraclitus's oscillation between the questions of (a) being as such (the first beginning), or the being of beings in the whole (*Sein des Seienden im Ganzen*), a redundancy insofar as beings in the whole (*Seiendes im Ganzen*), thought hermeneutic-phenomenologically (hermeneutically), always connotes its being, and (b) the truth of being (the other beginning). Heidegger's rendition of λόγος as being itself, or, as he discerns it being-historically, be-ing (*Seyn*) and enowning (*Ereignis*), it was further proposed, is commensurate with the sway of his hermeneutical priority: the question of the meaning of being. This question is *SZ*'s driving force and exemplified in Heidegger's being-historical writings, including, *Beiträge zur Philosophie* (*Vom Ereignis*) (GA 65) (1936-1938), [16] where he writes: "The question of the *truth of be-ing*," and in "accordance" with the thinking articulated in *SZ*, "is and remains *my* question, and is my *one and only* question; for this question concerns what is *most sole and unique*."[17]

But is the question of the meaning of being the *only* question enjoining hermeneutic-phenomenological thinking? A positive response might be inferred from the concentration of current Heidegger research on deciphering his being-historical writings. The earlier study asserts otherwise. It contends Heidegger's reading of λόγος as being itself appears to correlate to his first concern – one Levinas calls the "'egoism' of ontology" and affiliates with Heidegger's finding in "pre-

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[15] Kenneth Maly and Parvis Emad, "Introduction: Heraclitus and Essential Thinking," in *Heidegger on Heraclitus: A New Reading*, ed. Kenneth Maly and Parvis Emad (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986), 5; Parvis Emad, *On the Way to Heidegger's* Contributions to Philosophy (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), 106.

[16] Martin Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie* (*Vom Ereignis*) (1936-1938), GA 65, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989) (hereafter GA 65); *Contributions to Philosophy* (*From Enowning*), trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999) (hereafter EM-tr.).

[17] GA 65, 10-11; EM-tr., 8.

Socratism" the understanding of "thought as obedience to the truth of being"[18] – and may be obscuring other interpretations of the phenomenon spoken by the fragments, including ones that may come to light when read within the fundamental-ontological (transcendental-horizontal) perspective. Rather than default to prevailing (and sometimes manneristic) readings of Heidegger's reading of Heraclitus, including those that may intimate a patronage of his hermeneutical priority and be susceptible to the metaphysical biases (e.g., "worldview") Heidegger affiliates with "erudition,"[19] it was instead opted to follow the prescription Heidegger communicates to E. Fink during the "Heraclitus Seminar" of 1966/1967: "It does not concern me [Heidegger] to interpret Heraclitus by Heidegger," he says in response to Fink's reading of the fragments, but, "rather," to "heed what is unsaid in what is said."[20]

The second consideration situating the interpretation of λόγος as *Dasein* is the fundamental-ontological thesis, as laid forth in *SZ*, correlating the rigor of hermeneutic-phenomenological thinking to thinking being and beings steadfastly as a unicity regardless the matter thought, including being itself. Instances where Heidegger implicitly or explicitly underscores this imperative include: "being is always the being of a being;"[21] "there is no such thing as the 'side-by-side-ness' of an entity called *'Dasein'* with another entity called 'World;'"[22] the "compound expression 'being-in-the-World," which is synonymous with *Dasein*, "stands for a *unitary* phenomenon" and a "primary datum" that "must be seen as a whole,"[23] and, hence, "too" as "'World;'"[24] and "what is decisive for ontology is to prevent the splitting of the phenomenon—in other words, to hold its positive phenomenal content secure."[25] P. Emad reiterates this charge in his analysis of Heidegger's being-historical thinking when he asserts: "the onefold of be-ing and a being" – as well as the "forgottenness

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[18] Emmanuel Levinas, *Totalité et infini: essai sur l'extériorité* (Paris: Librairie Gènerale Française, 1990), 37; *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority,* trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hauge: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979) (hereafter AL-tr.), 49. Translation slightly modified.

[19] GA 65, 38; EM-tr., 27.

[20] Martin Heidegger and Eugen Fink, *Heraclitus Seminar 1966/1967*, trans. Charles H. Seibert (University: University of Alabama Press, 1979), 67; Trujillo, "Λόγος and *Dasein*: A Fresh Reading of Heidegger's Reading of Heraclitus," 7-10.

[21] "*Sein ist jeweils das Sein eines Seienden,*" GA 2, 12; MR-tr., 29. Translation modified.

[22] "*Es gibt nicht so etwas wie das 'Nebeneinander' eines Seienden, genannt 'Dasein,' mit anderem Seienden, genannt 'Welt,'*" GA 2, 74; MR-tr., 81. Translation slightly modified.

[23] "*Der zusammengesetzte Ausdruck 'In-der-Welt-sein' zeigt schon in seiner Prägung an, daß mit ihm ein einheitliches Phänomen gemeint ist. Dieser primäre Befund muß im Ganzen gesehen warden,*" GA 2, 71; MR-tr., 78. Translation slightly modified.

[24] "*Wollte man denn schon Welt überhaupt mit dem innerweltlich Seienden identifizieren, dann müßte man sagen, 'Welt' ist auch Dasein,*" GA 2, 158; MR-tr., 154. Translation slightly modified.

[25] "*Das ontologisch Entscheidende liegt darin, die Sprengung des Phänomens vorgängig zu verhüten, das heißt seinen positiven phänomenalen Bestand zu sichern,*" GA 2, 176; MR-tr., 174.

of be-ing" – "*must be thought at all cost*" to safeguard hermeneutic phenomenology from the "perspective of beings" and a metaphysical frame of mind.[26] A participant in the Heraclitus Seminar implies it too in his response to E. Fink's reading of Fragment 64,[27] which was based on Heidegger's rendition of the saying and could be (incorrectly) inferred to suggest a division between λόγος, discerned as being itself, and transcendence (*Dasein*). "If the steering principle [i.e., being itself] does not lie within the whole [i.e., beings in the whole]," this person asks, "must it be found outside or above the whole? But how can it be outside the whole?"[28] Clearly the answer is "no," and alleged equivocations in Heidegger's thinking are typically removed from the broader ambit of his research, including the posthumous publication of his being-historical writings. Heidegger intimates this point to Father Richardson in their 1962 correspondence regarding the "turning" ("*Kehre*") in his thinking.

> The distinction you make between Heidegger I and II is justified only on the condition that this is kept constantly in mind: only by way of what [Heidegger] I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by [Heidegger] II. But the thought of [Heidegger] I becomes possible only if it is contained in [Heidegger] II.[29]

Ostensible inconsistencies in Heidegger's thinking, including as might be inferred from Father Richardson's claim of a "fogged up" relation between the meaning of "*Dasein* as *Lichtung* [the clearing]" and "*Sein* itself as *Lichtung*,"[30] nearly almost always correspond to the challenges implicit to understanding what Heidegger is in fact laboring to do/say ("enowning-thinking," "thinking enowned by be-ing") ("*Ereignis-Denken*").[31] Heidegger's rendition of λόγος as ὁ Λόγος appears to be an expression of his effort to "leap over" the ontological difference to overcome the hermeneutical hinderances affiliated with dwelling within the distinction between being and beings.[32] It does not

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[26] Emad, *On the Way to Heidegger's* Contributions to Philosophy, 138-139.

[27] "τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰακίζει Κεραυνός," GA 7, 227; which, per Maly and Emad's translation of Martin Heidegger, "Fragments and Translations," in *Heidegger on Heraclitus: A New Reading*, ed. Kenneth Maly and Parvis Emad (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986) (hereafter ME-tr.), 45, Heidegger reads as: "But the lightning steers into (presencing) everything (which comes to presence)," and, in GA 55, 165, "But lightning steers beings in the whole."

[28] Heidegger and Fink, *Heraclitus Seminar 1966/1967*, 15.

[29] Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, xxii.

[30] "An Interview with William J. Richardson Part 1/3," by Babette Babich (May 2015), https://youtu.be/QpeE-A1CMKA.

[31] George Kovacs, *Thinking and Be-ing in Heidegger's* Beiträge zur Philosophi (Vom Ereignis) (Bucharest: Zeta Books, 2015), 14; "The Ontological Difference in Heidegger's *Zum Ereignis-Denken*," *Heidegger Studies* 35 (2019), 175.

[32] George Kovacs gives an insightful analysis of Heidegger's thinking of the ontological difference, including his endeavor to "leap over" it, in "The Ontological Difference in Heidegger's *Zum Ereignis-Denken*" and "The Ontological Difference in Heidegger's 'Grundbegriffe,'" *Heidegger Studies* 3/4 (1987).

connote a dualistic or metaphysical interpretation of being or *Dasein*. "'Human λόγος,'" the (originary) (*ursprünglich*) "gathering" ("*Sammlung*"), Heidegger insists in GA 55, "must never be thought," as can be "too easily" inferred, as a "gathering" that is "cut off" from "the Λόγος," the originary foregathering (*ursprüngliche Versammlung*), as if "delimited by a boundary."[33] The rendition of λόγος as being itself, as ὁ Λόγος, does not contravene the hermeneutic-phenomenological interpretation of *Dasein* as the instantiation of being. It does not depart from the understanding that dwelling resolutely (*entschlossen*) within the onefold (φαινόμενον) is requisite to prescinding the truth of being from its instantiation (as *Dasein*) to mitigate hermeneutical susceptibilities to metaphysical thinking.

