

**“History” and “Nothingness” in Heidegger and
Nietzsche: Learning from *Beiträge***

Volume 2

The Question of Anti-Semitism

by
Parvis Emad

Introduction

Nietzsche and Heidegger were born, lived, worked and died in a society in which anti-Semitism was tolerated, accepted and sometimes adored, and essentially viewed as a “normal” fact of life. Historically, anti-Semitism in Europe reached its culmination in the so-called Reformation of Christian Church led by Martin Luther. Luther’s virulent anti-Semitism remains an ineradicable blemish on the face of the Protestant Reformation Church regardless of the many apologies extended retroactively to ameliorate it. Looking at Luther’s book *Von den Juden und ihren Lügen* [*On the Jews and Their Lies*] it is difficult not to be reminded of Hitler and his tirades against the Jews. Luther’s and Hitler’s anti-Semitism are virtually indistinguishable. Preceding Hitler’s National Socialism by centuries, Luther denied any right and legitimacy to the Jewish people. He demanded that “their synagogues be set on fire, their prayer books be destroyed, Rabbis be forbidden to preach, homes razed, and property and money confiscated.”¹ Here also mention should be made of Pope Pius XII who has been alleged to have been anti-Semitic.² Independently of the truthfulness of the latter allegation, a number of facts make the conclusion unavoidable that anti-Semitism is upheld and surreptitiously nurtured by Christianity itself. Given the gravity of these facts, the question becomes whether anti-Semitism as a permanent fabric of the German society in which Nietzsche and Heidegger lived had any bearing on their views concerning “History” and “Nothingness.”

One might preliminarily ask whether it is fair to Nietzsche if we take anti-Semitism as an important manifestation of nihilism. In the same vein, one might ask whether it is fair to Heidegger to conceive anti-Semitism as an offshoot of the forgottenness and abandonment of and by being. Whereas upon a first glance the assumption of a connection in Nietzsche between anti-Semitism and nihilism may seem plausible, the assumption of a relation in Heidegger between anti-Semitism and forgottenness-abandonment of and by being is an assumption still awaiting an unhindered, meticulous and patiently enacted substantiation. Upon considering these assumptions work of the first volume of this study must be viewed incomplete. In this light the following questions are of utmost hermeneutic import. (1) How would Nietzsche’s thinking as it elucidates nihilism withstand the test of a direct confrontation with the issue of anti-Semitism? And (2) how would Heidegger’s thinking as it strives to elucidate the “forgottenness and abandonment of and by being” react to and consequently render intelligible the factuality of anti-Semitism?

The realization that the discussion devoted in the first volume of this study to the themes of ‘History’ and ‘Nothingness’ in Heidegger and Nietzsche is at the very least a

tentatively completed account of their views on these subjects sets the stage for assessing the impact of anti-Semitism on their philosophies. The subtitle of the present study brings this impact expressly to the fore. With this subtitle I want to stress the point that the question of anti-Semitism is not incidentally or fortuitously brought to bear on the thinking of both philosophers but comes with the intrinsic claim to be heard and addressed by their thinking. The different ways in which Nietzsche and Heidegger treat the issue of anti-Semitism is directly proportioned to the fact that Nietzsche took up this issue without knowing anything about the holocaust while Heidegger by contrast was fated to come to terms with anti-Semitism in the glaring and disturbing light of the holocaust.

If the historically baneful period called the “Inquisition” and the numerous pogroms, among other violations of Jewish rights and Jewish legitimacy, were not enough to awaken philosophical thinking to its obligations vis-à-vis anti-Semitism the eruption of the holocaust in the Germany of the early 20th century did precisely that: it awakened philosophical thinking from its centuries long slumber as regards anti-Semitism. Arising from significantly different backgrounds and pursuing significantly different intentions and objectives, Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s understanding of and stance toward anti-Semitism mark a point at which the two philosophers embark on diverse paths of thinking which opens up the possibilities of a new assessment of their overall philosophical outputs.