A fundamental-ontological reading of Heidegger's interpretation of Fragment 50[34] – one of the constellation of sayings, including fragments 1,[35] 16,[36] 32,[37] 64,[38] 112,[39] 123,[40] that are capital to his

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[33] GA 55, 353; AE-tr., 265. Translation modified.

[34] "οὐκ ἐμοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστιν ἓν πάντα [εἶναι]," GA 40, 137, which, per ME-tr., 36-38, Heidegger reads as: "If you have heard not me but rather the λόγος, then it is wise to say accordingly: all is *one*," and, in GA 55, 243, "If you have listened, not merely to me, but rather if you have heard the Logos (in attentive allegiance to it), then there is knowing (that consists in) saying – saying the same with the Logos – that all is one." Translations corrected.

[35] "τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ' ἐόντος ἀεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον· γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἀπείροισιν ἐοίκασι πειρώμενοι καὶ ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων τοιούτων ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγεῦμαι κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει. τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ποιοῦσιν ὅκωσπερ ὁκόσα εὕδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται," GA 40, 136; which, per ME-tr., 13-14, Heidegger reads as: "But whereas the λόγος remains ever λόγος, humans act as though they do not comprehend it, both before they have heard it as well as afterwards. For everything comes to be κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε, in accordance with and owing to this λόγος; however, humans are like those who venture something without experience, even though they have a go at those same words and deeds that I carry out by unfolding each thing κατὰ φύσιν, according to being, and by explaining how it is. But from the other people (the others as they all are, οἱ πολλοί) it remains concealed what they really do while awake, just as what they have done while asleep is afterwards concealed from them again."

[36] "τὸ μὴ δῦνόν ποτε πῶς ἄν τις λάθοι," GA 55, 46; which, per ME-tr., 20-21, Heidegger reads as: "How could anyone be concealed before the not ever setting (what never sets)?"

[37] "ἓν τὸ σοφὸν μοῦνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς ὄνομα," GA 7, 226; which, per ME-tr., 27-28, Heidegger reads as: "the unique one unifying all is alone the fateful," and, in GA 55, 376: "The one, the unique-one-unifying-unison, the only thing present in genuine knowing, resists the gathering and accords the gathering in the name of Zeus."

[38] "τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰακίζει Κεραυνός," GA 7, 227; which, per ME-tr., 45, Heidegger reads as: "But the lightning steers into (presencing) everything (which comes to presence)," and, in GA 55, 162, "But lightning steers beings in the whole."

[39] "σωφρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μεγίστη, καὶ σοφίη ἀληθέα λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαΐοντας," which, in *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit* (1929/1930), GA 29/30, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983) (hereafter GA 29/30), Heidegger reads as, "The greatest thing of which a human being is capable is thoughtfulness [about the whole]; wisdom [thoughtfulness] is saying the unconcealed as unconcealed and doing that in accordance with the sway of things, attentive to them;" in GA 55, 248, 399, "'And thus authentic knowing consists in saying the unconcealed and acting that along and in accord with that which shows itself from out of itself as it emerges,'" and; in GA 55, 373-374, "Reflecting thinking is nobility; and it is this because knowing is gathering the unconcealed (out of concealedness into unconcealedness) in the manner of bringing-forth into what is brought forth and set up, in the light of the emerging – (all of this however) in reference to the originary foregathering which ranges wide and brings-in [at the same time]," all per ME-tr., 60-61. Translations modified.

[40] "φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ," GA 29/30, 41; which, per ME-tr., 67, Heidegger reads as: "The sway of things has *in itself* the urge to be hidden," and, in GA 40, 122, "Being [emergent appearing] tends in itself to a self-concealing."

Heraclitus project – against the meaning intimated by the saying suggests "ἕν πάντα [εἶναι]" does not correspond λόγος *only* to the meaning of being itself (ὁ Λόγος). The "ἕν," which Heidegger renders as the "all-unifying-one" ("*das alles vereinende Eine*"),[41] – "the one that joins all, the being of all, the being of beings in the whole,"[42] and the "essential unfolding" of "beings in the whole"[43] – is, indeed, apparently, as the preceding study also denotes, the ownmost of λόγος (and λέγειν). But is it the meaning of λόγος exclusively spoken by the saying? Heidegger, per K. Maly and P. Emad's translation, reads Fragment 50 – "οὐκ ἐμοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστιν ἕν πάντα [εἶναι]" – as: "If you have heard not me but rather the λόγος, then it is wise to say accordingly: all is *one* [Eines *ist alles*]." "ἕν πάντα [εἶναι],"which translates directly as, "one-all-is," or, perhaps more tellingly when the amendment, "εἶναι," is withdrawn, "one-all-*is*," says the onefold.[44] It says beings in the whole, which is synonymous with φαινόμενον and *Dasein*, the being-of-the-t/here. This expanded interpretation, it was assessed, neither opposes nor precludes Heidegger's reading of Fragment 50. Instead it speaks to the breadth of Heraclitus's phenomenological thinking while resolving ostensible inconsistencies intimated by Heidegger's analysis, including, as Father Richardson remarks, the "dichotomy" suggested by his renditions of λόγος as "the joining (*Fügung*)" (being itself) *and* "that which is conjoined (*Gefüge*)" (beings in the whole)," or his use of the double entente, "that-which-is-joined-from-itself-that-joins" ("*fügender Fug*") (being as such, the being-of-beings-in-the-whole), to articulate the phenomena as a unicity that radiates the difference between being and beings.[45]

The third (final) postulate situating the thesis corresponding the meaning of λόγος to *Dasein* – which, conjoined with the other two propositions, helps free the meaning of everydayness also to be spoken by the fragments insofar as they indeed speak it – is the alignment of Heidegger's rendition of λέγειν in his Heraclitus studies with recent analyses redressing the misunderstanding of discourse (*Rede*) as a third "independent" existential in addition to *Befindlichkeit* (attunement) and *Verstehen*

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[41] GA 55, 269; AE-tr., 205.

[42] GA 55, 286; trans. Kenneth Maly, "The Transformation of 'Logic' in Heraclitus," 99. Translation modified.

[43] "*Das πάντα als das Seiende im Ganzen und das ἕν als der Grundzug des Seienden weben und wesen im Sein*," GA 55, 264; AE-tr., 201. Translation modified.

[44] See ME-tr., 36, for a brief explanation of Heidegger's interpretation of the amendment, "εἶναι."

[45] GA 40, 169; trans. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 263. Translation of "*Fügung*" and "*Gefüge*" modified.

(understanding).[46] T. Kalary and F. Schalow, following F.-W. von Herrmann's analysis,[47] source this misconception to "shallow readings" of *SZ* "Section 34: Da-sein *and* Discourse,"[48] which, incidentally, Father Richardson calls the text's "least satisfying section" and assesses reflects a developing understanding of a phenomenon (λόγος) that "still" defied Heidegger's efforts to elucidate.[49] Discourse, as meant in *SZ*, and despite Section 34, as Father Richardson further remarks, being "very obscure,"[50] is not a third existential. It is not, in addition to attunement and understanding, a third equally originary structure of disclosedness. *"Discourse is with attunement and understanding existentially equally originary"*[51] and "equally originarily" ("*gleichursprünglich*") determines the existentials[52] as their originary ecstatic possibility and dynamism (δύναμις). It is "the articulation of the understandability of the *Da*" ("*Wenn die Rede, die Artikulation der Verständlichkeit des Da...ist*"), "the originary existential of disclosedness" ("*ursprüngliches Existenzial der Erschlossenheit*"), and "primarily constituted by being-in-the-World."[53] Discourse is *"the existential-ontological foundation of language"* ("Das existenzial-ontologische Fundament der Sprache ist die Rede").[54] Its "own structure" ("*eigenen Struktur*") is "preordained" ("*vorgebildet*") by the "basic condition" ("*Grundverfassung*") of "*Dasein*," namely, being.[55] The Heraclitus studies, significantly more so than *SZ*, decipher "λέγειν" as "the guide for discovering" the ownmost of discourse,[56] reconciling into a unity the ostensible disparity of its constituting moments, and revealing the essential (*wesentlich*)

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[46] Thomas Kalary and Frank Schalow, "Attunement, Discourse, and the Onefold of Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Recent Heidegger-Literature and a New Translation of his Work in Critical Perspective," *Heidegger Studies* 27 (2011), 204.

[47] Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, *Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Daseins:* Ein Kommentar zu "Sein und Zeit,*"* Band 3 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Kostermann, 2008).

[48] Kalary and Schalow, "Attunement, Discourse, and the Onefold of Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Recent Heidegger-Literature and a New Translation of his Work in Critical Perspective," 204-205.

[49] Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 66-67.

[50] Ibid., 66.

[51] "Die Rede ist mit Befindlichkeit und Verstehen existenzial gleichursprünglich," GA 2, 213-214; MR-tr., 203-204. Translation modified.

[52] "*Befindlichkeit und Verstehen sind gleichursprünglich bestimmt durch die Rede,*" GA 2, 177; MR-tr., 172. Translation modified.

[53] "*Wenn die Rede, die Artikulation der Verständlichkeit des Da, ursprüngliches Existenzial der Erschlossenheit ist, diese aber primär konstituiert wird durch das In-der-Welt-sein, muß auch die Rede wesenhaft eine spezifisch weltliche Seinsart haben,*" GA 2, 214; MR-tr., 203-204. Translation modified.

[54] GA 2, 213; MR-tr., 203. Translation modified.

[55] "*Die Rede hat notwendig dieses Strukturmoment, weil sie die Erschlossenheit des In-der-Welt-seins mitkonstituiert, in ihrer eigenen Struktur durch diese Grundverfassung des Daseins vorgebildet ist,*" GA 2, 215; MR-tr., 205. Translation modified.

[56] "*Das λέγειν ist der Leitfaden der Gewinnung der Seinsstrukturen des im Ansprechen und Besprechen begegnenden Seienden,*" GA 2, 34; MR-tr., 47.

meaning of "ζῷον λόγον ἔχον" (i.e., *Dasein*) as "the living [*das Lebende*] whose being [*dessen Sein*] is essentially determined by the potentiality for discourse."[57]

As previously reported,[58] λέγειν, thought hermeneutic-phenomenologically (and etymologically) within Heidegger's dialogue with Heraclitus, means "to lay" ("*legen*") in the sense of "laying" ("*Legen*") understood as "letting-lie-together-before" ("*beisammen-vorliegen-Lassen*");[59] "gathering" ("*sammeln*") in the sense of "letting-lie-together-before" ("*beisammen-vorliegen-Lassen*"), sheltering ("*Unterbringen*"), and "harvesting" ("*Lesen*");[60] "to say" ("*sagen*") understood as "determined according to the lying-before of what is present as the letting-lie-together-before" ("*sich gemäß dem Vorliegen des Anwesenden als das beisammen-vor-liegen-Lassen bestimmt*");[61] "saying" (*Sagen*) understood as "letting-lie-together-before which gathers and is gathered" ("*gesammelt-sammelndes beisammen-vor-liegen-Lassen*")[62] and "letting-lie-together-before, in situated unconcealedness, everything which comes to presence" ("*beisammen-vor-liegen-Lassen alles dessen, was, in der Unverborgenheit gelegen, anwest*")[63] (i.e., "λέγειν as ἀποφαίνεσθαι," as rendered in *SZ* Section 7B);[64] and, like "laying" ("*legen*"), saying (*sagen*) discerned as "the letting-lie-before that gathers" ("*sammelndes vor-liegen-Lassen*") that is the "ownmost of language" ("*Wesen der Sprache*") and synonymous with "the revealing of the hidden into the revealed" ("*die Entbergung aber des Verborgenen in das Unverborgene*"), "the presencing itself of the present" ("*das Anwesen selbst des Anwesenden*"), and, hence, "the being of beings" ("*Sein des Seienden*").[65]

Transposed to the fundamental-ontological (transcendental-horizontal) perspective – including the understanding that "above all, only so long as *Dasein* is, i.e., the ontic potentiality of the understanding of being, 'is there' being"[66] – the exposition of λέγειν translates into an extended

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[57] "*Das Dasein, d. h. das Sein des Menschen ist in der vulgären ebenso wie in der philosophischen 'Definition' umgrenzt als ζῷον λόγον ἔχον, das Lebende, dessen Sein wesenhaft durch das Redenkönnen bestimmt ist*," GA 2, 34; MR-tr., 47.

[58] Trujillo, "Λόγος and *Dasein*: A Fresh Reading of Heidegger's Reading of Heraclitus," 11-12.

[59] GA 7, 216; KC-tr., 62.

[60] GA 7, 215; KC-tr., 61-62; GA 55, 178; AE-tr., 133.

[61] GA 7, 218; KC-tr., 64.

[62] GA 7, 219; KC-tr., 64.

[63] GA 7, 217; KC-tr., 63. Translation modified.

[64] GA 7, 218; KC-tr., 64.

[65] "*Daß es das λέγειν ist als legen, worein sagen und reden ihr Wesen fügen, enthält den Hinweis auf die früheste und reichste Entscheidung über das Wesen der Sprache.... Denn als sammelndes vor-liegen-Lassen empfängt das Sagen seine Wesensart aus der Unverborgenheit des beisammen-vor-Liegenden. Die Entbergung aber des Verborgenen in das Unverborgene ist das Anwesen selbst des Anwesenden. Wir nennen es das Sein des Seienden*," GA 7, 217-218; KC-tr., 63-64. Translation modified.

[66] "*Allerdings nur solange Dasein ist, das heißt die ontische Möglichkeit von Seinsverständnis, 'gibt es' Sein*," GA 2, 281; MR-tr., 255; trans. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 43. Translation modified.

(deeper, broader, clarified) interpretation of discourse. λέγειν comes to light as the essential meaning of transcendence, the essential meaning of transcendence is revealed as the essential meaning of discourse, and discourse is illumed as the being of the *Da* (t/here). The rendition of λέγειν as the "letting-lie-together-before" that – namely, whatever matter of "concern,"[67] including "all things" (i.e., the World) [68] – which is gathered into itself, "sheltered" [69] in "situated unconcealedness,"[70] the being of t/here, corresponds to the ownmost of transcendence. It is the essential way *Dasein* (transcendence) transcends beings to their being and meaning, to that which they *are*. λέγειν, as discerned by Heidegger's dialogue with Heraclitus, corresponds to the essential sway of the coming-to-pass (*Geschehen*) that distinguishes *Dasein* as the being of beings in the whole (*Sein des Seienden im Ganzen*),[71] as the t/here of its to be. This coming-to-pass, as underscored in *SZ* and, perhaps more deliberately, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1927/1928) (GA 3),[72] essentially includes the understanding of being (*Seinsverständnis*) (i.e., of the meaning of "is), and it is precisely "on the basis of this understanding of being," one that is inherently finite, as Heidegger emphasizes in GA 3, "that human being is the *Da*.[73] The understanding of being is the thrown (*geworfen*) understanding of being, meaning, it is originally "with the being of the opening irruption [*eröffnende Einbruch*] of the coming-to-pass of that which is,"[74] i.e., it is most own (*das Eigenste*) to *Dasein*, hence, "preconceptual" ("*vorbegrifflichen Seinsverständnis*") and "completely beyond

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[67] "*Allein, das* λέγειν, *legen, meint in seinem 'beisammen-vor-liegen-Lasse' gerade dies, daß uns das Vorliegende anliegt und deshalb angeht. Dem 'legen' ist als dem beisammen-vorliegen-Lassen daran gelegen, das Niedergelegte als das Vorliegende zu behalten,*" GA 7, 216; KC-tr., 62. Translation modified.

[68] "*Sagen und Reden wesen als das beisammen-vor-liegen-Lassen alles dessen...,*" GA 7, 217; KC-tr., 63. Translation modified.

[69] "*Das beisammen-vor-Liegende ist in die Unverborgenheit ein-, in sie weg-, in sie hin-gelegt, in sie hinter-legt, d.h. in sie geborgen. Dem* λέγειν *liegt bei seinem gesammelt-vor-liegen-Lassen an dieser Geborgenheit des Vorliegenden im Unverborgenen,*" GA 7, 217; KC-tr., 63.

[70] "*...in der Unverborgenheit gelegen, anwest,*" GA 7, 217; KC-tr., 63. Translation modified.

[71] "*Mit der Existenz des Menschen geschieht ein Einbruch in das Ganze des Seienden dergestalt, daß jetzt erst das Seiende in je verschiedener Weite, nach verschiedenen Stufen der Klarheit, in verschiedenen Graden der Sicherheit, an ihm selbst, d.h. als Seiendes offenbar wird,*" GA 3, 228; JC-tr., 235-236.

[72] Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1927/1928), GA 3, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991) (hereafter GA 3); *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962) (hereafter JC-tr.).

[73] "*Auf dem Grunde des Seinsverständnisses ist der Mensch das Da,*" GA 3, 229; JC-tr., 237. Translation modified. See also GA 3, 228-229; JC-tr., 236-237.