The outward occasion that largely but not exclusively prompted Nietzsche to address anti-Semitism was his sister Elisabeth’s marriage to the one Bernhard Förster, an anti-Semite and anti-Jewish Colonialist - - a marriage that met with Nietzsche’s vehement disapproval and undisguised revulsion.³ The inward occasion prompting Nietzsche to react to anti-Semitism was his complete rejection of Luther’s ideas and motivation behind his reformation of the Catholic Christianity and hierarchy. What prompted Heidegger to address anti-Semitism at the end was not unrelated to Hitler’s rise to power but apart from this disastrous event anti-Semitism was an issue that put certain strains on his being-historical thinking - - strains that he could not afford to ignore.

Even though a renewed examination of the question of anti-Semitism may seem to be as superfluous as beating a dead horse, Nietzsche’s reaction to this issue and Heidegger’s being-historical elucidation of it yield such insights into anti-Semitism that virtually forbid conveniently ignoring this question with the excuse that it is a familiar but no longer acute issue. If the verdict on anti-Semitism as an obnoxious but no longer an acute issue were to be given unshakable credibility then there would be no point bringing this question back to life. Does not the whole world concur that anti-Semitism is irretrievably dead and gone?

By and large the need to reexamine the question of anti-Semitism goes in tandem with the need to come to terms with the holocaust, that is, with this unprecedented, shameful and unforgettable historical blot that has singlehandedly defiled human history and human dignity. The ties of anti-Semitism to the holocaust are so painfully obvious and disturbingly obtrusive that any attempt at treating anti-Semitism in isolation from the holocaust seems doomed to failure. Today it is simply stupid and egregiously offensive to be an anti-Semite and espouse anti-Semitism whatever shape and form this may take. However, the universal condemnation of anti-Semitism should not be an excuse for taking anti-Semitism lightly and callously. Anti-Semitism still presents a serious challenge to philosophical thinking raising the question as to what in actuality happens to this thinking when it either ignores or submits itself to anti-Semitism. Besides the psychological gratification that the anti-Semite experiences, what else does anti-Semitism and its overwhelming force do to philosophical thinking? In their respective dealings with anti-Semitism Nietzsche and Heidegger have opened pathways leading out of this predicament and its lighthearted and callous reception.

Early on Nietzsche unhesitatingly included anti-Semitism among things that he vigorously “despised.” (KS vol. 6, p. 431) After initially taking anti-Semitism as a *fait accompli* and even to some extent defending it⁴ Heidegger exposed anti-Semitism to the full gamut of the elucidating power of his being-historical thinking. As I shall try to show when I examine Heidegger’s recently published *Die Schwarze Hefte (The Black Notebooks)*, the outcome was the realization that being-historical thinking has a great deal to say about anti-Semitism. The first step to be taken in the direction of elucidating this outcome consists in taking a preliminary look at anti-Semitism as it appears in the wake of the holocaust.

Nietzsche must have heard of pogroms and other undisguised or covert violations of Jewish rights and Jewish civilization. However, it is a truism to say that Nietzsche knew nothing of the holocaust taking place in the early years of the 20th century Germany. By the time the holocaust happened Nietzsche was already dead for more than a quarter of a century. But what can be reasonably said about Heidegger and holocaust? At first sight this much seems certain. Nowhere in his published writings does Heidegger mention the holocaust by name and nowhere does he explicitly take issue with it - - not even vis-à-vis his numerous Jewish friends, Jewish colleagues and Jewish students. However, what is striking in this connection is that Heidegger’s silence about the holocaust would appear in a new light when seen in connection with arguably the only existing eyewitness account of his initial reaction to the holocaust as an unprecedented and horrifying ignominy.