[74] "*Auf dem Grunde des Seinsverständnisses ist der Mensch das Da, mit dessen Sein der eröffnende Einbruch in das Seiende geschieht, so daß dieses sich als solches für ein Selbst bekunden kann,*" GA 3, 229; JC-tr., 237.

question" ("*völligen Fraglosigkeit*"),[75] "for the most part undetermined" and "inevitably vague,"[76] and coupled to *Dasein*'s reliance on beings to be.[77] The understanding of being, hence, originarily unfurls as the finite understandability of beings in the whole, and it is by way of this understandability that human being is the *Da*.

Recalling the sameness between the essential meaning of λέγειν and the ownmost of saying, the ownmost of transcendence discerned as the understandability of the *Da* comes to light as the articulable understandability (*artikulierbarn Verständlichkeit*) of the *Da*. Herein lies the meaning of discourse rendered as the existential-ontological basis of language and the originary existential of disclosedness ("*Erschlossenheit*") that is prefigured by being and *with* being-in-the-World constitutes ("*mitkonstituiert*") disclosedness.[78] Further recalling the active occurrence of λέγειν as "bringing-together-into-lying-before" ("*zusammen-ins-Vorliegen-bringen*"),[79] "gathering…which brings under shelter,"[80] "the revealing of the hidden into the revealed" corresponding to "the presencing itself of the present,"[81] and the originary manifestation of "saying and speaking" ("*Sagen und Reden*"),[82] as opposed to thinking only its more or less passive expression as "letting-lie-together-before that which is gathered into itself" (i.e., ἀποφαίνεσθαι) – which, incidentally, is aligned with the "approximation" of enowning as "'enabling,' 'bringing into condition of,' or 'welling up of'" and "an un-possessive owning"[83] – we stumble upon an extended interpretation of discourse that corresponds to the understanding, as articulated in *SZ*: "the attuned (i.e., thrown) understandability

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[75] "*Die Seinsfrage als Frage nach der Möglichkeit des Begriffes vom Sein entspringt ihrerseits aus dem vorbegrifflichen Seinsverständnis… Noch mehr: das in seiner ganzen Weite, Ständigkeit und Unbestimmtheit vorbegrifflich verstandene Sein des Seienden gibt sich in einer völligen Fraglosigkeit,*" GA 3, 226-227; JC-tr., 233-235.

[76] Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 33-34; GA 3, 226-227; JC-tr., 233-234.

[77] GA 3, 228; JC-tr., 225.

[78] "*Die Rede hat notwendig dieses Strukturmoment, weil sie die Erschlossenheit des In-der-Welt-seins mitkonstituiert, in ihrer eigenen Struktur durch diese Grundverfassung des Daseins vorgebildet ist,*" GA 2, 215; MR-tr., 205. Translation modified.

[79] GA 7, 215; KC-tr., 61.

[80] Ibid.

[81] "*Denn als sammelndes vor-liegen-Lassen empfängt das Sagen seine Wesensart aus der Unverborgenheit des beisammen-vor-Liegenden. Die Entbergung aber des Verborgenen in das Unverborgene ist das Anwesen selbst des Anwesenden,*" GA 7, 218; KR-tr., 64.

[82] "*Das Sagen und Reden der Sterblichen ereignet sich von früh an als λέγειν, als Legen. Sagen und Reden wesen als das beisammen-vor-liegen-Lassen alles dessen, was, in der Unverborgenheit gelegen, anwest. Das ursprüngliche λέγειν, das Legen, entfaltet sich früh und in einer alles Unverborgene durchwaltenden Weise als das Sagen und Reden,* GA 7, 217; KC-tr., 63.

[83] Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, "Translators' Forward," in *Contributions to Philosophy* (*From Enowning*) (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), xix.

of being-in-the-World *speaks itself as discourse.*[84] Discourse and λέγειν are essentially synonymous. Discourse (λέγειν) is the articulation of its ownmost, the articulable understandability of the *Da*, from its ownmost itself. Or, discourse (λέγειν) is the articulable understandability of the *Da* that articulates (speaks) itself from itself. Said simply: discourse (λέγειν) is the being of the *Da*. Each of the iterations connotes the radical finitude intrinsic to discourse. Discourse is the finite equally-originary-with-toward-which of attunement and understanding that enables and situates the existentials. Its ownmost is prefigured by the essential sway of ὁ Λόγος (being itself), or, as rendered being-historically, enowning (*Ereignis*) (also, be-ing). The reason "things become and are" in the "word, in language,"[85] human being is "speaking being" ("*Sprachwesen*"),[86] and "language and *man* [human being]...*belong* equally originarily (*gleichursprünglich*) to be-ing"[87] is because discourse is the being of the *Da*.

The proposed sameness unearthed between discourse and λέγειν is not inconsistent with Levinas's observation that "*Sein und Zeit* has argued perhaps but one sole thesis: being is inseparable from the comprehension of being."[88] By gathering things as they are gathered from themselves, hence, "joinable" ("*Fügsamkeit*"),[89] into situated unconcealedness, discourse, thought as λέγειν, liberates φαινόμενα (phenomena) to be *seen* (understood) through language; "understanding" ("*Verstehen*") constitutes "existentially what we call *Dasein*'s '*sight*' [Sicht]"[90] and is equally originarily with the potentiality of language, hence the thesis: if a phenomenon is not named, it does not exist, which is to say, its being and meaning remain hidden (concealed) from understanding. Discourse is the articulable understandability of phenomena and the potentiality (possibility and power) to articulate (hence, manifest and see) their meaning (*Sinn*). It enables attuned-

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[84] "*Die befindliche Verständlichkeit des In-der-Welt-seins* spricht sich als Rede aus," GA 2, 214; MR-tr., 204. Translation modified.

[85] GA 40, 16; RM-tr., 13.

[86] George Kovacs, "Heidegger's Insight into the History of Language," *Heidegger Studies* 29 (2013), 127.

[87] GA 65, 497; EM-tr., 350; George Kovacs, "Heidegger's Experience with Language," in *Heidegger, Translation, and the Task of Thinking: Essays in Honor of Parvis Emad*," ed. Frank Schalow (New York: Springer, 2011), 96.

[88] "Sein und Zeit *n'a peut-être soutenu qu'une seule 'thèse': l'être est inséparable de la compréhension de l'être* (*qui se déroule comme temps*), *l'être est déjà appel à la subjectivité*," Levinas, *Totalité et infini: essai sur l'extériorité*, 36; *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 45. Translation slightly modified.

[89] GA 55, 394; AE-tr., 291-292.

[90] "*Das Verstehen macht in seinem Entwurfcharakter existenzial das aus, was wir die* Sicht *des Daseins nennen*," GA 2, 194; MR-tr., 186. And relatedly, "*Wohl aber konstituiert das Verstehen das Sein des Da dergestalt, daß ein Dasein auf dem Grunde des Verstehens die verschiedenen Möglichkeiten der Sicht, des Sichumsehens, des Nurhinsehens, existierend ausbilden kann*," GA 2, 444-445: "Understanding constitutes, rather, the being of the t/here such that on its basis *Dasein* can effect the distinct potentialities of sight, of seeing around, or just seeing, existing on this basis," MR-tr., 385. Translation modified.

understanding to free the meaning of phenomena to be *seen* in projecting-open (*Entwurf*) (the enactment of attuned-understanding (*befindliches Verstehen*)).[91] What is "meaning?" Thought within the fundamental ontology of *SZ*, meaning is the "articulable that is articulated" ("*Bedeutungen sind als das Artikulierte des Artikulierbaren immer sinnhafte*").[92] Meaning is harbored in "understandability," liberated (brought to unconcealedness) by "articulable-understanding-disclosing" ("*verstehenden Erschließen artikulierbar*"),[93] and is "an existential of *Dasein*," and "not a property attaching to beings, lying 'behind' them, or floating somewhere as an 'intermediate domain.'"[94]

3. Everydayness and fallenness

The fourth understanding of λόγος proposed to be discoverable in Heidegger's reading of Heraclitus – in addition to the three tabled in the preceding report– is the illumination of λόγος as *Dasein* in its everyday mode. It is everyday λόγος, or, as spoken in the language of *SZ*, "everydayness."[95] Everydayness – which Heidegger also calls "the way in which everyday (*alltäglich*) *Dasein* always *is*,"[96] "*Dasein*'s everydayness,"[97] and, in its "basic constitution" (and consummation), "average *everydayness*" ("*durchschnittlichen* Alltäglichkeit")[98] – is the "undifferentiated" way *Dasein* first of all and for the most part *is* in-the-World (*in-der-Welt*) and with-others (*mit-Anderen*).[99] It is the way of (human) being – one that Heidegger emphasizes is a "positive characteristic"[100] and individuates as the "preliminary theme" of his fundamental ontology[101] – distinguished by its circumspective absorption in the "ready-at-hand" ("*Zuhandenes*")[102] and "'publicness'" ("'*die*

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[91] "*Das befindliche Verstehen...artikuliert sich bezüglich seiner Verständlichkeit in der Rede,*" GA 2, 444: Attuned-understanding...articulates itself in terms of its understandability in discourse," MR-tr., 385. Translation modified.