This eyewitness account comes to us owing to the French scholar Frédéric de Towarnicki. Visiting Heidegger at his home a few days after the end of the Second World War, Towarnicki showed Heidegger and his wife a photograph circulating in the French cultural center in Freiburg depicting a scene from the Concentration Camp at Dachau. Towarnicki describes what happened next as follows: “Appalled by what they saw both Heidegger and his wife silently looked at the photograph. Heidegger remained silent. Frau Heidegger assured me [Towarnicki] that no one knew anything about the existence of such camps and what was happening there. On her husband’s face there is an unmistakably visible distress. Speaking quietly Heidegger says ‘no word can describe this tragedy. People of Germany had been fallen pray to a band of criminals. One has overstepped an unprecedented threshold by transforming human beings into the material products disposable at the behest of a program. The time of nihilism is also the time of the inhuman’.”⁵

Does this eyewitness account acquit Heidegger of the charge often brought against him that by remaining silent on the holocaust he failed to meet the exigent need of expressing himself on this unprecedented ignominy? How are we to understand and interpret this silence?⁶ As is always the case when it comes to Heidegger nothing is simple and everything needs to be carefully weighed and interpreted. How is one to interpret Heidegger’s silence in the wake of the holocaust? In order to interpret Heidegger’s silence it seems to me that we can go by two hermeneutic guidelines. The first is to be found in a few verses of the final version of a poem Hölderlin wrote under the title “Mnemosyne,” that is, a poem that has been the subject of intensive and penetrating analyses by Heidegger. And the second guideline is a poem that Heidegger wrote and dedicated to Hannah Arendt.

The verses from “Mnemosyne” which are also in play in Heidegger’s poem read:

*Und vieles
Wie auf den Schultern eine
Last von Scheitern ist
Zu behalten. Aber bös sind
Die Pfade.*⁷

Paraphrasing this poem (not translating it), I submit that with these verses Hölderlin ascertains the unavoidability of having to retain and to bear (*behalten*) the load of failures even though the pathways to traverse are strewn with all things evil. Secondly, these verses of Hölderlin’s are in play in the poem Heidegger wrote and dedicated to Hannah Arendt on or around May 4th 1950 . Because the poem dedicated to Arendt casts a new light on Heidegger’s silence on the holocaust, it behooves reading this poem in its entirety.

Under the heading “*Nur Dir*” (Only to you) the poem follows the title “*Gedacht und Zart.*” which Heidegger puts in capital letters. Besides, he gives the poem a special format:

“GEDACHT UND ZART”

“Gedacht” –
Oh hilf mir wagen,
dies zu sagen.

Hör! „Gedacht”
heißt jetzt:
entwacht:
entsetzt
in alle Klüfte jenes Grimms,
dem Klag um Klage
deines Blutes, oh vernimm’s,
entstürzt und mein Zu-Dir
fortan ins wehe! frage!
Wirft, daß Scheit Du mir
mit jedem Kommen bürdest als die Last,
die nah, je näher, tiefer faßt,
am Schwingen jeder Rührung zerrt,
am Zarten der Berührung zehrt.

Gedacht: entwacht...
die Ruh verwehrt,
das Glück versperrt.

“Gedacht *und zart*”
der Brand des Leides
schmiede, scheid’ es,
frey im “und” zur Fahrt
geringt.

Erklungenes klingt.
Es sinkt
ins Nieerklage,
singt ins Ungewagte,
das ereignend, aus dem Kranz geartet,
Liebes, Leides in das Selbe zartet.⁸

In reading and interpreting this poem, I shall take my orientation from the distinctions concerning poetry put forth by the poet Ezra Pound. My drawing upon Pound is motivated by the recognition that his distinctions arise out of his immediate experience of and engagement with poetry. Concerning the abiding trait of poetry what would be more revealing than a poet’s reflections on it? What would qualify better than a poet’s testimony and reflections on the nature and the abiding trait of poetry? Reflecting on poetry, the young Pound differentiates “the

dynamic content” of a poem from “the shell” of it thereby uncovering “what part of poetry” is “indestructible,” what part “could *not be lost* by translation,” and “...what effects were obtainable in *one* language only and were utterly incapable of being translated.”⁹ As is readily observable, here Pound differentiates five elements endemic to poetry: the first one he calls its “dynamic content,” the second one its “shell,” the third one its “indestructible part,” the fourth one the complete “untranslatability of this part” and the fifth element which ascertains and confirms poetry’s belongingness to one language only.

From these five elements, the first one is arguably the most prominent because of its revealing potential and the light it casts on the other four. It is thanks to the first element that poetry’s formal structure, its “shell”(entailing its metrical beat, rhyming, invocation, translatability, etc.) comes to life and claim indestructibility. Moreover, what in Pound’s outlined differentiations occupies the highest place, that is, “the dynamic content” of poetry is what I would call its hermeneutic thrust. Pound characterizes the dynamic content or the hermeneutic thrust of poetry as “indestructible” in so far as regardless of how many times a poem is read or reread and how long a poem remains unread respectively, its dynamic content - - its hermeneutic thrust - - remains constant because it belongs to poetry’s abiding trait (*Wesen*).

By prioritizing the dynamic content of poetry - - its hermeneutic thrust - - Pound willy-nilly enters the arena where poetry and translation come face to face.¹⁰ The foremost indicator of this entry is Pound’s further differentiation when he characterizes the dynamic content of poetry (its hermeneutic thrust) as what cannot be lost through translation. Translation leaves this thrust intact, neither increasing nor decreasing it. This is to recognize and acknowledge the sameness of the hermeneutic thrust of a poem and a poem’s saying power. To hazard an example, I would say that regardless of how many times Hölderlin’s poem “Mnemosyne” is read or reread or how long this poem is left unread, its dynamic content or its hermeneutic thrust remains intact bearing witness to its own indestructibility. Considering the preceding example in light of Pound’s differentiations, I shall emphasize (a) the dynamic content of “Mnemosyne” (its hermeneutic thrust) as indestructible since this thrust is for ever protected from manipulation and misinterpretation. (b) When translated, the dynamic and indestructible content of “Mnemosyne,” its hermeneutic thrust will not be lost because, strictly speaking translating this poem amounts to transferring intact its dynamic content or its hermeneutic thrust either intralingually (from German to German) or interlingually (from German into another language). (c) This element will not be lost simply because the dynamic content, the hermeneutic thrust of this poem remains tied to *one* language only. (“Mnemosyne” is for ever tied to the German language.) (d) The dynamic content or the hermeneutic thrust of this poem will not be affected

by the process of translation in so far as this thrust is not in need of being transferred: this thrust is already “there” in the receiving (the host) language.

With his differentiations and analyses, Pound alerts us to the fact that a poem is translatable in so far as its dynamic content or hermeneutic thrust exists independently from what transpires in the domains of *interlingual* and *intralingual* translations.¹¹ Thus Pound relegates translation of a poem to a domain wherein the opposition between translatability and untranslatability no longer holds as a measure-giving opposition. For him a poem is translatable since already before translation takes place the dynamic and indestructible content of a poem (its hermeneutic thrust) is “there” and “operational” in only *one* language thus is unaffected by the transfer from this language to another language.

After this excursion into Ezra Pound’s reflections and differentiations concerning poetry let me take up the poem Heidegger wrote and dedicated to Hannah Arendt. The question I must ask at this juncture is this: what light do Pound’s reflections and differentiations cast on Heidegger’s poem dedicated to Arendt? Let me tentatively offer this answer. Pound’s reflections and distinctions on the nature and abiding-trait of poetry encourage us to determine and identify the dynamic content, the hermeneutic thrust of Heidegger’s poem. Moreover, subsequent to this determination and identification we realize that we must also inquire into the bearer of the dynamic content or the hermeneutic thrust of this poem. As soon as we acknowledge the need for this inquiry, we make the jolting discovery that Heidegger alone is not exclusively the one who bears and ushers in the hermeneutic thrust of this poem or its indestructible dynamic content: Hannah Arendt too shares with Heidegger this bearing and ushering. Considering this fact, I shall venture to suggest that Heidegger and Arendt, each in a different manner, contributes to the shaping of the dynamic content or the hermeneutic thrust of this poem. The nature and extent of this contribution come to light when we bear in mind that besides being the dedicatee of this poem Hannah Arendt is a Jewess. Her Jewishness is a deciding factor in forming the dynamic content or the hermeneutic thrust of this poem.