[92] GA 2, 214; MR-tr., 204. Translation modified.

[93] "*Sinn ist das, worin sich Verständlichkeit von etwas hält. Was im verstehenden Erschließen artikulierbar ist, nennen wir Sinn,*" GA 2, 201; MR-tr., 193. Translation modified.

[94] GA 2, 192; MR-tr., 201. Translation modified.

[95] GA 2, 68; MR-tr., 76.

[96] GA 2, 91; MR-tr., 96.

[97] GA 2, 23; MR-tr., 38.

[98] "*Und zwar soll sie das Seiende in dem zeigen, wie es zunächst und zumeist ist, in seiner durchschnittlichen* Alltäglichkeit," GA 2, 23; MR-tr., 38.

[99] "*Die Welt des Daseins ist* Mitwelt. *Das In-Sein ist* Mitsein *mit Anderen. Das innerweltliche Ansichsein dieser ist* Mitdasein," GA 2, 159; MR-tr., 155.

[100] GA 2, 69; MR-tr., 58.

[101] GA 2, 90-91; MR-tr., 95.

[102] GA 2, 93; MR-tr., 98. Translation modified.

Öffentlichkeit"),[103] with the "'environment'" ("World about'") ("*Umwelt*")[104] that is "closest" to it.[105] The ready-at-hand signifies things with which *Dasein* is first of all and for the most part circumspectively preoccupied (*besorgt*). It denotes the beings meaningfully related to its "*dealings*" ("*Umgang*") and distinguished by their "instrumentality" ("*Zuhandenheit*"),[106] by their "useability," "conduciveness," and "manipulability" (i.e., beings endured as instruments),[107] by "*what*" *Dasein* first of all "does, uses, expects, avoids."[108] Publicness denotes *Dasein*'s *average* way of attuned-understanding itself, the World, and "others" who *are* t/here with it "'too'" (*Mitdasein*) (t/here-being-with-others). It coincides with the attuned-projecting-open correlated to "*the 'they'*" ("das Man"),[109] or the interpretations, motivations, and attitudes affiliated with the "everyone" amidst "everywhere" who is "nobody,"[110] but recede into nothingness when *Dasein* is compelled to decide in the face of its originary "answerability" ("*Verantwortlichkeit*") to itself (as the freedom- and responsibility-to-be) and the truth of being.[111] As the circumspective absorption in the "they," *Dasein* "pre-ontologically" ("*vorontologische Auslegung*")[112] ("pre-thematically") – "prior to any reflective distinction between ontic and ontological"[113] – surrenders its disclosedness, including its existentiality (originary task-to-be) and potentiality to inabide the truth, to the "dictatorship" of the meanings commensurate with "being-lost in the publicness of the 'they'" ("*des Verlorenseins in die Öffentlichkeit des Man*").[114]

Everydayness ensues *with Dasein*'s "*falling*,"[115] and falling, the "basic way of the being of everydayness,"[116] is continuous *with* its "thrownness" ("*Geworfenheit*"). *Dasein* is "thrown being-in-the-World" ("*geworfenes In-der-Welt-sein*"),[117] and, as thrown (*geworfen*), is, "*as long as* it is," falling as everydayness;[118] fallenness (*Verfallenheit*) belongs to thrownness and everydayness to fallenness.

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[103] GA 2, 170; MR-tr., 165.

[104] GA 2, 169; MR-tr., 164.

[105] GA 2, 87, 90; MR-tr., 93, 95.

[106] GA 2, 93; MR-tr., 98. Translation modified.

[107] GA 2, 92; MR-tr., 97.

[108] GA 2, 170; MR-tr., 165.

[109] GA 2, 169; MR-tr., 164.

[110] GA 2, 170; MR-tr., 165-166.

[111] GA 2, 170; MR-tr., 165.

[112] GA 2, 173; MR-tr., 168.

[113] Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 53.

[114] GA 2, 233, 169; MR-tr., 220, 164.

[115] GA 2, 233; MR-tr., 219.

[116] GA 2, 233; MR-tr., 219. Translation modified.

[117] GA 2, 222; MR-tr., 210. Translation modified.

[118] GA 2, 237; MR-tr., 223.

Thrownness is *Dasein*'s *"facticity of being delivered over"* to itself as disclosedness,[119] as "'that it is and has to be,'"[120] with the "whence" and "whither" remaining in "darkness."[121] As thrown, *"Dasein* is brought before its being as [already] t/here,"[122] as that-which-is-open" ("*das Offenbare*") ("φαινόμενον," "the manifest"),[123] obliged to be. It unfurls (comes-to-pass) as the "disclosing of thrownness" ("*Erschließen der Geworfenheit*")[124] that is perennially falling. *Dasein*, as thrownness, factically finds itself falling from its intrinsic potentiality-to-be – including the anxiety (*Angst*) invoked by its originary freedom and responsibility to decide itself, to choose who and how it will be, its existentiality – as everydayness. *Dasein* "*can* fall" from the truth of itself (factical disclosedness) as the circumspective preoccupation (*Besorgen*) with beings and publicness "*only* because attuned-understanding being-in-the-World is an issue for it,"[125] that is, only because its ownmost is its "to-be" ("*Zu-sein*") (i.e., is concern).[126]

Everydayness denotes a way of being (*Seinsweise*) Heidegger distinguishes as "inauthentic" ("*uneigentliches*") and a *"positive* potentiality" ("positive *Möglichkeit*") rather than a "negative evaluation."[127] Everydayness and inauthenticity are essentially synonymous; everydayness is *Dasein*'s "mode of inauthenticity" ("*Modus der Uneigentlichkeit*").[128] They both denote everyday *Dasein* as the way of being "completely captivated," perhaps even beguiled, by the ready-at-hand and the mode of "being-with-one-another" ("*Miteinandersein*") enjoined by publicness[129] – including the susceptibilities they generate to intend "others" as prospects for domination and control[130] – and where the meaning of being and transcendence is lost. The difference between everydayness and inauthenticity is the latter more so than the former underscores the chosen dimensions of everydayness. Whereas everydayness and inauthenticity both consist in a forgottenness of being (*Seinsvergessenheit*) and an abandonment of being (*Seinsverlassenheit*), the meaning of

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[119] GA 2, 180-181, 251; MR-tr., 174, 234.

[120] GA 2, 180-181; MR-tr., 174.

[121] GA 2, 179; MR-tr., 173.

[122] GA 2, 179; MR-tr., 173.

[123] GA 2, 58; MR-tr., 255; trans. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 214.

[124] GA 2, 182; MR-tr., 176.

[125] "*Das Dasein* kann *nur verfallen,* weil *es ihm um das verstehend-befindliche In-der-Welt-sein geht*," GA 2, 224; MR-tr., 238. Translation modified.

[126] "*Das 'Wesen' dieses Seienden liegt in seinem Zu-sein… Das 'Wesen' des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz*," GA 2, 56; MR-tr., 67. Translation slightly modified.

[127] GA 2, 194, 233; MR-tr., 186, 220.

[128] GA 2, 59; MR-tr., 69.

[129] GA 2, 233; MR-tr., 220. Translation modified.

[130] GA 2, 163, MR-tr., 158.

everydayness leans toward the first moment and the meaning of inauthenticity leans toward the second. Inauthenticity distinguishes everydayness as fallen *Dasein* "fleeing *in the face of*" its ownmost, namely, its "to be," hence, deciding, for the most part pre-thematically, to flee (thus abandoning itself), and "forgetfulness *thereof*," which it also chooses (hence abandoning itself again), mostly pre-thematically.[131] It reveals everydayness as a chosen, although always falling, alienation from being, transcendence, and the potentiality-to-be, as *Dasein*'s flight from "*being-free for* the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself."[132]

Everydayness (inauthenticity) is *Dasein* freely letting its originary concern (*Sorge*) (for being) be displaced (although never replaced) by a circumspective preoccupation (*Besorgen*) with beings and the "they." It is *Dasein* deciding to-be-lost-in-inauthenticity. Everydayness is a way of being comprising a jointure (*verfügen*) of two chosen moments, "mostly" the latter.[133] One: *Dasein* forgets or forgoes its ontological prerogative – the comprehension of the meaning of "is" – and itself as being-in-the-World (transcendence) to a captivation with the ready-at-hand, with things distinguished by their instrumentality and removed from factical disclosedness. Two: *Dasein* surrenders its potentiality-to-be, including its ownmost power, possibility, and responsibility to inabide the truth (ἀλήθεια, being), to a circumspective absorption in the "they," to the custodianship of the ubiquitous nobody, to what "they" say phenomena (including itself and being) are and should be.[134] The impetus internal to these moments: anxiety. Everydayness (inauthenticity) correlates to a "turning away from" anxiety "in falling."[135] *Dasein* disburdens itself of anxiety by forgetting transcendence, repudiating its potentiality-to-be, and yielding its disclosedness to its "ineluctable drag" toward its absorption in the World,[136] particularly the "they"—"*Dasein* in its everydayness is *disburdened* by the 'they.'"[137] Everyday *Dasein* liberates itself to-be-inauthentic by ceding its "possibilities-to-be" ("*Seinsmöglichkeiten*") to the ubiquitous everyone who is nobody to "dispose" of as "they please," thus freeing itself to "take things easily and make them easy."[138]

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[131] GA 2, 59, 251-252; MR-tr., 69, 234; Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 50-51.