This means that the Jewishness of Hannah Arendt is the foremost hermeneutic precondition for grasping what this poem says. It is as a Jewess and a former lover that Heidegger addresses Hannah Arendt in this poem. He included this poem in a letter he wrote to Arendt on or around May 4, 1950.¹² This means that Hannah Arendt’s Jewishness must be given its full due in the attempt to grasp this poem. It is via Arendt’s Jewishness that this poem counts as Heidegger’s only extant “statement” on the holocaust. I maintain this even though the tremendous ignominy called the holocaust is not mentioned by name in the poem. Arendt’s Jewishness remains the point of reference to the holocaust in words such as “*jenes Grimms*,”

“*deines Blutes*,” “*Nieerklagtes*,” “*Leides*”: throughout the poem these words obtain their meaning from that ignominy.

It is paramount that in reading this poem we do not lose sight of the fact that Hannah Arendt, the Jewess and the former lover is the one to whom this poem is dedicated. By fleeing Hitler’s Germany Arendt survived the holocaust thereby with her mere presence qualified to invoke Heidegger’s speaking about the holocaust. The first hermeneutic guideline for understanding this poem as a basic “statement” of Heidegger concerning the holocaust is captured in the title of this poem: “*Gedacht und Zart*” (Thought Through and Delicate). The second hermeneutic guideline is Heidegger’s asking Hannah Arendt for help. This happens in the first verse of this poem “*Oh hilf mir wagen, dies zu sagen*” (Oh help me venture to say this). Hannah Arendt’s mere presence as a Jewess who survived the holocaust qualifies her for helping Heidegger to venture saying what needs to be said about the holocaust. We should not lose sight of the fact that the presence of the dedicatee throughout this poem is the major factor contributing to the saying power that shapes this poem in its entirety.

In order to tentatively sum up the preceding as concerns the dynamic hermeneutic content of this poem, two points should be emphasized. First, it is instructive and illuminating to bear in mind that right after the title that Heidegger gives to this poem, he asks the dedicatee for help, “*Oh hilf mir wagen/ Dies zu sagen*“ (Oh, help me venture to say this.) This request is a clear indication that the Jewishness of the person to whom the poem is dedicated (Hannah Arendt) is also what partakes of the utterances coming to the fore in the poem. The foremost fruit of this partaking and collusion is Heidegger’s refining and defining the first word in the title of the poem, that is, the word “*Gedacht*” (thought through). “Now,” (that is, *Jetzt*, after the holocaust) the word “*Gedacht*” means *entwacht* (awakened), *entsetzt* (displaced into and dismayed) *alle Klüfte jenes Grimms* (into all the cleavages of that fury), *dem Klag um Klage* (into the keenness of keening) *deines Blutes*, (your blood) *oh vernimm’s* (oh perceive and take it in), *entstürzt und mein Zu-Dir* (the sudden forth-bursting and ‘the to you’ that is mine) *fortan ins webe! frage!* (henceforth into woe! question!) *Wirft, deß’ Scheit Du mir* (you throw me the cut) *mit jedem Kommen bürdest als die Last* (with every coming it bears the load) *die nah, je näher, tiefer faßt*, (which near and nearer grips deeper), *am Schwingen jeder Rührung zerrt*, (feeds on the swinging of every touch) *am Zarten der Berührung zehrt* (feeds on the delicateness of every touch.)

The poem proceeds to outline what is it that needs the venture of being further articulated: “*Gedacht: entwacht...*” (thought through: awakened) *die Ruh verwehrt* (calmness hindered), “*das Glück versperrt*” (rejoicing denied), “*Gedacht und zart*” (thought through and delicate), “*der Brand des Leides*” (the blaze of agony) “*schmiede, scheid’ es*” (forge and part it) “*frey im*

‘und’ zur Fahrt geringt’ (free in the “and” to ride reduced) “Erklungenes klingt,” (the resonated resonates) “es sinket ins Nieerklagte,” (it sinks into the never bemoaned) “singt ins Ungewagte” (it sings unto the not dared) “das ereignend, aus dem Kranz geartet” (that enownend is made out of the wreath) “Liebes, Leides in das Selbe zartet” (renders delicate the same belonging to love and pain).