[132] GA 2, 233; MR-tr., 220.

[133] "*Dieses Aufgehen bei…hat meist den Charakter des Verlorenseins in die Öffentlichkeit des Man*," GA 2, 233; MR-tr., 220.

[134] GA 2, 152; MR-tr., 149. Translation modified.

[135] GA 2, 251; MR-tr., 234.

[136] Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 38.

[137] GA 2, 170; MR-tr., 165.

[138] GA 2, 168, 170; MR-tr., 164, 165. Translation modified.

Letting itself be seized by the "*vortex*" ("Wirbel") of its circumspective preoccupation with beings and the "they," by the thrown gravity of its World about, *Dasein* is factically "fallen away" ("*abgefallen*") from its "authentic potentiality-to-be-itself" ("*eigentlichem Selbstseinkönnen*")[139] and inertially "swirled into" ("*hineingewirbelt*") its inauthenticity[140]—"*Dasein*'s absorption in the 'they' and its absorption in the 'World' of its circumspective preoccupation" are begotten by the "*fleeing* of *Dasein* from itself as the authentic potentiality-to-be-itself."[141] Inauthentic *Dasein* is at home within/as an *average* mode of disclosing that is oblivious to being, itself as the being-of-the-t/here, and its potentiality-to-be, which also means its intrinsic freedom- and responsibility-to-be. It finds abode within things pragmatically near, with beings distinguished by their usefulness and instrumentality, and the public interpretation and valuation of meaning, with the facile disclosedness (attunement, understanding, and discourse) of "having seen everything, having understood everything."[142] Disclosedness slides into inauthenticity insofar as *Dasein* inabides an everyday mode of "to be." Everyday *Dasein* supplants its existentiality, its authentic (originary and radically unique) potentiality-to-be, with interpretations denotative of the "they," with what "they" dictate phenomena, including human being, are and should be. Everyday *Dasein* (inauthenticity) is a way of "*not-being*...which is closest to *Dasein* and *Dasein* maintains itself for the most part."[143] This "not-being" does not mean nothingness. It means *Dasein* "is so absorbed in the ontic as to be oblivious to the ontological (being)."[144] It means a privation of disclosedness.

4. λόγος and everydayness

In *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz* (1928) (GA 26) Heidegger reads Fragment 115 – "ψυχῆς ἐστι λόγος ἑαυτὸν αὔξων" – as: "*Dasein* is the being who enriches itself from out of itself in the manner of understanding."[145] In GA 55 he renders it also as: "Proper to the

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[139] "*Das Dasein ist von ihm selbst als eigentlichem Selbstseinkönnen zunächst immer schon abgefallen und an die 'Welt' verfallen,*" GA 2, 233, MR-tr., 220. Translation modified.

[140] GA 2, 237; MR-tr., 223. Translation modified.

[141] "*Das Aufgehen im Man und bei der besorgten 'Welt' offenbart so etwas wie eine* Flucht *des Daseins vor ihm selbst als eigentlichem Selbst-sein-können,*" GA 2, 245; MR-tr., 229. Translation modified.

[142] GA 2, 235; MR-tr., 222.

[143] GA 2, 233; MR-tr., 220. Translation modified.

[144] Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 70; GA 2, 175-176; MR-tr., 184.

[145] *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz* (1928), GA 26, ed. Klaus Held (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978) (hereafter GA 26), 273; ME-tr., 62. Translation slightly modified.

wide-ranging bringing-in is a gathering [*ein Sammeln*] that is self-enriching from out of itself"[146] and "Proper to the soul is a gathering that enriches itself."[147] Thought fundamental-ontologically within the context of Heraclitus's phenomenological thinking, his interplay between the two beginnings, and the saying power of the original Greek, Fragment 115 – as well as Fragment 45,[148] which also coincides ψυχή with "the wide-ranging bringing-in," a movement that is phenomenologically akin to "self-akin-ecstatic" and "ecstatic-horizontal disclosure"[149] – could also be interpreted as, "*Dasein* is its disclosedness," or perhaps more tellingly: "'*Dasein is* its disclosedness'" ("'*das Dasein* ist *seine Erschlossenheit*'"),[150] which, by italicizing the "is," as Heidegger does in GA 2, not only intimates more explicitly the sameness between "ψυχή" and "λόγος," but also speaks more directly to λόγος as a unicity, namely, the being-of-the-t/here (φαινόμενον). A fundamental-ontological interpretation of the fragment also withholds any valuation, whether positive or negative, of the "manner of understanding" by which ψυχή, as itself its "manner of understanding," as λόγος, "enriches" itself. Instead, and especially when read against Heidegger's other interpretations of the sayings – particularly, as examined below, fragments 1, 2, 9, 19, 34, 51, 72, 73, 78, and 89 – it implies a horizon of authentic and inauthentic possibilities, the latter overshadowing the common, useful, and everyday. Interpreted against Heidegger's dialogue with Heraclitus and the fundamental ontology of *SZ*, Fragment 115, especially when read alongside Fragment 45 and other relevant sayings, intimates the sameness between λόγος and *Dasein* and connotes everyday λόγος as a mode of inauthenticity that includes the potentiality to awaken to its authenticity.

Insofar as the meaning of λόγος also corresponds to the meaning of *Dasein*, and not only being itself, authentic λόγος and authentic *Dasein* are essentially equivalent. Each is the meaning of λόγος implied by the "ἀκούσαντας τοῦ λόγου" of Fragment 50, which, as read by Heidegger in GA 55, carries the connotation of resolutely caring for being, as well as beings in the whole, heeding (hence also listening to) the call to be: "(*ihm gehorsam, horchsam*) *auf den Logos gehört*."[151] Authentic λόγος

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[146] GA 55, 17, 354; ME-tr., 62.

[147] GA 55, 17, 394; ME-tr., 62.

[148] "ψυχῆς πείρατα ἰὼν οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροιο πᾶσαν ἐπιπορευόμενος ὁδόν· οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει," GA 55, 309; which, per ME-tr., 32, Heidegger reads as: "You cannot find on your way the outermost boundaries of the wide-ranging bringing-in, so wide is its gathering."

[149] Kalary and Schalow, "Attunement, Discourse, and the Onefold of Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Recent Heidegger-Literature and a New Translation of his Work in Critical Perspective," 202, 206.

[150] "*Sofern aber das Wesen dieses Seienden die Existenz ist, besagt der existenziale Satz 'das Dasein* ist *seine Erschlossenheit*,'" GA 2, 177; MR-tr., 171.

[151] GA 55, 243; ME-tr., 38. Translation mine.

corresponds to *Dasein* mindfully dwelling within that-which-is-open and "the open" ("*das Offene*") itself, in "φύσις" (being as such; the being of beings in the whole) and "ἀλήθεια" (being itself).[152] It is the attuned-projecting-open of λέγειν – the being of the *Da*, including being itself – as "ὁμολογεῖν," as inabiding being as such and being itself, and "in ὁμολογεῖν and as ὁμολογεῖν," unfurling the same as "the Λόγος" (being itself) (i.e., gathering according to the sway ownmost to *Dasein*), and, as that same (sway), says: "ἓν πάντα [εἶναι]" ("one-all-is").[153] ὁμολογεῖν, discerned fundamental-ontologically, and which in his reading of Fragment 50 Heidegger interprets also as the "proper hearing" (i.e., truthful listening, the endeavor to inabide the truth) ("*eigentliches Hören*") coinciding with (and the same as) *Dasein* "dwelling in heedful belonging" ("*wenn ihr euch im horchsamen Gehören aufhaltet*"),[154] connotes the same meaning as authenticity. It implies the re-solve to dwell mindfully in the World, attuned to being, and heedful of the truth of *Dasein*'s essential possibilities (*Wesensmöglichkeiten*), including the thrown potentiality to be inauthentic, which is to say: the "way of being" ("*Seinsweise*") in falling discerned hermeneutically as "*Alltäglichkeit*" ("everydayness") and "the mode (*Modus*) of inertia."[155]

Authenticity (ὁμολογεῖν) is the mode of λόγος (thought as *Dasein*) swaying as the "noble-minded" ("ἄριστος") of Fragment 49[156] and the "wise" ("σοφόν") of Fragment 50.[157] It corresponds to the "thoughtfulness" ("σωφρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μεγίστη") spoken more amply by Fragment 112, which in GA 29/30 Heidegger reads as, "The greatest thing of which a human being is capable is thoughtfulness [*Besonnenheit*] (about the whole); wisdom (thoughtfulness) is saying the unconcealed as unconcealed [*das Unverborgene als Unverborgenes*] and doing that in accordance with the sway [being] of things, attentive to them,"[158] and in GA 55: "'And thus authentic knowing [*eigentliche Wissen*] consists in saying the unconcealed and acting that along and in accord with that which shows itself from out of itself as it emerges.'"[159] The converse of the "thoughtfulness" and "authentic

[152] GA 55, 17, 141, 365; trans. Maly, "The Transformation of 'Logic' in Heraclitus," 100; AE-tr., 15, 106, 273.