Reading this poem we notice the specific points toward which Heidegger gravitates. The guiding idea of this gravitation is that each point counts as “having been thought through” - - a process primarily and unmistakably following Heidegger’s plea for help. With this pleading the dynamic content of the poem, its hermeneutic thrust receives a sharper contour insofar as this plea results in Heidegger breaking his silence about the holocaust. Imbedded in this breakage are two obvious questions to which I have already alluded: “who wrote this poem?” and “for whom was this poem written?” Only when we take into account the existential background within which Heidegger stood while addressing the holocaust through this poem, only then do we succeed in abrogating the aura of obviousness that surrounds the first question. Owing to Frédéric de Towarnicki we have already observed the Heidegger who wrote this poem. This was the Heidegger who knew of the holocaust *post factum* and suffered from this knowing. Even though Heidegger nowhere in his works explicitly addressed the holocaust, through this poem he broke his silence on this unprecedented ignominy. In this connection the following points should be kept in mind. (a) The holocaust was an extraordinary ignominious event which owing to its extraordinariness was rescued from falling into oblivion and be forgotten. (b) The holocaust is the reminder that man is exposed to the likelihood that he may lose his abiding-trait, his *Wesen*. The perpetrators of the holocaust had already abrogated *das Wesen des Menschen* - - they were without *Wesen* - - *wesenlos*. (c) Even though reminiscent of Giordano Bruno’s death on the stake, the holocaust - - unlike Bruno’s death - - has a super-individual dimension: it goes far beyond the fate of an individual. (d) To express himself on this extraordinary ignominious event Heidegger chose the medium of poetizing. It is no exaggeration to say then that insofar as this poem is spoken to Hannah Arendt who survived the holocaust every word in this poem is “thought through and delicate” (*Gedacht und Zart*) and with every word Heidegger breaks his silence on the holocaust. And yet Paul Celan’s poem alluding to the holocaust surpasses Heidegger’ love-poem to Hannah Arendt because Celan’s poem is not a plea to an individual, specific person. It reads as follows:

Zur Blindheit über-
redete Augen.
Ihre – “ein
Rätsel ist Rein-
entsprungenes” --, ihre

Erinnerung an
schwimmende Hölderlintürme, möwen-
umschwirrt.

Besuche ertrunkener Schreiner bei
diesen
tauchenden Worten:

Käme,
käme ein Mensch,
käme ein Mensch zur Welt, heute, mit
dem Lichtbart der
Patriarchen: er dürfte,
spräch er von dieser
Zeit, er
dürfte
nur lallen und lallen,
immer-, immer-
zuzu.

Even though translation of this poem cannot be a substitute of the original German, the translation into English is a gateway to grasping what Celan says. It reads as follows:

“Eyes persuaded-
to blindness.
Their – „a
riddle, what is pure-
ly arisen“ --, their
memory of
floating Hölderlintowers, gull-
enswirled.

Visits of drowned joiners to
these
plunging words:

Came, if there
came a man,
came a man to the world, today, with
the patriarchs’
light-beard: he could,
if he spoke of this
time, he
could
only babble and babble,
ever- ever-
moremore.”¹³

This poem should be read together with Celan's "Todesfuge," or "Deathfuge":

Schwarze Milch der Frühe wir trinken sie abends
wir trinken sie mittags und morgens wir trinken sie nachts
wir trinken und trinken
wir schaufeln ein Grab in den Lüften da liegt man nicht eng
Ein Mann wohnt im Haus der spielt mit den Schlangen der schreibt
Der schreibt wenn es dunkelt nach Deutschland dein goldenes Haar
Margarete
Er schreibt es und tritt vor das Haus und es blitzen die Sterne er pfeift
Seine Rüden herbei
Er pfeift seine Juden hervor lässt schaufeln ein Grab in der Erde
er befiehlt uns spielt auf nun zum Tanz