[153] GA 55, 249-251, 371; AE-tr., 191-192, 277-278; Maly, "The Transformation of 'Logic' in Heraclitus," 101-102. See also Fragment 50 as cited.

[154] GA 7, 222; ME-tr., 38. Translation modified. See also, Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, 67.

[155] Personal communication with the author, 8 August and 21 September 2024.

[156] "εἷς ἐμοὶ μύριοι, ἐὰν ἄριστος ἦι," GA 55, 395, which, per ME-tr., 35, Heidegger reads as: "A single one is worth ten thousand to me, if that person is noble-minded."

[157] GA 40, 137; ME-tr., 37.

[158] GA 29/30, 41-42; ME-tr., 60-61. Translation modified.

[159] "'*Und so besteht das eigentliche Wissen darin, das Unverborgene zu sagen und zu tun, aus dem Hinhorchen, entlang und gemäß dem, was von sich aus aufgehend sich zeigt,*'" GA 55, 248, 399; ME-tr., 60-61. Translation modified.

knowing" spoken by Fragment 112, interpreted fundamental-ontologically, is the fallen (and chosen) alienation from the unconcealed as unconcealed (being as such) and the sway ownmost to the World, namely, its being (e.g., being-in, being-with), or truth. It is the forgottenness or abandonment of being, *Seinsvergessenheit* or *Seinsverlassenheit*, or both – the neglect of the meaning of "to be," of truth as such, ἀλήθεια, coupled to the limitations ingredient to the comprehension of being, including those denoted by fallenness – and the renunciation of the potentiality-to-be commensurate with the circumspective absorption in (machinational comportment with) the World. It is, thought being-historically, "mindlessness" ("*Besinnungslosigkeit*"),[160] and the mode of being (*Seinsmodus*) belonging to everydayness. It is everyday λόγος, or λόγος operating in a mode of inauthenticity and where the meaning of ὁμολογεῖν, and hence also transcendence and being, is passed over or lost. The inverse of the meaning of λόγος spoken by these sayings, particularly Fragment 112, corresponds to everydayness (inauthenticity). It is *Dasein* who "constantly surrenders itself to the 'World'" of its circumspective preoccupation, "evades itself,"[161] and, in its turning away, "*closes off*" itself from "its authenticity and possibilities, even if only the possibility of genuinely foundering."[162]

Heidegger's reading of Heraclitus is redolent with suggestions of everydayness. The apparent reason, one whose provenance can be ascribed to Heraclitus's phenomenological thinking: to distinguish tenebrously the attuned-understanding requisite to heeding-saying being and beings in the whole. The fragments, interpreted fundamental-ontologically, not only appear to correspond λόγος to discourse, being, and *Dasein*, as has been contended. They also illume λόγος, discerned as *Dasein*, in its everydayness, particularly its average everydayness, the consummation of inauthenticity. Instances include the mode of transcendence (more accurately, transcending) suggested by the "human dwelling (within beings in the whole)" that "does not have γνῶμαι" (mindfulness) as opposed to "divine dwelling," which "does," suggested by Fragment 78[163] and the way of *Dasein* Fragment 1 correlates to "the others as they all are, οἱ πολλοί" (i.e., *Dasein* circumspectively absorbed in things and publicness), and: (a) "act as though they do not

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[160] George Kovacs, "Heidegger's Directives in *Mindfulness* for Understanding the Be-ing Historical Relationship of Machination and Art," *Heidegger Studies* 24 (2008), 43.

[161] GA 2, 185; MR-tr., 178. Translation slightly modified.

[162] GA 2, 236; MR-tr., 222.

[163] "ἦθος γὰρ ἀνθρώπειον μὲν οὐκ ἔχει γνώμας, θεῖον δὲ ἔχει," GA 55, 349-350; which, ME-tr., 51, Heidegger reads as: "Human dwelling (within beings taken in the whole) does not have γνῶμαι, but divine dwelling does." Translation slightly modified.

comprehend it [being], both before they have heard it as well as afterwards," notwithstanding that "everything comes to be κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε, in accordance with and owing to this λόγος [to being];" (b) presuppose an impoverished understanding of being despite the parodying of "words and deeds" whose origination ensues "κατὰ φύσιν, according to being" and "being as such in the whole" ("*Das Seiende als solches im Ganzen*"); and (c) enact a way of disclosing (*Erschließen*) where being "remains concealed" as if they were "asleep" even though "awake."[164] Another is the "*Dasein*" spoken by Heidegger's reading of Fragment 51 who "comport themselves in everyday fashion and do not understand that and how that [sc., being itself] which is at variance with itself still is in accord with itself [i.e., the way being itself sways, namely, and together with the interpretation of Fragment 112, as ἀλήθεια, φύσις, and the Λόγος, "the unconcealment that is based in concealing"[165]]; that is oppositional accord, as with the bow and the lyre."[166]

Other suggestions of everydayness spoken by Heidegger's dialogue with Heraclitus include his reading of fragments 73, 9, 19, 72, 34, 2, and 89. Fragment 73, as interpreted by Heidegger, who only cites the first part of the saying, admonishes the reader to "not act or speak as if asleep,"[167] which, in the context of this analysis, connotes the open resolve (*Ent-schlossenheit*) of authenticity to not lose sight of transcendence to an absorption in the World, particularly the "they." Fragment 9, "donkeys prefer straw to gold,"[168] according to Heidegger, implies the understanding that although *Dasein* "always and everywhere" contend with beings as they are (*Seienden*), the meaning of "being remains hidden from them."[169] It further implies a correlation of this hiddenness to a decision, one that, can be inferred, ensues from *Dasein*'s factical freedom- and responsibility-to-be, to flee authenticity into "publicness as the mode of being of the 'they.'"[170] Fragment 19 – "ἀκοῦσαι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι οὐδ' εἰπεῖν" – distinguishes the everyday frame of mind as a way of transcending "incapable of hearing [the

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[164] GA 40, 136; ME-tr., 13-14. For the interpretation of φύσις also as "*Das Seiende als solches im Ganzen*," see GA 40, 19; RM-tr., 16. Translation mine.

[165] GA 55, 371; Kenneth Maly and Steven Davis, "Reading Heidegger Reading Heraclitus—Fragment 112," in *Heidegger on Heraclitus: A New Reading*, ed. Kenneth Maly and Parvis Emad (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986), 148-149. Translation slightly modified.

[166] "οὐ ξυνιᾶσιν ὅκως διαφερόμενον ἑωυτῷ ὁμολογέει. παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης," Martin Heidegger, *Hölderlins Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rhein"* (1934/35), GA 39, ed. Susanne Ziegler, third ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999), 123-124 (hereafter GA 39), which, per ME-tr., 39-40, Heidegger reads as: "Those who in their *Dasein* comport themselves in everyday fashion do not understand that and how that which is at variance with itself still is in accord with itself; that is oppositional accord, as with the bow and the lyre."

[167] "οὐ δεῖ ὥσπερ καθεύδοντας ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν," GA 40, 137; ME-tr., 50.

[168] "ὄνους σύρματ' ἂν ἑλέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσόν," GA 40, 141; ME-tr., 18.

[169] "*Sie betreiben fortgesetzt überall das Seiende. Doch das Sein bleibt ihnen verborgen*," GA 40, 141; RM-tr., 132.

[170] "*Die Öffentlichkeit als die Seinsart des Man*," GA 2, 184; MR-tr., 178. Translation mine.

meaning of being] and of speaking [the meaning of being]."[171] According to Heidegger, it also denotes *Dasein* who "are unable to bring their *Dasein* to rest in the being of beings" ("*Sie vermögen ihr Dasein nicht zum Stehen zu bringen im Sein des Seienden*").[172] Fragment 72 – "ὧι μάλιστα διηνεκῶς ὁμιλοῦσι λόγωι...τούτωι διαφέρονται, καὶ οἷς καθ' ἡμέραν ἐγκυροῦσι, ταῦτα αὐτοῖς ξένα φαίνεται" – as interpreted by Heidegger, says the meaning of everydayness more completely (and explicitly).