Schwarze Milch der Frühe wir trinken dich nachts
wir trinken dich morgens und mittags wir trinken dich abends
wir trinken und trinken
Ein Mann wohnt im Haus der spielt mit den Schlangen der schreibt
der schreibt wenn es dunkelt nach Deutschland dein goldenes Haar
Margarete
Dein aschenes Haar Sulamith wir schaufeln ein Grab in den Lüften
da liegt man nicht eng

(e) The reunion with the former lover, Hannah Arendt, was not the returning of the same. Neither Heidegger who wrote the poem nor Arendt to whom the poem is dedicated is the same. The holocaust changed both of them. However, having been written *without the knowledge* of the holocaust, *Die Schwarze Hefte (The Black Notebook)*, as we shall see, cast a new light - - however disturbing - - on both Heidegger's position on anti-Semitism as well as on the holocaust.

Against the background I sketched with the preceding observations, I shall devote Part One of this study to exploring Nietzsche's views on Judaism and the Jewish question. Accordingly, chapter one will outline the outcome of that exploration. However, noteworthy is the fact that this outcome is not embedded in a system. Underlying both chapters and supporting them is the hermeneutic insight that there is no system in Nietzsche philosophy entailing a unified theory concerning the Jewish question and anti-Semitism. It is well to bear in mind that Nietzsche is the first philosopher in the European tradition of thought to have declared the idea of and the striving for a system as passé. With his work, Nietzsche provides an example of how philosophical thinking can be coherent without succumbing to the lures of system and system-building. But this does not mean Nietzsche's thought lacks systematic coherence. This is manifest, among other places, in his "systematic" and coherent treatment of the Jewish question and anti-Semitism.

ENDNOTES

¹ Michael, Robert. *Holy Hatred: Christianity, Anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 112.

² See John Cornwell, *Hitler's Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII* (Viking, 1999).

³ See Curt Paul Janz, *Friedrich Nietzsche: Biographie*, (Carl Hanser Verlag, München: 1993), volume II, p. 336. ff.

⁴ *Hannah Arendt-Martin Heidegger Briefe 1925-1975*, ed. Ursula Ludz (Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann: 1998) p. 69.

⁵ Frédéric de Towarnicki, *À La rencontre de Heidegger: souvenirs d'un messager de la Forêt-Noire*, (Paris, Gallimard: 1993) p. 73.

⁶ Regarding Heidegger's silence, see George Kovacs, "On Heidegger's Silence," *Heidegger Studies*, 5 (1989): 135-151

⁷ *Hölderlin Werke und Briefe*, volume I eds Friedrich Beißner and Jochen Schmidt, (Insel Verlag, Frankfurt am Main: 1969) p.201.

⁸ *Hannah Arendt-Martin Heidegger Briefe 1925-1975*, ed. Ursula Ludz (Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann: 1998) pp. 101-102.

⁹ A. David Moody, *Ezra Pound: Poet, a Portrait of the Man and his Work*, volume I, *The Young Genius, 1885-1920*, (Oxford University Press, New York: 2009) p. 16.

¹⁰ For more on this domain, see Parvis Emad, *Translation and Interpretation: Learning from Beiträge*, ed. Frank Schalow, Zeta Books (Bucharest: 2012) pp. 114-116, 140-188.

¹¹ For a brief account of *inter-* and *intra*lingual translations, see pp. 15-16 of the first volume of this study. For a more detailed account of these two issues, see Parvis Emad, *Translation and Interpretation: Learning from Beiträge*, ed. Frank Schalow, Zeta Books (Bucharest, 2012) pp. 60-86.

¹² I say on or around May 4, 1950 because the edited volume of the correspondence of Heidegger and Arendt does not make clear whether Heidegger sent this poem as a letter or separately. The letter numbered 60 is dated May 4, 1950 whereas the letter numbered 61 has no addressee and no greetings. See *Hannah Arendt-Martin Heidegger Briefe 1925-1975*, ed. Ursula Ludz (Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann: 1998) pp. 98-102.

¹³ John Felstiner, *Selected Poems and Prose of Paul Celan*, (W. W. Norton, New York: 2001), p.158-159.