> From that to which for the most part they [as *Dasein*] are bound and by which they are thoroughly sustained, the Λόγος [being itself], from that they separate [alienate] themselves; and it becomes manifest: whatever they daily encounter [including themselves] remains foreign (in its presencing) to them.[173]

The meaning of λόγος intimated by these sayings corresponds to the mode of *Dasein* that presupposes an indigent understanding of being and has embarked on a flight from authenticity. It implies everydayness: *Dasein* distinguished by its obliviousness to being, circumspective absorption in the World, and capitulation to the public ontology of the "they." It corresponds to the everyday *Dasein* who, "in confronting the Logos," as Heidegger determines in his rendition of Fragment 34,[174] is "uncomprehending" ("ἀξύνετοι") regardless whether it "has heard it." According to Heidegger, what "Heraclitus means to say" is: "Persons have hearing, they hear words, but in this hearing, they cannot 'heed'...the λόγος [being itself]," [175] which articulates the essential meaning spoken by an interpretation of Fragment 72 rendered alongside readings of fragments 1, 2,[176] 34, 50, and 73 and also given in GA 40: "forever with the λόγος, yet forever removed from it, absent though present; thus they are the ἀξύνετοι, the uncomprehending."[177] The "ἀξύνετοι," as rendered, connotes the indigent understanding of being – "the already and especially gathered toward the originary foregathering"[178] – and alienation from factical disclosedness belonging to everydayness: to transcendence provisionally closed off to itself and the possibility it harbors to unfold as ὁμολογεῖν, as the same as

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[171] GA 40, 141; ME-tr., 22.

[172] GA 40, 140; RM-tr., 132. Translation mine.

[173] GA 7, 287; ME-tr., 48-49.

[174] "ἀξύνετοι ἀκούσαντες κωφοῖσιν ἐοίκασι· φάτις αὐτοῖσιν μαρτυρεῖ παρεόντας ἀπεῖναι," GA 40, 138; which, per ME-tr., 29, Heidegger reads as: "those who do not bring together what is ever together are hearers who are like the deaf."

[175] GA 40, 136-139; RM-tr., 127-130. Translation modified.

[176] "διὸ δεῖ ἕπεσθαι τῶι (ξυνῶι, τουτέστι τῶι) κοινῶι· ξυνὸς γὰρ ὁ κοινός. τοῦ λόγου δ' ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν," GA 40, 136; which, per ME-tr., 15, Heidegger reads as: "Therefore it is necessary to follow, i.e. to adhere to, what is common to beings, the masses go on living as if every individual had their own understanding (sense)."

[177] GA 40, 139; RM-tr., 130. Translation modified.

[178] GA 55, 356; AE-tr., 266.

that-which-is-open and the open itself, as the truth of transcendence and being. It belongs to λόγος (*Dasein*) lost to the "calculating" and "machination" (instrumentality and domination) commensurate with the "favor" of "more pressing things" (sc., the ready-at-hand and publicness);[179] corresponds to the dissociation from being spoken by Fragment 2, "...but whereas the λόγος [being itself] essentially unfolds as what is common to beings, the masses go on living as if every individual had their own understanding (sense);"[180] and is basic to the way of *Dasein* connoted by Fragment 89: "The World is one and common to those who are awake; but each one who is asleep turns to a World all their own."[181]

5. Concluding remarks

This study proposes a fourth understanding of λόγος – in addition to its elucidation as discourse, being itself, and *Dasein* – it contends is also discoverable in Heidegger's reading of Heraclitus. It is everyday λόγος, or, as rendered fundamental-ontologically, everydayness. The fragments, it is propounded here, also say the meaning of *Dasein* in its everyday or average way of being, as a mode of disclosedness oblivious to the meaning of "to be" and distinguished by a circumspective preoccupation with beings and the "they." This thesis, like the one postulated in the preceding study, is explorative rather than reparational. It endeavors to bring to light the "unsaid" in Heraclitus by continuing the course of Heidegger's thinking – by harvesting the fields he cultivates along the way of pursuing his hermeneutical priority – and enacting hermeneutic-phenomenological thinking other than thinking being itself. Thinking being itself, a way of thinking "based on and out of be-ing, enowned and attuned by be-ing"[182] and whose being-historical articulations include "essential thinking" ("*wesentliches Denken*"),[183] "enowning-thinking" ("*Ereignis-Denken*"),[184] and "en-thinking" ("*Er-denken*"),[185] as G. Kovacs clarifies, may indeed hold hermeneutical primacy. It investigates the basic meaning of "is" and the ownmost of *Dasein*, invokes a way of thinking that is more "radical,"

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[179] GA 55, 391-392; AE-tr., 290-291.
[180] GA 40, 136; ME-tr., 15.
[181] GA 26, 220; ME-tr., 53. Translation slightly modified.
[182] Kovacs, *Thinking and Be-ing in Heidegger's* Beiträge Zur Philosophi (Vom Ereignis), 23.
[183] Ibid., 82.
[184] Ibid., 218.
[185] Ibid., 23.

"originary," and "enabling," [186] and augments the power and horizons of phenomenological questioning. It does not, however, and as previously contended, command all hermeneutic-phenomenological thinking. [187] Nor did Heidegger argue it should. There is no directive in Heidegger's writings enjoining all hermeneutic-phenomenological thinking to think being itself. Hermeneutic phenomenology is a way of seeing and articulating that – as witnessed in the Heraclitus studies – vacillates "between the 'transcendental-horizontal [fundamental-ontological] perspective' and a 'being-historical perspective.'" [188] It is the endeavor to unfurl as ὁμολογεῖν, to inabide being and say the same as being says, where being, whichever way one may hermeneutically articulate it, invariably means the being-of-beings-in-the-whole. Its only directive is to heed the truth (being) (ἀλήθεια) of phenomena, to strive, with all of its "stumbling and getting up again,"[189] to dwell within the truth. All hermeneutical prescriptions tendered are commensurate with this mandate.

In GA 65 Heidegger writes: "Nevertheless the task remains: *the restoration of beings from within the truth of be-ing*."[190] If the motivations propelling this study are reduced to a single variable this charge would be it. The petition underscores the imperative to think the onefold "at all cost" regardless the matter thought, and, moreover, to labor to think it anew more radically, more originarily, more inceptually. It also offers the prospect of perhaps surmising more clearly the essential sway of enowning – the clearing (*Lichtung*) of the self-concealing-withdrawing – not only in itself, but within the being-of-beings-in-the-whole correlated to, as Father Richardson emphasizes in his study of GA 3, the radical finitude (*Endlichkeit*) ingredient to the comprehension of being.[191] The clarified (extended) interpretation of discourse (*Rede*) as the being of the *Da* (t/here) brought to light by the hermeneutical elucidation of λέγειν may be a way to frame propositionally enowning's sway in *Dasein*. Could discourse, as illumed by the Heraclitus studies and *SZ* asserts is preordained by being, be the instantiation of the essential sway of the clearing of the self-concealing-withdrawing (of enowning)? Does discourse, the articulable understandability of the *Da* that articulates (speaks)

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[186] Ibid., 23.

[187] Trujillo, "Λόγος and *Dasein*: A Fresh Reading of Heidegger's Reading of Heraclitus," 10.

[188] Frank Schalow, "Introduction," in *Heidegger, Translation, and the Task of Thinking: Essays in Honor of Parvis Emad*, ed. Frank Schalow (New York: Springer, 2011), 39-40.

[189] GA 65, 84; EM-tr., 58.

[190] "*Gleichwohl bleibt die Aufgabe*: Die Wiederbringung des Seienden aus der Wahrheit des Seyns," GA 65, 11; EM-tr., 8. Translation modified.

[191] Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 33; "William J. Richardson on Heidegger's Being and Time," by Babette Babich (16 October 2011), https://youtu.be/ab7XkaC6LVU; GA 3, 217; JC-tr., 224.

itself from itself, essentially sway as enowning? If so, is hermeneutic phenomenology up to the prospect of attempting to elucidate that essential sway? These questions suggest the task to restore beings from within the truth of be-ing may necessitate a second hermeneutical leap: the first, over the ontological difference into the (always receding) meaning of be-ing; the second (regardless whatever its hermeneutical shortfalls) over the truth of be-ing into the truth of φαινόμενον, the being-of-beings-in-the-whole; both propelled by the awakening of the thinker to the ontological difference and the understanding of the World as a *unitary* phenomenon: the being-of-the-t/here. It surely requires resolutely (*entschlossen*) thinking disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*), inclusive of its originary existential, discourse, not only as the essential meaning of the "t/here" ("*Da*"), as Heidegger chiefly does in *SZ*, but *at the same time* as it shows itself as it is from itself, "in one" with the "t/here-being [*Da-sein*] of the World."[192]

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[192] "*Der Ausdruck 'Da' meint diese wesenhafte Erschlossenheit. Durch sie ist dieses Seiende* (*das Dasein*) *in eins mit dem Da-sein von Welt für es selbst 'da,'*" GA 2, 176-177; MR-tr., 171. Translation modified. For clarification of Heidegger's rendition of the "*Da*" as disclosedness see Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, "Dasein and Da-sein in *Being and Time* and in *Contributions to Philosophy* (*From Enowning*)," in *Heidegger, Translation, and the Task of Thinking: Essays in Honor of Parvis Emad*, ed. Frank Schalow (New York: Springer, 2011).

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